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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the international relief 
assistance to Ethiopia during the 1984-86 famine.
It begins by examining the country's glorious past 
vis-a-vis its present international status. In Part One, 
the underlying causes of the famine are discussed to 
provide a background to the subsequent analysis of the 
international relief effort. Also discussed, is the role 
of the international media in alerting public opinion and 
successfully transforming the famine into an issue of 
international concern.
In Part Two, the responses of the various actors 
are analysed: in particular the bilateral response of 
Ethiopia's political allies and her opponents; of the 
Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
role of the United Nations in coordinating the 
international relief effort at the multilateral level.
Part Three (Chapter Eight), tests the theoretical 
assumptions outlined at the beginning of the thesis. With 
regard to the first, namely the relative importance of 
opponents and allies, the study concludes Ethiopia's 
political opponents were more responsive to her appeal 
for emergency relief than her allies. With regard to the 
second, namely the role of the NGOs the conclusion is 
that these organizations played the most important role 
in shaping the international response to the emergency. 
Chapter Nine summarizes our general conclusions.
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CHAPTER ONE
General Introduction
Studies of the 1984 famine in Ethiopia can, 
generally speaking, be grouped into two categories. On 
one hand, there are those that are concerned with 
analysing the underlying causes of the famine; on the 
other, there are are those that concentrate analysis on 
the various international responses to the disaster.
Examples of studies in the first group are the 
works of Timberlakel and Hancock,2 while those in the 
second group include the writings of Peter Gill,3 
Jansson,4 Dawit5 and Clarke.6
Timberlake 's work focuses on the relationship 
between the causes of famine and environmental 
degradation. Graham Hancock's book is a treatment of the 
causes and a critique of the international response of 
donors.
Peter Gill's book is about the failure of aid 
donors to bring quick respite to the famine victims.
Kurt Jansson's book offers a personal insight into 
the role of the UN by a man who was head of its relief 
effort. Dawit's work is an account of the personal 
experiences of one of the principal actors in Ethiopia's 
internal politics and the former head of the country's 
Relief and Rehabilitation Organization- the Government 
body concerned with the coordination of donors' relief
1
inside Ethiopia. Finally, Clarke's book examines the 
Government's resettlement programme as its own form of 
response to the famine.
By contrast none of these studies, has examined the 
famine in the framework of superpower rivalry in 
Ethiopia. In this study we have chosen to focus on this 
aspect because of its pertinence to Ethiopia at the time 
of the crisis. It offers an interesting angle from which 
we can study the international response of donors, the 
period being critical in the country's history. This 
thesis argues that contrary to the general assumption, 
humanitarian relief is not unfettered by political 
motives.
The conclusions reached in our analysis are that 
the apparent ideological fraternity of Ethiopia's allies 
was not matched by them in terms of the aid expected by 
Ethiopia to cope with the emergency; and that as a result 
the involvement of Western donor states (brought about 
through Western non-governmental organizations and 
public opinion) was necessary for the emergency relief 
operations to succeed.
In this Introductory Chapter we propose to discuss 
the country's history in brief, and relate that to the 
origins of the rivalry of the superpowers in Ethiopia 
before examining their response in the subsequent 
chapters.
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1. Ethiopia; The Land and its People 
Ethiopia is in many respects a fascinating country, 
whether examined in the context of her ancient past or of 
the more recent Marxist-Leninist period. feyiAcl notes;
Ethiopia is, in may ways the odd man 
out of Africa. Apart from a few years 
after the Italian invasion in 1935, it 
was never a European colony; it had 
recorded contacts with the outside 
world going back several centuries; 
almost half the population are Coptic 
Christians; its social structure has 
changed little. This unusual 
background gave Ethiopia a fascination 
to both Europeans and Africans, not to 
mention the West Indian Rastafarians.7
The Ethiopians are a proud people with ancient 
history and a deep sense of national identity. Ethiopia is 
located on the Horn of Africa, at the meeting point 
between Africa and Asia. On the North-East the country is 
bounded by the Red Sea, on the East by Djibouti and 
Somalia, on the South by Kenya and on the West by Sudan. 
Ethiopia has a land area of 1,221,900 kms, extending 
l,577kms from North to South, and l,639kms from East to 
West. Although most of the country is high plateau (around 
7,000 feet) with over 60 percent of the total land area 
arable, only 11 percent is cultivated.8
Ethiopia's strategic location, however, has thrust 
her "into the international arena as a potential crisis 
zone", thus making her of "significance as regards the 
world-wide defence strategy of both superpowers".9
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2. Ethiopia in Historical Perspectives:
The Glorious Past vis-a-vis the Inglorious Present 
Ethiopia's self image and more generally the 
country's reputation in the international community has 
been seriously affected by the consequences of the famine. 
Until recently, Ethiopia's image, unique among African 
states, was both positive and innovatory, and generally 
viewed favourably within the international community.
According to Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Ethiopia's 
current image is one of a country reduced to destitution, 
begging, moral degradation, and humiliation.10 It is the 
image of a country that relies on foreign food gifts for 
its survival.
Until the intervention of the military in the mid 
1970s, Ethiopia had had for centuries, a continuous 
political order. The country was formerly ruled by a 
monarchy, with power heavily concentrated in the person of 
the monarch. After the revolution in 1974, Ethiopia 
switched to a Marxist-Leninist political order.11
(a). The Glorious Past
Princes shall come out of Egypt,
Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her 
hands to God.12
Ethiopia is unique in many respects among modern 
African states. The name "Ethiopia", meaning "the country 
of the people with burned faces", was given to her by the 
Greeks.13 Her Arab neighbours referred to her as
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Abyssinia.14 Ethiopia is the only country south of the 
Sahara mentioned in both the Bible and the Holy Qur'anlS 
, and is among the most ancient states, whose Aksum empire 
flourished during classical times.16 R.A. Rogers, writing 
about the country in 1936, spoke of her with great 
admiration. He said:
Ethiopia, conquering Lion of the Tribe 
of Judah, saw the rise and fall of the 
Pharaohs. She saw the Empires of 
Cambyses, Darius, Cyrus and Alexander 
the Great melt into nothingness. She 
saw the glory that was Greece and the 
grandeur that was Rome become heaps of 
stone. This most ancient of nations 
saw the rising and the setting of the 
Ceasars of the West and the East. She 
saw the birth of Islam, witnessed its 
sweep across the entire Old World and
aided in its check. She saw the rise
and decline of the Holy Roman Empire 
and the discovery of the New 
World 17
Until the deposition of the Emperor in 1974, the 
Ethiopian monarchy was one of the most ancient.18 The 
Emperor assumed the title "King of Kings, the Lion of 
Judah...", tracing his ancestry back to about 1000 BC, to 
King Solomon of Judah.19
According to popular belief, particularly among 
Ethiopians, their origins date from the union of Queen 
Sheba and King Solomon, from which the dynasty of the
Ethiopian royal family was conceived. Thus, the
Ethiopians claimed that they were a chosen people of God 
and the descendants of a great and divine race:
An Ethiopian legend maintained in the 
classic chronicle of the kings,
Kebra Nagast (Glory of the Kings),
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contends that Menelik 1 and his 
successors are descendants of holy 
men, since Solomon was one of a series 
through whose bodies had passed a 
"pear" first placed by God in Adam and 
intended finally, having entered the 
body of Hannah, to be the essence of 
her daughter, the virgin Mary. Christ 
being the son of God and Menelik a 
Kinsman of Christ, the kings of 
Ethiopia descendants of Menelik are of 
a divine line.20
Although the source of this myth is buried in 
history, it is a claim highly valued by Ethiopians and by 
diaspora Africans. This aside, Ethiopians have 
distinguished themselves in many ways. First they have 
evolved a system of writing found nowhere else21 , so 
comparing with the ancient Greeks, Romans, Chinese,
Indians and the Egyptians with whom they share the waters 
of the Nile. The possession of a literary tradition 
provides evidence of a great past. As has been argued by 
Professor Mazrui, one of the reasons for black Africa's 
backwardness may have to do with the absence of a literary 
culture that preserves the past in the written form 
instead of the oral tradition.22
Ethiopia has also evolved its own calendar to which 
it still adheres. The calendar bears a fixed relationship 
to the Gregorian calendar, although it has 13 months 
instead of twelve, with 12 months of thirty days each and 
the thirteenth of five days (six days in a leap year).23 
Furthermore, the early introduction of Christianity 
to Ethiopia in the fourth century sets a record of 
sovereign existence on the continent. It is noted:
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The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the 
oldest established church in 
Christendom, dating back over 1,500 
years had survived, indeed thrived, 
despite centuries of isolation fron 
(sic) the rest of the Christian world. 
During the middle ages, this 
isolation helped fuel rumours in the 
West of Prester John, a mythical 
Christian priest-king said to live 
somewhere in the East, who, westerners 
believed, would one day march in his 
armies to defend western Christendom 
against the Muslim hordes. From the 
13th century, it was thought that 
Prester John must be the ruler of 
Ethiopia.24
As in its ancient past, modern Ethiopia has 
distinguished herself during the period of European 
colonial adventures in Africa. At the battle of Adowa in 
1896, Ethiopia soundly defeated the Italians, thus becoming 
the first and only black African nation to defeat^European 
colonial power and therefore escape formal colonialism. An 
Ethiopian scholar, Professor Negussay Ayele, speaks of 
this:
Ethiopia distinguished herself as the 
only African nation to defeat an 
imperial power and contain the forward 
progress of the colonial powers on 
the Horn-Britain, France and Italy- by 
signing boundary treaties, although by 
those same treaties her own expansion 
towards the sea was being checked.25
And, as Professor Schwab also noted:
Ethiopia is the only state south of 
the Sahara, that utilised classical 
techniques of imperialism and 
expansion through military conquests 
to determine its geographical 
boundaries. It is therefore 
distinctive within Africa where all 
other states south of the Sahara have
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had their geographical limits 
established by European powers.2 6
Having escaped Italian occupation and rule (except 
between 193 6-1941) Ethiopia became a founder member of the 
defunct League of Nations at a time when the rest of black 
Africa and Asian countries were still under colonial rule. 
This paved the way for the country to become also a 
founder member of the United Nations in 1945. By 1963, 
when the rest of Africa had emerged from colonial rule to 
independence, Ethiopia successfully wooed them to establish 
the headquarters of the continental "Organisation of 
African Unity" in its capital, Addis Ababa.27
Furthermore, recent archaeological findings traced 
the oldest human fossils yet discovered, -to Ethiopia, 
which have provided suggestion that Ethiopia may well be 
the first home of Man.28 The findings shattered earlier 
contending theories about the "historic"origin of man:
Three major findings have been in the 
running for mainstream man: 
Australopithecus, first found by 
Raymond Dart in South Africa, Homo 
Habilis or handy man, found by Dr. 
Louis Leakey's "1470" skull which with 
a brain size twice as large as 
Australopithecus yet one Million years
older,..... threw previously accepted
theories into disarray. The common 
ancestor to all may well be found in 
Ethiopia.29
Today, however, it is Ethiopia's more recent losing 
battle against famine and starvation rather than its 
ancient culture and achievements, that colours its image 
in the international community.
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(b) . The Inglorious Present
Consequent upon the 1984 famine, Mengistu expressed 
his dissatisfaction with the country's international 
image.3 0As Clapham rightly observed:
Famine is of course the starkest 
indicator of failure for a regime 
which itself came to power in the 
midst of famine, and set agricultural 
transformation as the first of its 
development priorities.31
Ethiopia is bedevilled by famine, drought, wars and
grinding poverty. Only six percent of the country's
population has access to clean water; the country has a
high infant mortality rate and average life expectancy of
less than 4 0 years. Per capita income is $114 per annum,
while the receipt of development aid, at $6 per capita
puts her at the bottom of the league even among African
states, whose average is $20 per capita.32 The country is
now classified by the United Nations as one of the 29 least
developed countries (LLDCJ.33 Yet Ethiopia is forced to
spend more per capita on military hardware than any other
country south of the Sahara.34
What is startling, however, is that under normal
circumstances Ethiopia can produce enough food to feed its
population. And although Ethiopia is currently at the
bottom of the international league of states in many
respects, the country is famous for her leading position in
the world coffee market (the word "coffee" originated from
Kaffa, the coffee producing area of the country).35
Ethiopia has also contributed to world grain production.
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As observed by_Mackenzie in the wake of the 1984-1986 
famine:
Grain is pouring into Ethiopia as the 
rich nations belatedly respond to the 
famine that has been killing people 
there for two years. There is a deep 
irony to this: most of the grain 
evolved in Ethiopia. Many of the high 
yielding strains of wheat and barley 
depend on genes which came originally 
from wild grasses of the Ethiopian 
highlands. The world depends on them 
for food.36
Thus, Ethiopia is a country with both a glorious past 
and an unenviable present low standing, manifested in her 
reliance on others for the food the country needs to 
survive during emergencies. It is in this context that we 
study the international politics behind the relief that was 
mounted in 1984-86. First, we distinguish the country*s two 
phases of foreign outlooks.
3. Ethiopia's World Outlook up to the mid 1970s
Throughout his reign, from October 1928 until his 
deposition in September 1974, the late Emperor Haile- 
Salassie personally dominated Ethiopia's foreign policy.
As will become clear in the thesis (see Chapter Five), 
during this time Ethiopia's foreign relations were Western 
oriented.
Haile-Selassie's relations with the West dated from 
his service as regent to the crown. In the wake of the 
Italian occupation he lived in exile in Britain, whence 
he "continued to function as a chief of state".37 When
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the occupation ended he was brought back to Ethiopia in 
1941 with the assistance of Britain. Subsequently he 
cultivated good relations with the West, particularly with 
the United States and Britain.
In 1945 the Emperor adopted the American currency 
name "dollar" for the name of his country's currency38 and 
in 1953 permitted the United States to build the Kagnew 
communication satellite centre at Asmara. In return, the 
US provided him with massive financial and military 
assistance. The warm relationship with the West, did not 
preclude him from establishing relations with both the 
Soviet Union or with China. He undertook a trip in 1959 to 
the Soviet Union and in 1971 to China. But on the whole 
Ethiopia's main allies were the Western countries,39 until 
the revolution of 1974 when the country's outlook entered 
a different phase.
4. Ethiopia's Outlook since the mid 1970s
The transition from feudal state to socialist 
order was the beginning of a new chapter in Ethiopia's 
history. From the beginning, however, the transition was 
marked by turbulent changes and internal strife. Schwab 
observed:
To move from feudalism to state 
socialism, without going through the
intervening stages........ demands an
extraordinary upheaval and this is 
precisely what has taken place in 
Ethiopia.40
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The competition for leadership was fiercely fought 
between three rival groups all claiming some form of 
marxist ideological orientation. The period saw initially 
the so-called white Terror Campaign, waged between the 
Trotskyite student dominated Ethiopia People's 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the more classically marxist 
All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Me'ison), led by 
intellectuals. The rivalry between the two was only brought 
to an end by the appearance of the "Red Terror", under the 
leadership of the Derg, which at first directed its 
activities principally against the Trotskyites and then 
later against Me'ison, before emerging as the 
unchallenged architect of Ethiopia's internal and external 
political destiny.41
Having dethroned the Emperor, the new leadership also 
changed Ethiopia's world outlook.In place of the old order 
a new political and economic system based on the Soviet 
model was created, with the Soviet Union and Cuba emerging 
as the country's main military and political allies and 
major sources of foreign aid.42 In line with this the land 
and the economy, including foreign companies, industries, 
banks, financial institutions and investment houses were 
nationalized.43 It is in this context that we will study 
the international famine relief operations mounted in 
Ethiopia from 1984-86.
5. Scope of the Thesis
This thesis dwells exclusively on the 1984-86 famine
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relief operations in Ethiopia. Its focus is the 
international response of donors. It examines, in turn, 
the response of the media; the bilateral assistance 
provided by Eastern and Western countries; the response of 
Western non-governmental organizations, and the role of 
the United Nations.
In the section that treats Western bilateral donors, 
the US, UK and Canada are selected for detailed study as 
representatives of Ethiopia1 political "opponents" for 
three reasons. First, both the US and UK are leading 
members of the Western alliance and were at one time 
Ethiopia's main allies, while Canada seems an appropriate 
choice as a representative of the smaller Western 
countries with a reputation of good relations with Third 
World countries. Second, both the US and UK have been 
central in the relief operations. Third, in all these 
three countries English is use as a primary medium of 
communication.
In the section pertaining to the media, only 
television is selected, the main reason being the central 
role played by the television broadcast in October 1984: it 
is this coverage that is of immediate relevance for our 
purpose.
6. Methodology And Hypothesis
Two approaches have been employed in this study for 
data collection, interpretation and analysis. The first is 
the extensive interviewing of donor representatives:
13
bilaterals, the UN, NGOs, RRC officials. Such data has also 
been collected from television documentaries about the 
famine. The other consists in library research of 
documented works: books, journals, magazines and 
newspapers.
The basic assumption of the thesis is that contrary 
to our expectation it is not Ethiopia's political allies 
that have responded more to her appeals for humanitarian 
assistance but rather her political opponents. However, the 
effective response of the latter was made possible only 
through the critical role played by the non-governmental 
organizations.
Part One begins by discussing Ethiopia in historical 
context and examining the background causes of the famine 
as well as the role of the media. Part Two examines the 
international response of donors. Part Three consists of 
Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Eight discusses the 
relationship between humanitarian aid and international 
politics. Chapter Nine summarizes our general conclusions.
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PART ONE 
CONTEXT OF THE 1984-86 FAMINE
CHAPTER TWO
The Causes of Famine
1. Introduction
It is necessary to begin this 
chapter by examining the background causes of the 
famine. In doing so it is relevant to discuss the role 
played by both the immediate and the remote factors 
involved in contributing towards the development of the 
emergency. This will help us appreciate both the intensity 
and magnitude of the crisis as it emerged. The importance 
of discussing the background becomes relevant because of 
its implications for the international assistance 
required by and provided to Ethiopia.
2. History of Famine in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has known famines throughout its history. 
According to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
(RRC), (the Government's agency responsible for dealing 
with famine and famine relief related matters), drought in 
Ethiopia dates as far back as to the beginning of the 
country's history.1 Degefu, lists 28 different incidents of 
drought and famine dating from pre-biblical times (253- 
243BC) to 1982.2 In this century alone there has been 
seven major famines in Ethiopia: 1916-1920: 1927-1928: 
1934-1935: 1947-1958: 1964-1965: 1971-1974 and 1984-1985.3 
Of those the 1984 famine was the most severe.4
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3. The Role of Geo-phvsical Factors
There exists a strong relationship between the 
country's topographical features and the frequent 
occurrence of famines. As a result of the favourable 
climate of the northern highlands, 90% of the country's 
population is settled there, although the area accounts 
for only 49% of the country's land surface area.
Thus the remaining 10% of the population inhabit the 
lowland areas, which constitute 51% of the country's land 
mass, and therefore the greater part of it.5
As a result, the highlands, are densely populated
while the lowlands are conversely sparsely populated. One
immediate by-product of this is that the highlands are over
cultivated. This in turn accelerates the problem of soil
erosion in the area and further complicate issues. As one
observer noted:
[the] Very high densities of people 
and of livestock especially in the 
north have compounded the difficulties 
and contributed to the overworking and 
destruction of the soil. The country 
now loses an estimated 1.6 billion 
tonnes of top soil annually through 
wind and water erosion, principally 
from the highland areas.6
Thus whatever rain is received in these areas is 
emptied in the lowlands areas. The impact of soil erosion 
alone, is estimated to affect the food production capacity 
of more than seventy-five percent of the high land 
population.7
Furthermore the topography of the country would 
inhibit the application of modern techniques of farming
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such as irrigation even if the resources to do so were 
available. Ethiopia is:
Characterised by very high plateaus 
with precipitious edges, towering 
mounting peaks, deep gorges and 
valleys, mighty river systems, lakes, 
great grasslands, warm and arid 
lowlands. The low land areas in the 
east, south, south-east and west are 
characterised by high temperatures, 
excessive evaporation, scanty rainfall 
and limited vegetation.8
(a) Deforestation
Added to the problems of soil erosion is that of the 
continual cutting of the country's forest to meet the fuel 
demands of the rising population. At the turn of this 
century much of Ethiopia was heavily forested. But the 
cutting of trees for fuel and for building residential 
houses has left much of the country deforested.As Vestal, 
points out:
most peasants have no chemical 
fertilisers and the animal dung that 
they once used to enrich the soil 
is now being burned for fuel. This 
happened because of continuing 
deforestation. At the turn of the 
century, 40 per cent of Ethiopia was 
covered by forest. Twenty years ago, 
the figure was down to 16 per cent, 
while today only 3.1 per cent of 
forest land remains.9
(b) Overgrazing
The rapid growth and increase in the number of 
cattle in the country leads to the overgrazing of the land 
and the removal of its vegetation cover. Ethiopia has the
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highest head count of cattle in Africa.10
4. The Population Factor
Like most developing countries Ethiopia's population 
is on the rise. Ethiopia's estimated population of forty 
six million people makes her the second largest country 
south of the Sahara. The population is growing at the rate 
of 2.9 per cent per annum.11 And according to a World
Bank report it means that "one million" persons are added 
to the population every twelve calendar months.12 More 
people certainly means more mouths to feed. And in the case 
of Ethiopia this indeed means quite a lot to feed. In 194 6 
the country's population was sixa million, but by 1986 it 
has risen to forty six million.
The relationship of population to famine is obvious 
in a country where 85% of the population is engaged in 
agriculture and depend on the local land for their food 
supply.
5. Poor Technology
The farming methods in Ethiopia, and indeed in the 
rest of the continent, are still very traditional. They 
have not improved since ancient times. Ploughing, weeding 
and threshing are still done by hand, with weak oxen and 
simple tools.13 The lack of technological advancement has 
affected the performance of the agricultural sector. As a 
result of the poor management of the land, food production
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in the country declined by about 5% during the six years 
that preceded the famine.14 In fact, Ethiopia's food 
production, per capita has been on a steady decline since 
the end of the Second World War.15
6. Political Factors
(a). Governmental Policies
The Government's agricultural policies have 
contributed in three ways to the low level of agricultural 
productivity.
In the first place, the Government agricultural 
budget favours the state farm sectors rather than the 
peasant producers. Between 70 and 90 percent of the 
Government's investment in agriculture go to the state 
farms and cooperatives which produce only 10 percent of the 
country's food needs.16 Giorghis noted the impact of the 
government collective farms:
Even though the number of 
collectivised farms is small, their 
effect on nation-wide production has 
been catastrophic. These farms are 
given more fertiliser per hectare than 
peasant farms; they are given more 
land per household, they are given 
tractors and more draft animals than 
the rest of the peasants. But for all 
the attention they get, productivity 
is extremely low and almost no surplus 
is produced for market.17
The state cooperatives also, have low output, as a result
of the low morale of workers. As one critic sadly
observed:
Even in the best time Ethiopian 
farms operated on the brink of
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agricultural disaster but some how the 
delicate balance needed to farm the 
same land continually for thousands 
of years was maintained. This 
changed when state control of the 
economy was added to the peasants 
plight. The result has been a famine 
affecting 7.9 million people.18
Secondly, the policy of fixing prices demotivates 
farmers from producing more than their immediate 
requirements for consumption since they are not allowed to 
trade their surplus.19Finally, the policy of redistributing 
the land prevents them from making long term investment 
in the farms. All these factors, sapped their motivation to 
make up for the shortfall of food in deficit areas.2 0
(b). Wars and Famine.
In his description of war, Thomas Hobbes wrote:
so the nature of war, consisteth 
not in actual fighting; but in the 
known disposition thereto, during 
all the time there is no assurance
to the contrary.......In such
condition there is no place for
industry....... no letters and
.......... the life of man is
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish 
and short.
Indeed in 1984-1986, the worst areas affected by 
famine in Africa were countries that had one form of 
unrest or another: Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Chad and 
Angola.
In Ethiopia, fighting has been endemic in Eritrea, 
Tigray, parts of Wollo, and in the Oromo land. In addition, 
Ethiopia's relations with her neighbours, particularly
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Somalia and Sudan, are also frequently conflictual.
(i) Eritrea
The northern province has had no peace for three 
decades now.
To understand the nature of the conflict it is 
necessary to sketch its historical origins. Eritrea was 
created as an Italian colony from 1890. It remained under 
Italy's colonial rule until 1941. When the Italians were 
defeated in the Second World War, Britain took over the 
administration of the territory from 1941 until 1952. From 
then, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia under the UN 
auspices. However in 1962 the late Emperor dissolved the 
Eritrean Parliament, thereby abrogating the arrangement 
under which Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia. Instead, the 
status of Eritrea was reduced to one of Ethiopia's fourteen 
provinces. Eritrea has since then been fighting for its 
independence.
In 1962 the first Eritrean Liberation movement 
emerged-the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The 
organization embarked on guerrilla warfare against the 
central Government with devastating consequences for both 
life and property. In 1970, a breakaway group emerged 
from the ELF to form a separate organization (as a result 
of disagreement within the leadership, as to who should 
lead it)-the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF).21 
However an internal war ensued between the two liberation 
movements from 1972-1974 and further deepened the crises
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that the province had to cope with. By 1975 they reached a
settlement and agreed to take on the central Government
forces instead of fighting amongst themselves.
The beleaguSl situation in the province has been 
summed up:
Eritrea............butchered by
Haile-Selassie's forces in the late 
1950*3, bombed by the American-backed 
regime in the 1960's, napalmed and 
nerve gassed by Russian-backed junta 
in the 1970's and how find themselves
up against a Russian equipped,
trained and led Ethiopian Army.22
Eritrean raids on Asmara airport in 1986 and the oil 
depot in Massawa underlined the continuing destruction 
caused by the lack of peace and failure to reach a 
political settlement.23
Eritrea is of strategic, military and security 
importance to Ethiopia. Economically, it provides the 
country with its main access to the sea, and 
politically, Eritrea's secession may spell the end of 
Ethiopia as a political entity.
However the continuation of the conflict has worsened 
the agrarian crisis through the damage inflicted on the 
people and the rural economy.
(ii) Tigray
The conflict between Tigray and the central 
Government is a post revolution phenomenon. Unlike in 
Eritrea, the basis of dispute here is not the demand for 
independence or secession. At first the province's
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objective was secession, but this was subsequently modified 
to the goal of "self determination" for the people of 
Tigray within the context of a united Ethiopia.24
As a result, in 1975 the first liberation movement, 
the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed 
(with the help of the EPLF). Besides the TPLF, The Tigray 
Liberation Movement (TLM) and the Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) are also waging a struggle 
against the Government.25
The resort to military means to effect change has 
inadvertedly affected the pattern of rural life in the 
province, with devastating impact on food production. The 
continuation of the conflict between the liberation 
movements and the Government has contributed to the 
development of famine in the province. The failure to agree 
a cease-fire even at the peak of the 1984 famine, clearly 
underlines the severity with which the conflict rages on:
there were three fierce clashes in the 
province of Wollo, as guerrillas from 
the TPLF attacked the garrison towns 
of Rabit and Godye on the main road 
north out of the Ethiopian Capital.26
The civil wars had disruptive effects on food production 
and supply throughout the northern region.
(iii) The Oromo
The largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromos, are 
discontented too. Although they have not been as successful 
militarily or as effective as the Eritreans and the
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Tigreans in their campaigns, the existence of their cause 
provides an additional set of problems for the Government 
in Addis Ababa. In the 1960s, the Oromo people founded The 
Oromo Liberation Front [OLF], an organization committed to 
the achievement of self-determination for all the Oromo 
people, on the basis of their common culture and language. 
The OLF subsequently mounted armed operations in Bale, 
Sidamo and Hererghe.
In 1976 The Somali Government assisted in the 
founding of another liberation group among the Oromos, the 
Somali and Abo Liberation Front (SALF) aimed at tapping 
Oromo discontent.2 7
(iv). Conditions Along the Border with Sudan 
Conditions along their common border, (stretching
1,200 miles along the north-western part of Ethiopia and 
the eastern part of Sudan) are for the most part 
strained.28 Although actual war has never broken out 
between the two states, there were occasions when troops 
were mobilised along both sides of the border. However 
each side provides direct military and material support to 
secessionist group(s) operating against the other side. For 
Sudan this means providing support to the EPLF and the 
TPLF. For Ethiopia it means providing support to the 
Sudanese Peoples Liberation Front (SPLA).
(v). The War with Somalia
The most serious threat yet posed to Ethiopia comes
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from Somalia's challenge to the Ogaden, Ethiopia's south 
eastern province.29 The first outbreak of armed conflict 
between them occurred in 1964 at the border village of 
Tug-Wajale.30 In 1969 Ethiopian troops and Somali civilians 
clashed again at Ramaleh.
However the nine month Ogaden war from July 1977 to 
March 1978 nearly brought Ethiopia to external occupation 
but for the massive military assistance it received from 
the Soviet Union and Cuba. By the end of the war, Ethiopia 
had incurred half a billion dollars in costs and the 
displacement of two million people.31 And no sooner had the 
two sides stopped, than they began another encounter in 
1980.32
7. Costs of The wars
The various conflicts confronting Ethiopia from both 
within and without have been costly to her in many 
respects. In the first place they have denied her peace and 
the prospects of peaceful development.
Secondly they have intensified the process of famine 
especially in the northern provinces through their 
constraints on food production and the enormous destruction 
of lives and property they have caused.33
Thirdly the lack of political settlement in all these 
conflicts means that the country continues to be in 
perpetual state of turmoil. Thus in the absence of peace 
there could be no meaningful development in agriculture or 
industry because resources are continually diverted to
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defence. Already the government's defence and military 
spending is the highest, per capita, in Black Africa.34 It 
is noted:
Some forty-six per cent of Ethiopia's 
budget goes on defence and internal 
security and that does not include 
credit payments on armaments bought 
from the Soviet Union. Yet the regime 
militarisation-Ethiopia has an army of 
300,000 troops and over 100 combat 
aircraft-has failed to halt the 
spread of armed opposition to its 
rule. It now confronts not only the 
Eritrean fighting for independence, 
but also powerful guerrilla movements 
in Tigray and northern Wollo which are 
demanding a democratic Ethiopian 
state.35
It is apparent from the foregoing that all these 
factors have made the prospects of famine more conducive 
in Ethiopia. However, the immediate trigger is, as it has 
always been the lack of rain.
8. The Nature of the Current Crisis
There are three seasons in Ethiopia. From early 
September to mid March the country receives no rainfall at 
all. Between March and June, it receives the little rains, 
known as the (Belg). From mid-June to early September, it 
experiences its main rainfall (the Meher).36The Meher 
season accounts for about 85-95% of the national food 
production, while the Belg rains account for the remaining
However because of the country's geographical 
location and proximity to the Equator, its rainfall is not 
evenly distributed.37 For instance Addis Ababa, receives
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on the average 1250 millimetres annually, while Asmara 
receives not more than 450 millimetres. The eastern 
highlands on the other hand because of their extreme 
dryness are generally arid and barren.38Thus severe lack of 
rain can spell disastrous consequences for the country, and 
could lead to drought and even famine.
(a) The Lack of Rains and the On Set of Famine
The immediate cause of the 1984 famine was the lack 
of rain in most parts of the country for three consecutive 
crop seasons. From 1982 up to 1984 all the fourteen 
regions experienced severe shortage of rainfall; the Belg 
rains of 1982/83, the Meher rains of 1983 and the Belg 
rains of 1984 had all failed.39
The failure of the 1983 Meher rains,40 led to low 
precipitation (about half normal) right across the 
country and with no rains at all in many parts.
The drought led to crop failures in most parts of the 
country. The 1983 failure led to a failure of 80% of crop 
production in Sidamo, (the one province which had always 
suffered least) whenever the northern provinces of Tigray, 
Eritrea and Wollo were affected by drought.41 The continued 
lack of rain in 1984 resulted in an 80 % crop failure in 
Wollo, and the remaining 13 provinces as well.42 As a 
result over five million people were at risk of starvation 
by early 1984.In Wollo, over 1.7 million people were 
affected out of a population of 2.5 million. In Tigray the 
number was 1.3 million. In Eritrea close to a million were
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affected.43
The Table below gives the geographical scope of the famine 
and the detail breakdown of the number of people affected 
in each of the regions.
Table 1
Estimates of The Number of People Affected in The 14 
Regions.
Administrative Region Number of People Affected
1. Wollo 1,790,830
2. Tigray 1,331,890
3. Eritrea 827,000
4. Gondar 376,500
5. Harerghe 346,889
6 • Sidamo 209,968
7. Shoa 131,034
8. Gamo-Goffa 79,880
9. Bale 52,950
10. Assab 45,000
11. Gojj am 35,200
12. Illubabor 33,077
14. Arssi 2,530
14. Kef fa 1.550
Total 5.264.298
Source: Assistance Reguirements 1984. published by The RRC, 
Addis Ababa, March 1984, p.5.
By October 1984 the number of people affected had 
increased by another one million people.44 
The pervasive nature of the famine is clear since none of 
the provinces remained untouched. Death was a frequent 
occurrence in all of the provinces but more especially in 
the northern provinces where the situation was worst.
(b) Build up to the Emergency
From the middle of 1984 the hardship intensified as 
more people became affected. As the situation became more 
desperate children risked death by kneeling on traffic 
roads in order to beg for food from travellers and 
passers-by . People were forced to try wild roots and 
berries and the lucky ones mixed mud with porridge to make 
the food go even further.
In response, there was an increase in the number of 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) arriving to meet the 
rising demand for humanitarian aid.45
(c) The Emergence of Relief Camps
Meanwhile, as the scarcity intensified, emergency 
relief camps sprung up all over the country, as the 
famine victims saw this as their last possible defence 
against starvation.46
In 1984 numerous relief camps emerged in Wollo, 
Tigray, Shoa, and Gondar: in Wollo for instance there were
Ba#
camps at Korem, Alomata and Lalibela; in Tigray there were 
camps at Makelle* while in Gondar and Sidamo there
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were camps at Ibnat and Walaita respectively.
(d) The Intensity of Famine: Korem. Makelle. Bati.
Korem
Today 35 people died here,
12 adults and 23 children,
Yesterday was 19,
the day before was 16,
the day before that 29,
the day before that 41....47
Korem was the epicentre of the famine and was the 
site of the biggest relief camp in 1984. The combination of
lack of rain for three consecutive years combined with the
insurrections in parts of Wollo worsened the situation.
Over three quarters of the people of the province were
affected by the shortage of food.
In March 1984, Korem*s population of 3000 people 
swelled to over 10,000 due to the severity of the famine. 
By September the camp population had exploded to over 
100,000.48 People were crowded together in poor sanitary 
conditions which
resulted in the outbreak of diseases: diarrhoea, dysentery, 
pneumonia, bronchitis and malaria and added to the death 
rate among the camp population. The situation was further 
made worse by the falling temperatures at night since the 
people had no protection against the cold.49 In October 
1984, additional arrivals to the camp were still at the 
rate of 1000 per day.
In March 1985 (at the peak of the crisis) the death
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rate was over 100 people per day with over 17,000 children 
being looked after by relief agencies.
Makelle
The story of Makelle is similar in many respects to 
that of Korem. It was the second biggest relief camp. At 
the peak of crisis Makelle town sheltered over 80,000 
people. Conditions in the camps were severe and agonisingly 
painful. The death rate at the start of the crisis was 
between thirty and forty people per day and reached 90 
to 100, in March 1985. The people were crowded together in 
tents without food, water or clothing. One reporter on the 
scene at the time said the sight of so many people at 
Makelle was quite awesome:"they stretched out in their 
thousands like some nomadic tribes".50
Bati
In Bati the story was similar. There were over 630 
tents with over 40 people crowded into each. There were 
thirty-two full time grave diggers employed. A relief nurse 
at the camp observed:
There, the people seem to have gone 
beyond despair, even beyond feeling, 
they sit like breathing statues, 
drained of everything save the 
mechanics of being alive. It is hard 
to admit, but it is almost as if they 
do not appear to be people any more.
At Bati the response is more 
devastatingly human. People.... stare 
in silent accusation.51
Before enough food was brought into the country
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officials had to make difficult choices between those who 
should receive food and those who would be refused. It was 
a difficult time for the relief agencies because the 
situation dictated that a choice had to be made in order to 
minimise the loss of life by "selecting” those who had a 
better chance of surviving. According to Brian Stewart:
Around every aid centre crowds are 
locked out by barbed wire fences, or 
stone walls because there wasn't 
enough food.52
Yet despite that, there were people who couldn't eat 
the food because their stomachs were bloated. Some were so 
seriously affected that they needed intensive feeding after 
every twenty minutes.53 And those strong enough amongst 
them had to pick through the dirt for each individual 
grain when the food arrived.
Throughout the country, at the peak of the emergency 
6000 people were dying daily and an estimated 1,000,000 
people were being treated in 43 emergency shelters.54 Six 
months after the emergency was brought to international 
attention, the situation was still critical although it had 
started to show signs of improvement (the number of deaths 
began to come down). And still a year after, there were 
more than 20,000 people being treated in Korem. Even in 
1986, the death toll averaged 2000 per day and there were 
still about 70,000 people being attended to, in 23 
camps.55
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9. Conclusion
In 1985 there were not less than forty three relief 
shelters, 280 distribution points and a 150 feeding 
centres throughout Ethiopia to cope with the emergency. The 
accurate number of people who perished may never be 
known. But The UN co-ordinator puts the figure at one 
million.56 There is no reason why this figure should be 
doubted bearing in mind the extent of the affected 
population in the country as evidenced by the high daily 
death toll in the relief camps over an extended period of 
time.
If this is accepted then it follows that the
magnitude of the death toll is five times the number that
died during the 1970s famine, which led to the
deposition of the Emperor and the consequent establishment 
of the military in power. Compared with the casualties 
involved in the First World War, the 1984 famine was 
severe, (representing a tenth of the total people who died 
between 1914-1918).57
Also at least 200,000 children were officially 
orphaned. For these children the consequences will linger 
into their adult lives.
And there were millions permanently dislocated from 
their villages as they were resettled elsewhere in the 
country.58 Over all there were between 8-9 million 
people affected by the famine.
In the next chapter we examine how the international 
community was mobilised to respond to the cries for help.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Media And The Internationalization of Concernl
1. Introduction
What triggered the current flurry of 
relief activity was the screening by 
the BBC, of a harrowing documentary on
the misery of the drought victims.2
It is perhaps necessary to begin this chapter by 
saying that without the media coverage of the crisis, the 
mobilization of relief assistance from both allies and 
opponents and indeed from the Western public, would not 
have been realized in earnest, nor would it have achieved 
the same degree of success that it did.
The BBC coverage on October 23 1984, however, marked 
a turning point, because from that date the famine was 
given prominence by both bilateral, multilateral and public
donors. Before that time there had been sporadic attempts
mainly by NGOs and the public to meet the demands but these 
efforts were by themselves inadequate to counter the 
massive relief needs in Ethiopia.
From October 23 the international community focused 
its attention on the crisis, as a result of the scale of 
suffering shown on Television, which affected public 
opinion and triggered it to demand increased action from 
its governments. From then onwards measures were taken by 
the major donors in line with demands from their public to 
meet the relief needs of the famine victims.
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In this chapter we will focus attention on how the 
media was instrumental in transforming the famine into an 
issue of international concern, thereby initiating the 
mounting of the relief operation that was necessary to 
overcome the problem.
2. The Media as a Relief Actor3
The media plays two important roles as an actor in 
relief. First, it is a source of news for millions of 
readers, listeners, and viewers. In providing news it 
reaches a wide range of audiences, including governmental 
elites, non-governmental and intergovernmental audiences.4 
Thus the information it provides can play a 
significant role in influencing public opinion, and even 
indirectly shaping the official policies of governments. 
Indeed it is acknowledged that more often than is usually 
realized, government decisions are in part based on 
information received through the news channels.5
Because it reaches a wide range of audiences all 
simultaneously it is therefore an indispensable tool in 
mobilizing support for causes. Indeed, it is well 
documented that the response to droughts in the past is 
based on the publicity generated for them through the 
media.6 Thus an essential requirement for mobilizing 
humanitarian assistance is a powerful publicity machine.7 
As James Lewis observed:
However, assessments made by the news 
media will certainly have been used 
as a basis for response by the 
general public who provide
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contributions for the relief aid sent 
by non governmental organization. And 
the non governmental organizations 
will base the presentation of their 
appeals on the degree of coverage 
presented by the news media and will 
use the same news media to carry their 
appeal.8
Second, the media plays the important role of "Agenda 
setting". In performing this function the media sets the 
priorities that the other relief actors devote to any 
given disaster.9 Therefore the response and attention 
allocated to any particular emergency is determined to a 
very large extent by the emphasis given to it by the 
media.
The question that then follows is how did the media 
"set the agenda" in the Ethiopian famine? Before addressing 
this question we first need to place the media in its 
global setting.
3. Media's International Setting
As a result of the current global communication 
structure, news flows mostly from the industrial north 
to the industrializing south. The dominance of the north 
in the technological field endows it with a powerful 
advantage in taking the lead in defining what should 
constitute global news and issues. For the south, its lack 
of resources and technology imposes limitations over its 
ability to internationalise issues. For these reasons the 
influence of the south is limited to its areas of 
influence, which are mainly national, or at best regional 
in scope. The implication of this is that it is the media
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in the north that determines what issues have the 
potential of becoming internationalized and what issues 
remain dormant.10
Within the industrialized north however the capacity 
of the Eastern Bloc countries' media is circumscribed by 
the structural set up of these societies. First, the 
press and media in general is government and Party 
controlled.il Second, there is the question of lack of 
resources. In view of these constraints it is Western 
media that has taken the lead in globalizing issues.12 
It is also in this context that the strategic 
position of London reinforces the current structure. 
First, every international airline in the world passes 
through London at some stage. Second, there is the factor 
of English being an international language in which many 
communication and media specialists have their training.13 
Third, there is the fact that "most of the foreign news 
seen on television screens throughout the world will at 
some stage have been processed in London".14
4. Internationalizing the Famine:The Role of BBC TV
(a). TV's edge over other Mediums
Television has replaced newspapers and the radio as a 
prime source of news for most people in Western Europe and 
North America. The success of television in transforming 
the famine into a global issue is connected to the enormous 
power it wields as a medium. This power lies in its ability 
to announce its "message not merely to the king but
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instantly to a massive public all watching, all affected, 
all reacting simultaneously".15 In performing its daily 
routine, television "telescopes complex distant events into 
immediate "live" pictures which can have immediate live and 
anguishing results".16 It is its power to relay distant 
events "live" that gives the medium its competitive 
advantage over the press and the radio as a prime source of 
news in the industrialized world.
In the Third World the radio is still the leading 
source of news for most people, with the press serving the 
urban centres and the educated elites. Below we chart the 
course of how the media covered the famine in the period 
before October, and how the October 23 programme, created 
its impact.
(b). Early Media Efforts to Raise Relief
From the spring of 1983 through to early October 
1984, numerous efforts were undertaken by the international 
media to bring home to the viewing public what was then a 
developing crisis in Ethiopia. These efforts achieved a 
modest degree of success. Early television programmes and 
appeals date from the spring of 1983 when both the BBC and 
ITN teams toured the northern provinces of Ethiopia and 
issued a joint appeal to the British public which brought 
in £2 million for the famine.17
In March 1984 the Irish Concern in Ethiopia made a 
documentary on the crisis based on conditions in Walaita. 
This was later shown in June 1984 on Channel 4 news and
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"News at Ten" and the evening news bulletin of RTE (the 
Irish television station) and in twelve other countries.18 
Also in March 1983 Mohammed Amin head of Visnews, Africa 
Bureau, had filmed and published material on the famine: 
some of the scripts produced by Amin stated that Ethiopia 
would suffer its severest famine disaster since that of 
1973 if no international help was forthcoming. Amin's 
script was headed "International Aid call for drought 
stricken Ethiopia".19 Later in the same month Amin did 
another story titled "Ethiopia: food and Aid from Europe 
for the starving refugees".20
In April one of Visnew's scripts read "Ethiopia: 
relief work continues in Ethiopia where aid workers taken 
hostage".2lAgain in July 1983 a photographer on the 
Denvor post personally financed a visit to Ethiopia after 
seeing a TV report on the famine, but despite the troubles 
he encountered both before he left the US and while in 
Ethiopia, his pictures were rejected by the major media 
outlets in America. None of the networks accepted his story 
on the grounds that the pictures were not strong enough, 
and because at that time there had been few people at the 
point of death. CBS for instance told Tony Suan, "It was 
not a Biafra,.... it was not a situation where people were 
dropping like flies".22
In April 1984, Amin went to Ethiopia again and did 
a story which was picked up by Reuters, yet that too failed 
to produce a major response from the broadcasting 
organizations.23In May 1984 Earth-scan's organized tour
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trip for twenty international journalists equally failed 
to excite interest. According to one of the journalists on 
the tour the story "sank without a trace in terms of 
exciting interest in the organizations".24
In June 1984 the Irish Concern documentary was again 
televised and met with a similar fate to that of earlier 
efforts. The first serious inroad made by the famine in 
terms of winning attention and generating interest was in 
July of 1984 following the Central Television documentary 
by Charles Stewart titled "Seeds of Despair"-a sixty minute 
long documentary- which was shown on July 17 and 
subsequently on all the independent television networks at 
10.30 P.M.25
The screening of this documentary served two 
important functions. First, it was the basis of the first 
major appeal on the famine in Britain. The appeal organized 
by the British Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), however 
was not meant for Ethiopia alone but for ten other African 
countries as well. Second, it initiated competition between 
the two television networks in the UK-the BBC and ITV-which 
spurred them to give the famine the much needed attention 
for publicity. The BBC's knowledge that ITV were to use 
Stewart's documentary pushed them into doing a story on 
Ethiopia. As a result, Michael Buerk's July report was 
produced. Indeed despite the fact that the latter derived 
inspiration from the knowledge of ITV's intention, it 
succeeded in being televised a few hours before the ITV's 
documentary "Seeds of Despair".
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On July 19, the DEC then launched two appeals
simultaneously on both the BBC and ITV for the famine in
\
Africa. Four days later extracts from the Irish Concern 
documentary were televised again on channel 4 news, and 
ITN's "News At Ten".26These messages evidently served in 
getting public attention and generating the required 
response. They brought in £10 million for the DEC'S 
appeals. The fact that the DEC had never raised such a 
record sum in its entire history suggests that at this 
point the crisis had gained ground with audiences in the 
UK. In retrospect, it had served to prepare the ground 
for the subsequent appeals in October. In this sense the 
July appeals served to prepare the British public for what 
was to follow in October. Incidentally, the two major 
television networks did not return to the issue with full 
force until sometime in October. The story faded with 
only four items done for the whole of August, September and 
early October by both networks.27
(c). The October Coverage and its Impact
October 23 1984 marked an important landmark by way 
of shaping the focus of international attention on the 
disaster in Ethiopia. Private individuals, relief 
organizations and governments were shocked beyond belief 
with the disturbing revelations that thousands of people 
were dying for want of food now in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century.
Anxious private donors and the public in the West,
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in conjunction with relief agencies, reacted spontaneously 
with donations of money and food for the suffering victims 
in a manner that was unprecedented in recent times. Fund 
raising activities for the famine started in earnest after 
the broadcast. One of the most famous fund raisers, Bob 
Geldof, who also affected the shape of the global 
response in a profound way, derived inspiration from the 
October BBC footage. Together with other concerned citizens 
and private relief agencies they called on their 
governments to respond to the emergency. It was the 
combined pressure from the public and the relief agencies 
that literally moved Western governments to respond in a 
manner that these governments would otherwise not have done 
(because of their opposition to the marxist regime of 
Mengistu Haile Mariam).28 Their impact on government 
yielded immediate results in the sense that for the first 
time these governments undertook a firm commitment to act. 
At the bilateral level the UK and the US Governments 
increased their assistance substantially. Likewise at the 
multilateral level governments adopted appropriate measures 
to meet the emergency by setting up the United Nations 
Office of Emergency Relief Operation in Ethiopia. The UN 
Assistant Secretary General Kurt Jansson was appointed to 
head the Office barely less than two weeks after the BBC 
program.29
The question that merits analysis at this juncture is 
how did television succeed in transforming the famine 
into the phenomenal success it achieved as an issue of
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global concern? And what was unique about the October 23 
television coverage that made it possible to move both 
people and governments to act to the degree that they did?
The October 23 story^like the July coverage, was 
produced in similar circumstance. Here too the hidden hand 
of competition operated in shaping the two networks' 
interest in the famine and their subsequent coverage of the 
story. Once again circumstances worked in favour of the 
BBC, even though the pace was set by ITV stations. The 
story of how the BBC succeeded in bringing the October 
footage to the public before the ITV, derived greatly from 
their knowledge of ITV's planned program.
It appears that by some combination of chance and 
luck the BBC overtook the ITV once more. Peter Gill of 
Thames Television had prepared a documentary on the crisis 
titled "Bitter Harvest".30 However, arrangements to have 
the documentary screened were overtaken by a Thames 
television technicians' strike.
Five days after Gill had left Ethiopia, Buerk,
Amin and Michael Wooldridge of the BBC radio arrived to do 
a story on the famine. The trio got permission to travel 
to Makelle, Lalibella and Korem, having been aware that 
Gill had been to Korem. Within five days they had 
accomplished their assignment. By October 22, they had left 
Ethiopia and by October 23, Buerk had arrived in London 
with the story ready for transmission. The first broadcast 
went out at lunch time with what is now the famous BBC 
footage on the Ethiopian famine story. In the following
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words of Buerk accompanied by the film shots of Amin the 
BBC captured the attention of millions of viewers and 
listeners:
Dawn, and as the sun breaks through 
the piercing chill of night on the 
plain outside Korem, it lights up a 
biblical famine, now, in the 20th 
century. This place, say workers here 
is the closest thing to hell on earth. 
Thousands of wasted people are coming 
here for help. Many find only death. 
They flood in every day from villages 
hundreds of miles away, felled by 
hanger, driven beyond the point of 
desperation. Death is all around. A 
child or adult dies every 20 minutes. 
Korem, an insignificant town, has 
become an important place of grief.31
By the six o'clock news the story was repeated as the 
leading story and was left to run for eight minutes. It was 
repeated again on the nine o'clock news though as the 
fourth item this time. The next day, October 24, Buerk's 
second report went out both at midday and on the six 
o'clock news.32 The footage and the way it was relayed 
triggered other stations and the media around the world to 
focus on Ethiopia. Thus the way the BBC handled the story 
assured it the success it achieved. On this Harrison and 
Palmer noted:
For a start by leading on two 
consecutive days with items of eight 
and seven minutes in length in news 
programme where two minutes was the 
norm the BBC was quite clearly saying: 
"Here is an event of major 
importance".
And once the BBC was assured of success:
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the story was retold and kept running 
on the regional television stations 
and on home, local and world service 
radio.3 3
It was after this report, coupled with appeals from 
Oxfam and the Save the Children Fund (SCF) that Gill's 
"bitter harvest" documentary was finally allowed to be 
shown by the striking Union on October 25, 1985. With the 
story now firmly in place in peoples' minds, public 
pressure began mounting on governments to respond to the 
emergency. Inspite of the story's significant success with 
the media in the UK, other networks were still slow in 
picking it up. For instance after the lunch news report on 
October 23, Visnews offered the story to Eurovision and 
NBC on the same day and both organizations rejected the 
story. According to Kevin Hamilton, the managing editor of 
Visnews in London, both Joe Angotti, the then European 
manager of NBC and Frieda Morris, NBC's bureau chief in 
London tried several times to have NBC New York take the 
pictures. The reaction from NBC NY, was that "the show 
is full up, we don't have any room for them. Why don't 
you send them over in a aeroplane, we take a look at them 
next week".34
After a lot of insistence from Joe Angotti, NBC NY 
accepted the pictures but not without recutting them before 
finally putting them as the eighth item on their Nightly 
News, with remembrance of the Beirut bombing, five items 
before the pictures.35Tom Brokaw, the presenter of the 
program introduced the footage with this comment:
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For sometime now we have been hearing 
reports of another famine in Africa, 
this time in Ethiopia. Stories of mass 
hunger and death, but with all else 
going on these days so often those 
reports don't have much impact- words 
from far off places. No more. Tonight 
we end this program with this report:
"Dawn....... an important place of
grief".
Meanwhile, Eurovision called for the pictures the 
following day, October 24, after hearing about their 
impact. Kevin Hamilton lamented bitterly over the failure 
of the major media networks, particularly, those in the US 
to realize the potential of the crisis before this period. 
He observed:
I am surprised given the 
competitiveness and the expertise that 
does exist in American network TV, 
that someone didn't pick up on 
Ethiopia, until it was handed to them 
on a plate.36
5. The Transformation of The Famine
When people saw the pictures for themselves the
impact was created. The pertinent question here is, why did
this particular piece succeed in exciting organizational
and public interest beyond the audience in the UK? The
answers to this question lies in a combination of factors.
Four are outlined by Wiseberg37 that condition media
success in evoking public opinion on a given issue. These
relate to the timing of the issue; the nature of the issue
itself; the values of the society being addressed; and the
organizational orientation of the media institution.
Using Wiseberg's theoretical framework the following
explanations can be offered. One factor that may also be
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added here is the factor of chance.
(a). The Timing Factor
It is indeed the case that timing played a critical
role in October. First, because there was no competing
news event in Europe and around the world at the time, it
enabled the media networks in Britain to focus on the issue
for quite a considerable length of time. For instance a
week later media attention was shifted to the news of the
assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi.38
Thus if there had been an event judged by the media
to be more newsworthy than the famine, perhaps the story
would not have been as successful as it turned out to be.
Compare for instance what happened to the coverage of the
Nigerian civil war in the 1960s, media fortunes of which
were affected by its coincidence with the outbreak of the
seven day Arab-Israeli war. The International media
focused its attention on the latter which it judged to be
more important.39 October was also winter time in the UK
when most people were at home and not on holiday. This too
contributed in broadening the scale of public reaction
since there were more people at home than in the summer. On
this Gill is quoted:
The fact that there were two days of 
hard news coverage on the BBC which 
was stressing the suffering and simply 
the suffering in northern Ethiopia, 
followed by our coming in on the 
Thursday night with an hour of the 
essential politics before an audience 
of 6-7 million contributed to what was 
precisely the right combination of 
news and current affairs and with 
precisely the right timing.4 0
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Moreover the July DEC appeal had helped in priming 
the British public before the October footage. But it was 
not sufficient on its own to excite interest in the absence 
of right timing and other factors. The story simply faded 
inspite of the fact that it was as dramatic as any story 
could be. For instance Buerk was filmed holding a starving 
child who subsequently died. Although the piece in 
combination with the other pieces carried by both the BBC 
and ITV generated a big response, the coverage did not 
lead to a global response like the October footage.
(b). The Power of Pictures
The nature of the issue itself appeals easily to 
public sympathy. The point about starvation is that it is 
reducible to dimensions which people can understand very 
easily. One of the factors that brought the famine to 
public attention was the fact that thousands of people 
were seen on television screen in very pathetic 
conditions. Thus while people could listen to the radio 
and hear the same words or turn to the pages of papers and 
read all about it, the effect could not be the same, as 
when they saw the pictures. To hear, read or be told about 
the story was not enough. To see the pictures "live" made a 
great difference. Seeing and witnessing the endless mass 
of people crying and dying on TV in our presence as it were 
is quite disturbing. The power of the pictures did indeed 
make an impact on people*s consciences:
The scale of the response owes much to 
the fact that people did see the faces
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of famine-the victims were right there 
in their living rooms.41
This, coupled with the fact that television audience is 
larger than that of either the radio or the press was 
effective in magnifying the impact of the story.
(c). Organizational Values
The organizational orientation of the media 
institution was also operative in the October coverage of 
the issue. For instance on occasions the media prioritised 
the story while on other occasions it did not. In the July 
report, Buerk's story was slotted mid bulletin between 
the French Prime Minister's resignation and Israeli's 
involvement in Lebanon. In the case of the October report 
it was broadcast at lunch time and the six o'clock news as 
the lead item on both news programmes, although the 
story was transferred to the fourth item by the time of the 
nine o'clock news bulletin.42 Similarly with the NBC the 
story was first slotted as the eighth and last item on the 
news bulletin. In this sense then, the institutional 
imperatives were clearly at work. Also operative was the 
commercial competition between the two major networks, 
which is deeply embedded in the organizational orientation 
of the media. Cris Crammer of the BBC said :
I will be conning you if I suggested 
the fact that ITV was there was not 
an influence.43
The fact that the pictures were emotionally charged
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meant that the media could focus on them for a while 
since one of the unwritten rules of media coverage is to 
dwell on the sensational and the dramatic. Indeed this 
was why Tony Suan's pictures were rejected initially 
because at that point people were not dropping dead, or 
at least not on the same scale as they did later in 
October. It has to be stressed here that it is not 
intended to imply that this was deliberate on the part of 
the media but rather a consequence of their organizational 
set up. As David Kline, remarked "we don't report on all 
the planes that landed safely on a given day". The 
implication being that they report on the ones that did 
not. The media by definition reports on problems that have 
reach a crisis point.
(d). The Chance Factor
There is also the operative "hand" of chance. 
According to BBC's John Simpson, October 23 was by chance 
a slack news day when they could have used any story. He 
said:
We could have led with any of a 
handful of fairly substantial 
stories.... in the end it was decided 
to try an imaginative lead.44
Indeed even after it was shown, other media houses at first 
turned it down.
Added to this was the pairing of Amin and Buerk on
the same trip. This might have played a role in the BBC's
decision to pay extra attention to the story. If the story
had broken a year later when South Africa had become
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the dominating news story it would have been unlikely 
that Buerk could have been sent to Ethiopia.45 The 
coincidence of record grain harvests in Europe that year 
corresponding with the scenes of destitution from Ethiopia, 
round about Christmas time sat uneasily on many peoples' 
minds. Then there was the chance factor that Bob 
Geldof happened to be one of those watching television 
that day, which had been decisive in turning the story into 
an international issue of concern.
Finally there was the equally important factor that 
the story was told in societies where public opinion could 
influence public policy. The fact that private interest 
groups could demand and focus government attention on any 
issue of interest for immediate debate and action ensured 
the successful globalization of concern. Three days after 
the story The Guardian observed:
European Governments and the EEC have 
at last begun to take vigorous action 
to deal with the Ethiopian famine 
under pressure from the aid agencies 
and public opinion.46
The media had clearly played a role in bringing 
about a climate of change about the famine. Without its 
intervention the response of the international community, 
especially that of the major bilateral donors, might never 
have come about. However, the media, like any other human 
institution was slow in picking the story and in showing 
great interest in it both before October and shortly after 
the October 23 broadcast.
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6. Conclusion
From the spring of 1983, up to the last quarter of 
1984 attempts by individuals, relief organizations and 
officials to get international action and relief for 
Ethiopia met with varying degrees of success. However, with 
the October BBC report international concern was galvanized 
as a result of the impact of the piece on the television 
watching public in Europe. The scale of the suffering 
affected public opinion to an unprecedented level, and 
consequently the public demanded greater action from their 
governments. Indeed the role of the media in igniting world 
concern is fully acknowledged:
All the relief efforts would not have 
gotten off the ground without the BBC 
program.47
Despite the efforts of concerned organizations and 
groups it is evident that without the media's intervention, 
the Ethiopian famine would not have achieved the 
international recognition and subsequent universal action 
that it did.
In this sense the media was instrumental in 
transforming the famine into an issue of universal 
concern. After it focused its attention and aroused the 
public in the West to make demands on their governments, 
the stage was set for the relief actors to go into full 
action. How they became involved after the stage had been 
set, is the focus of analysis in the next chapters.
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PART TWO
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE OF DONORS
CHAPTER FOUR
The Bilateral Response of Ethiopia's Political Allies
1. Introduction
Ethiopians expected the Soviet Union 
to provide a substantial portion of 
the famine relief aid between 1984 and 
198&, but they were disappointed...1
Since Ethiopia switched its allies in 197?, the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries have been 
Ethiopia*s main political and ideological backers.2 As a 
result extensive networks of social, economic, cultural and 
political links have been developed and maintained and 
have replaced earlier Western ties (beside the one area of 
commercial trading).
The East has given Ethiopia both development aid 
including oil subsidy, and more importantly has been the 
country's source of military supply. In 1977 the Soviet 
Union mounted a massive military airlift that ensured the 
political survival of the country following its attack by 
Somalia. At the end of the war the two sides signed a 
twenty year trade and technical cooperation pact that 
required each party to consult the other on all matters 
of common interest. By the time of the outbreak of the 1984 
crisis Ethiopia was already finalising arrangements for the 
adoption of a one party political model along the lines of 
other socialist states.
Yet, as we will see, despite these extensive linkages
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between Ethiopia and its allies the latter have been 
unable (for a variety of political and economic reasons) to 
respond adequately to Ethiopia's appeal for emergency 
assistance. .
In this chapter we will focus our attention on the 
reaction of Ethiopia's allies following the latter's 
appeals for humanitarian help. In doing so however we have 
to place it in the context of their improved relations. 
Below we examine Ethiopia's relations with its allies and 
analyze their aid against the background of their leading 
position.
2. Interstate Relations
(a). Earlv Historical Relations
Despite the fact that early relations predated the 
October 1917 Revolution in Russia it was not until 1956 
that a Soviet Embassy was opened in Addis Ababa.3
The first Russian official delegation to Ethiopia 
took place in 1890-91 and four years later an Ethiopian 
mission (largely military in composition) visited Russia. 
Indeed a Russian officer acted as a military adviser to 
Emperor Menelik 11, during the battle of Adowa (1896), 
which resulted in the defeat of the invading Italian 
forces. After Ethiopia's military success, Russian 
officers continued to serve in Menelik's army and a 
Russian Red Cross mission began active involvement in 
Ethiopia. But although cordial relations were maintained 
even in the days of Emperor Haile Selassie, on the whole,
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the Russians did not have a firm footing in Ethiopia, 
despite the fact that the late Emperor was the first 
African leader to visit the Soviet Union (in 1959).4
With the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974 and the 
subsequent realignment that followed, the Soviet Union and 
its allies gained an unprecedented position in Ethiopia.
(b). Realignment And Soviet Ascendancy
Ethiopia1s switch to the Soviet Union had been viewed 
as the most dramatic change there had ever been in the post 
war period. With that move the country was "lost” to the 
Soviets and their allies, after a quarter of a century of 
unchallenged United States domination.5 However the 
circumstances leading to the change have been interpreted 
differently by scholars. According to Halliday it was 
Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia with US's encouragement, 
that led to the Russian and Cuban advance in Ethiopia.6 
^ns on the other hand argued that it was the US 
Government's decision of April 1977 to stop the $100m 
military supply that served as the turning point, because 
it left Ethiopia with no alternative but to turn to the 
Soviet Union.7 Whatever were the reasons behind Ethiopia's 
move it was certainly clear that the country turned to the 
USSR of its own volition. As David observed:
without any interference from the Soviet 
Union, a socialist pro Soviet government 
took power in what had once been the 
most important U.S. ally in black 
Africa 8
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And if this was the case then the Soviet Union could 
hardly have ignored Ethiopia, since to do so would have 
been to miss a great opportunity and to preclude the 
future exploitation of similar developments in other 
countries.9 In any case the Soviet Union gladly took on the 
offer. The immediate consequence was that the Soviet Union 
not only filled in the military aid vacuum left by the US.10 
but also stepped in to the political and ideological 
vacuum left by the West.
Within a short time Soviet influence had gained such 
ascendancy that one writer commented it was "unthinkable" 
for Ethiopia to oppose Soviet policies.11 Indeed it is for 
this reason that most commentators described post 
revolutionary Ethiopia in a variety of eye catching 
aphorisms ranging from being Moscow's declared ally,12 
to its most loyal friend in Africa.13
Therefore against this background of such a widely 
shared perception it becomes imperative to delve into the 
nature of the alliance and to inquire whether they have 
matched their political and ideological dominance with 
their ally's appeals for humanitarian assistance.
(c). Post Revolution Relations with the East
From the beginning of the February 1974 uprising to
February, 1977 (the time when Mengistu emerged as the 
leader of the Dergue),-Ethiopia was strictly speaking non- 
aligned to either the West or the East. During this period 
the leadership was preoccupied with coping with internal
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unrests that the revolution unleashed and with internal 
power struggles. It was a period of uncertainty for 
Ethiopia.14
However with the supremacy of Mengistu, Ethiopia 
turned to the Soviet bloc. According to Steven David four 
reasons were important in influencing Mengistu to turn to 
the East. The first had to do with his own self-proclaimed 
revolutionary and socialist disposition. As a declared 
revolutionary it was becoming embarrassing and politically 
dangerous for him to be dependent on the chief benefactor 
of the previous regime and world's leading capitalist 
power.
Secondly, a socialist ideology and Soviet orientation 
seemed more in keeping with his plan of drastic land 
reform and the continuation of terror, which he felt was 
necessary to perpetuate his rule.
Thirdly, tilting towards the Soviet would enable him 
to undercut much of the Eritrean communist and radical 
support and at the same time provide him with the 
opportunity of getting the Soviets to restrain their 
Somali clients.
Lastly, Mengistu was unhappy with the record of US 
military support and especially at the sharp drop of arms 
deliveries.15 Mengistu's emergence to the leadership 
position was therefore undoubtedly decisive in the 
reorientation of Ethiopia towards the Soviets.16 As a 
result since February
1977 Ethiopia's international relations have been changed
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so as to be in line with its new ideology. The question 
that immediately arises is how strong has the Soviet and 
Eastern bloc countries influence been in Ethiopia?
(i). Socio-cultural Relations
Socio-cultural relations is one area that has bonded 
Ethiopia and its new allies together. Thousands of Soviet, 
East German, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian 
specialists of all kinds are spread around Ethiopia in 
far greater number than westerners.17 The Soviets are 
found in all fields of Ethiopia's economic life. The 
Russians are in the construction industry; in agriculture, 
energy and education sectors.
The Soviets have provided Ethiopia with professors 
and instructors to help train Ethiopians in areas 
ranging from medicine and geology to ideology and 
political education. In 1977, Soviet professors and 
lecturers were put in charge of teaching ideology at the 
country's only University then and at Ethiopia's Yekatit 
66 Party School.18
Earlier on, the Soviet Union together with Cuba, the 
GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
donated books on socialist philosophy and marxist 
literature to the Yekatit 66 Political School as a token 
of sympathy and solidarity after the destruction of part of 
the school by a bomb.
Furthermore the Soviet Union provides scholarships 
annually to Ethiopian students for studies in the USSR for
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a period of four to seven years in all fields of learning 
such as: engineering; agriculture; natural science; and 
the social sciences. In the 1979/80 academic session alone 
the USSR provided scholarships to over 12 00 Ethiopians 
while the other Eastern Bloc countries provided another 
1800 places.19
In addition official visits between the Ethiopian 
capital and those of its allies take place on a regular 
basis. Mengistu himself has travelled to almost all the 
capitals of his allies* countries, (in the aftermath of the 
famine he made his eighth visit to Moscow since he seized 
power in 1977).20 He visited Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR 
and Romania in 1978. Similarly his top officials have 
frequently visited the Eastern European capitals, e.g. 
Czechoslovakia in July 1977;21 Yugoslavia;22 the GDR;23 
Cuba;24etc. etc. On the other hand, his allies have 
frequently visited Ethiopia, e.g. Cuba's Fidel Castro was 
there in 1977 and 1978; the GDR's leader Mr Eric Honecker 
in 1979; Yugoslavia's Vice President and his federal 
secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1979; and Mr. Alex et 
Kosygin of the Politburo of the CPSU, Central Committee 
and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1979.
(ii) . Economic Relations
Development Aid
Economic relations between the two sides are 
dominated by development aid rather than by serious 
commercial trading. Although the Soviets gave assistance to
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Ethiopia during the time of the Emperor (e.g. building the 
country's only oil refinery at Asseb in 1959 and a loan 
of $200m), these, cannot match their efforts since the 
revolution. For instance the two countries signed a 
shipping agreement to facilitate bilateral trade on August 
8 1978, and an Air link agreement aimed at strengthening 
trade and cultural ties.25 The Soviets have also been 
providing Ethiopia with an oil subsidy (20%) below the 
world market prices.26 Similarly they have built a cement 
factory, a hydro electric station and a tractor assembly 
plant among others.27
Trade
Despite their impressive record of co-operation and 
assistance however, there is little trade between the 
two countries, and such as there is, tends to be to the 
advantage of the Soviet Union. Discussing Ethiopia-Soviet 
trade in 1986 Professor Halliday and Maxine Molyneau 
noted that :
of annual exports of around $400 
million, the majority went to the US 
($100 million) and the EEC ($130 
million). Soviet figures for 1983 show 
that of a total of bilateral trade of 
186 million roubles (equivalent to 
around $220 million), Soviet exports 
account for $168 million, but imports 
from Ethiopia for a mere $18 million.28
Or as another scholar pointed out:
Soviet economic aid and trade have been 
poor instruments of influence. The 
Soviet Union has consistently maintained
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a favourable balance of trade with 
developing countries. This trade is 
usually bilateral, with Soviet 
manufactured goods being exchanged for 
Third world raw materials and crops. In 
the case of Ethiopia, there have been 
claims that the Soviet union has taken 
most of Ethiopia's coffee as part 
payment for arms, and that has left 
Ethiopia with little currency for other 
goods on the international market.29
But despite the lack of strong trading links, the two sides 
have more than compensated for this, in other ways in 
particular in the political arena of their relations.
(iii). Political Relations 
Military Aid
Indeed Soviet military assistance is the foundation 
of political relations between Ethiopia and the Soviet 
Union. Soviet military aid during the 1977/78 Ogaden war 
served to bring the two countries closer together than 
ever before. In November 1977 the Soviet Union undertook a 
massive military airlift to Ethiopia, after attempts to 
bring both Ethiopia and Somalia to the Soviet fold failed. 
Ethiopia was assisted with more than a billion dollars 
worth of arms, (three times the amount supplied to her by 
the United States in over 25 years).30
There was also the direct involvement of Soviet and 
Cuban personnel in the war.31 It was this singular act 
more than any other that cemented the alliance between 
Moscow and Addis Ababa.32 In return Ethiopia signed a 
twenty year friendship and co-operation treaty on 
November 20 1978, which set the seal on the evolving new
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alliance.3 3 Regarding the treaty it is observed that:
The accord has set the seal on the 
close alliance which had developed 
between Moscow and Addis Ababa, since 
the Soviet Union rellied [sic] behind 
the Mengistu regime in its war with 
Somalia. In terms of the treaty both 
countries pledged to collaborate in the 
political, economic and military fields 
for the next twenty years. The treaty 
binds each side to consult the other on 
important international questions 
directly involving the interests of the 
two.3 4
The treaty was undoubtedly an important milestone in 
Ethiopia- Soviet relations. In its own words it is 
significant because it has "set the seal on close alliance" 
between the two states, thus paving the way for the USSR 
to influence events in Ethiopia in a more fundamental way, 
such as by the formation of a socialist political party 
along Soviet lines.
(iv). The Formation of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE)
By any measure the transformation of Ethiopia from a 
feudal political society to a socialist one party state 
within such a short period confirms the degree of Soviet 
influence in the country and much more than that 
solidified their treaty.
The Soviet Union had encouraged Mengistu to create 
a socialist party of the kind that exists in other 
socialist countries. The importance of promoting such 
structures in its satellite states lies in the sense that 
it makes for easier dealings with these countries. The
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Soviet Union uses the existence of such structures as 
evidence of the regime's commitment to socialism.35 
Thus, a year after the signing of the friendship and 
co-operation treaty the Provisional Military and 
Administrative Council announced the formation of the 
Commission for Organising the Party of the Workers of 
Ethiopia (COPWE) in December 1979. Thereafter the 
commission held two congresses (in June 1980 and January 
1983) prior to the formal launching of the Party on 
September 12 1984, (exactly ten years after the overthrow
of the Emperor). After the formation of the Party, TASS was 
quoted as saying:
The creation of the Worker's Party of 
Ethiopia heralds an important event in 
the development of the revolutionary 
process and is a confirmation of the 
viable force of marxist-leninist 
ideas.3 6
(v). The Role of other Socialist Partners
Other Socialist Bloc countries beside the Soviet 
Union have also been engaged in assisting Ethiopia to 
move closer to their camp. We have already mentioned 
that these states provided scholarships to Ethiopian 
students to study in their countries, and their donation 
of revolutionary literature. In addition, Ethiopia has 
signed trade and technical agreements with a number of 
these countries.
Cultural, technical and scientific agreements were 
signed with Hungary in 1977;37 and with Yugoslavia in 
1978. Similar agreements were signed with the GDR,
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Bulgaria, Cuba and Czechoslovakia.38 These states have 
also assisted Ethiopia in the supply of arms, personnel 
and advisers. For instance Cuba and the GDR, have both 
provided arms and advisers (in the case of the GDR, for the 
purpose of training the Ethiopian state security force) 
while Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia provided light arms 
and armunitions, particularly in the early days of the 
revolution.39 They also provided economic aid and loans to 
Ethiopia. For instance the GDR helped in the construction 
of Ethiopia's biggest cement plant;40
Czechoslovakia provided loans for the establishment of a 
polyester textiles factory, pipe assembly plant and the 
modernisation of Addis Ababa's abattoir,41 in addition to 
its large military support made during the 1977/78 Ogaden 
war; and Cuba has contributed immensely in the provision 
of medical assistance to Ethiopia.42 At one point the 
Cuban medical mission in Ethiopia was the largest in 
Africa and provided services to eleven out of the fourteen 
provinces of the country.43
(vi). International Solidarity with Allies
Without a doubt Ethiopia has moved in the direction 
of the Socialist Bloc countries. Evidence of this move is 
expressed not only in economic and military support but in 
other symbolic forms. For instance in the aftermath of the 
1977/78 Ogaden war, Cuba's Castro named some schools in 
Havanna "Gara marda" after the Ethiopian and Cuban war 
heroes who died during the war, and another one was named
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after Col. Mengistu. The Ethiopian Government likewise 
built a statue of Lenin in Addis Ababa, (the first of its 
kind in Africa) and adopted favorable positions for their 
allies on a variety of international issues. For example 
Ethiopia boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics games in 
solidarity with the Soviet bloc; voted against the UN 
General Assembly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1980; and supported the 
USSR'S position on Kampuchea. As late as February 1985 the 
Ethiopian leader ordered all senior government personnel 
to discard their European business dress and don Khaki or 
blue North Korean style uniforms.44
In view of the tremendous increase in cultural, 
economic and political ties, what has been the allies' 
response to Ethiopia's appeals for help?
The allies have come up with food, transport and 
other forms of relief. But as will become clear in the 
discussion, their major contribution in the emergency was 
in the provision of transport and their subsequent 
participation in the Government's resettlement programme. 
Below we examine and analyse each of those areas of 
allies' aid.
3. The Relief Response of Allies
(a). Food Aid45
Following Mengistu's visit to the Soviet Union in 
December 1984 (to appeal for more relief assistance) the 
late Soviet President Chernenko indicated to him that the
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Soviet Union could render only a limited assistance. 
Reporting the meeting, TASS was cited:
Chernenko pointed out that the Soviet 
people take to heart the ordeal that has 
befallen the people of Ethiopia as a 
result of the protracted drought and 
strive to render necessary help and 
support as far as possible.46
The Soviet Union made food donations in only two 
instances. The first donation made through the RRC was for 
3100 mt. tonnes in 1984. The second donation (made in 
1985), was for another 7,045 mt. tonnes of food. There was 
no further food aid donation made by the Soviets for the 
rest of the relief period. Therefore, the total amount 
provided by the Soviet Union between 1984-86 sums up to 
just a little over 10,000 mt. tonnes. This was less than 
the amount provided by the Peoples Republic of China during 
the relief operation. The Chinese provided 1,000 mt. tonnes 
of food grain in 1984: over 22,000 mt. tonnes in 1985 and
another 2,000 mt. tonnes in 1986.
Thus even in comparison with states of the same 
ideological inclination Soviet food assistance lags far 
behind that made available by China.
Indeed among all the socialist countries it is only
the Peoples Republic of China that provided grain in
all the three years of relief consecutively.
But the assistance from the Peoples Republic of China
was for grain alone because they did not provide
supplementary food. However, the Soviet Union did not
supply supplementary food either.47 Only a few countries
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such as the GDR and Cuba made substantial supplementary 
food grain donations.
Put together food aid assistance from the twelve 
leading countries of the Socialist bloc48 in 1984 stood at 
5,545 mt. tonnes of grain and 6,876 mt. tonnes of 
supplementary food; in 1985 they provided 50,203 mt. tonnes 
of grain and 5,032 of supplementary food; while in 1986 
they provided only 2,024 mt.tonnes of food grain.
Thus it is evident from these figures that for the 
whole of 1984 (at the time when the images of the starving 
were continuously at the centre of global attention), they 
provided just around 12,500 mt. tonnes of both food grain 
and supplementary food. They also gave their most 
substantial assistance in 1985, (over 55,000 mt. tonnes of 
both food grain and supplementary food) while in 1986 
their assistance was just a little over 2,000 mt.tonnes 
(and even this was from from the Peoples' Republic of China 
rather than from the Soviet Union or its allies).
All in all, the Eastern Bloc countries provided 
under 70,000 mt.tonnes of food aid for the whole period of 
the relief operation. This figure comprises 57,772 mt. 
tonnes of grain and 11,908 mt.tonnes of supplementary food 
aid.
If comparison is made with the smallest donation of 
food from the EEC for 1984 alone it would be seen that 
EEC's donation of 73,000 mt.tonnes of food grain (excluding 
their supplementary food aid for 1984) is higher than 
the total of both grain and supplementary food provided
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by the entire Soviet Bloc countries for the whole of the 
relief period (1984-1986), and even this takes into 
account the contribution provided by the Peoples1 
Republic of China.
Likewise if comparison were made with what was given 
by the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1984 the tonnage of 
65,145 mt. tonnes of grain (excluding supplementary food), 
is indeed higher than the total provided by the Eastern 
Bloc for the duration of the relief operation. However 
even if the EEC and WFP are inter-governmental 
organisations rather than bilateral donors, a comparison 
with a single donor state say for instance, Canada, 
brings out the relatively small size of Ethiopian allies' 
aid: in 1984 Canada provided 51,000 mt.tonnes of food 
grain (which was close to the 57,000 mt.tonnes provided 
by the Soviet Bloc countries). Indeed Soviet's aid of 
10,000 mt. tonnes pales in comparison to that of countries 
like India, Sweden and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe gave twice as 
much as the Soviet Union. The country donated over 12,000 
mt.tonnes of food in both 1985 and 1986.
Despite the relative size of their aid nevertheless 
their contributions were important. But much more important 
than their food aid donations was their transport 
assistance.
(b). Transport Assistance 
Land Vehicles
The most notable area of Eastern Bloc aid was in the
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provision of transportation. In this area the East was 
generous. They provided trucks, trailers, light vehicles 
and air transport. Between October 1984 and March 1985 when 
the problem of transportation was acute the Soviet Union 
made a significant contribution in this area. In 1985 the 
RRC received 300 trucks and 9 light vehicles from the 
USSR. In 1986 a further donation of 9 light vehicles was 
made by the Soviets. The GDR and the Democratic Republic of 
Korea gave 171 trucks in 1985. Thus, the allies have 
provided land transportation to the tune of over 550 
trucks.
The Soviet Union's own share constituted about 60% 
of all Eastern Bloc land transportation assistance. But 
despite this, a closer examination reveals that they did 
not have an overall lead even in this sector.
It is true that in the early stages of the 
international response, 87% of the land transportation was 
provided by the GDR and the Republic of korea, while 13% 
was provided by the non- Eastern bloc countries. However, 
in 1985 (despite the massive figure of over 300 trucks and 
light vehicles from the allies) they provided only 44% of 
the total land transport. The remaining 56% came from 
Western donor Governments and international organisations. 
Eastern and Western land transportation combined exceeded 
over 1000 trucks, trailers and light vehicles.
In 1986 Ethiopia's allies provided only 2% (9 
vehicles) of the total of the land transportation and the 
non-socialist countries contributed the remaining 98% (352
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vehicles).49 Thus for the duration of the three year relief 
period, the Soviet Bloc gave 44% of the total land 
transportation while the remainder (56%) was made by the 
non-socialist group.
(c). Air Assistance
The USSR made available 12 AN-12 Aircraft and 22 Ml- 
8 helicopters in November 1984.50 However in an effort to 
portray his allies as not lagging behind the West, Mengistu 
plunged the operation into controversy by stating that 
75% of the air transportation used in the food airlift was 
provided by the Soviet Union.51 Certainly the Soviets 
provided more transport planes than any other country East 
or West. It is also true that their planes stayed in 
Ethiopia beyond the end of the relief operation in 1986.52
In addition to the Soviet planes, the GDR provided 
2 AN-2 6, and one IL-18 from November 1984 to October 1985 
while Poland provided 3M-8 helicopters. Libya provided 
another 2 AN-2 6 from February 1985 to October 1985. A 
measure of the Eastern Bloc's solidarity however was in the 
support it gave to the Government's resettlement 
programme especially compared to the unfavorable view taken 
of the programme by most Western donors.
(d). Transport and Resettlement
The bulk of Soviet assistance was absorbed in the 
transportation of settlers from the denuded provinces of 
Tigray, Wollo, and Shoa to the resettlement sites in the
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south and western parts of the country.
The Ethiopian Government embarked on the programme in 
early November 1984 in the belief that a realistic solution 
to the continuous cycle of famine in the northern 
provinces must involve the resettlement of the population 
to the more fertile areas of the country.53
However, before the programme could reach its target 
of resettling 1.5 million people54 it met with stiff 
opposition from the USG, Britain and the EEC, as a result 
of which it was suspended from August 1985 until April 
1987.55
Western governments refused to assist the programme 
on the grounds that the Ethiopian Government was using 
force and was insensitive to the human rights aspects 
involved.56 Judging from the support given by other Western 
states like Canada and Italy, and a host of Western 
agencies such as the CRDA, West German Menschen fur 
Menschen, Irish Concern and Band Aid to the program (on 
humanitarian grounds), it looks as though the critics' 
refusal to assist may have been derived largely from the 
reservations they held about the regime and its allies.57
(e). Other Assistance from the East
Other relief items received from the Eastern Bloc 
included medical equipment, blankets, clothing and 
footwear; shelter materials and household utensils and 
spare parts.
Poland made a substantial contribution of medical
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items at the beginning of the crisis. Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, the GDR and Hungary were also important donors 
of these items in 1985.
Although the GDR, Bulgaria and China provided 
agricultural machinery, water supply equipment, power 
materials and communication equipment in 1985, these items 
are development rather than relief items. Their nature 
therefore underscores a fundamental difference in the 
perception and response to relief between the East and the 
West. In the East there is no clear distinction between 
relief and development. In the West the distinction makes a 
great deal of difference. Western countries are prepared 
to participate in relief activities whenever necessary. 
From their point of view other criteria have to be met 
before a country becomes eligible for development 
assistance.
4. Evaluation of the Allies1 Humanitarian Assistance
From the outset controversy surrounded the role and 
response of Ethiopia's allies. According to some scholars 
there was no record of either the RRC making an appeal to 
the Soviets for relief nor a record of the Soviet union 
sending relief to Ethiopia until after October 1984.58 
Other scholars disagree and argue that the Soviet Union 
responded to the March 1984 appeal made by the Ethiopian 
Government. The first view is held by Legum who claims:
Yet, there is no record of the RRC 
having made appeal to the soviet bloc or 
of the dispatch of emergency aid from 
that source until after western aid had
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began to pour into Ethiopia in October 
1984, following the traumatic impact of 
a seven minute film by the distinguished 
Kenyan cameraman Mohammed Amin with 
commentary by a BBC reporter Michael 
Buerk.59
Representing the other view is Mr. Gill who claims that 
the Soviet Union alone with Canada, the EEC and the WFP, 
promised to send some grain in response to the 1984 March 
appeal. The Russians came up with 10,000 tons of rice, the 
North Koreans and Chinese with 6,000 tons of grain, and 
the Cubans said they would send 5000 tonnes of Sugar.60 
However in what appears as a middle of the road position 
the former US Charge d'affaires in Addis Ababa, David Korn 
points out:
The Soviet Union had made its yearly 
donation of 10,000 tons of rice in June 
before the extent of the crisis could be 
known. The Soviet union made no further 
donation of food during 1984 or up to 
the first half of 1985, though other 
eastern bloc governments sent small 
shipments of food.61
Whatever the truth of the matter, it is evident that 
the Soviet Union was not unaware of conditions in 
Ethiopia before October 1984. Indeed, in May 1984, the 
Soviet Red Cross organisation sent a gift of relief aid 
along with many Western NGOs to the famine areas.62 The 
Soviet media however did not report the drought until the 
end of October 1984.63
But one area beyond contention is with regard to the 
large quantity of trucks, trailers and air transport 
provided by the allies. Following the October BBC appeal 
the USSR committed massive transport assistance for
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used in the relief. This was certainly essential in moving 
the food in to the famine zones. Indeed without this 
support certainly more lives would have been lost. But 
despite this, should the allies' response be judged as 
adequate? In other words was the assistance provided, what 
should have been expected of the allies particularly in 
the face of a tragedy of such magnitude?
If the account of the Soviet Union's response to the 
March appeal was indeed correct then it is obvious that 
this gave the Soviet Union an edge over the US and 
Britain, whom it was observed at this juncture, pledged 
nothing.64 But although the response came early it appears 
to have fallen far short of what was needed and what would 
be expected of a major ally, especially in view of the 
magnitude of the disaster.
Looking at the size of Soviet food assistance, one 
cannot but argue that it was a poor donor of food aid. For 
instance the 10,000 mt. tonnes of rice pledged in March 
1984 beside being relatively small was also the wrong 
kind of aid at the time, as rice is not a major part of the 
Ethiopian diet. Hence the Ethiopian Government had to 
resell it in order to buy the staple diet "teff" instead.
Explanation as to why the Soviet Union was a poor 
donor of food is not hard to find. To start with the Soviet 
Union is a net importer itself.65 The Soviet Union 
purchases much of its wheat grain from the West despite the 
fact that it is also an important world producer.66 Indeed 
in the whole of the COMECON countries only Hungary and
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Romania are food exporters.67 This perhaps explainswhy 
the East could not match Western food donation (we will 
come back to this in the next chapter). And also perhaps 
this was why Bulgaria and Hungary were the most important 
donors of food in 1985 after the Soviet Union.
Again, Cuba's decision to send 5,000 tonnes of 
sugar must not be unrelated to Cuba's leading position in 
the world sugar market. It does certainly look as if the 
donation was made from surplus availability of the 
commodity rather than on the actual needs of the famine 
victims. In the circumstance it was the grain provided by 
the North Koreans and the Chinese that was of immediate 
relevance. And since the Chinese are a competing power 
with the Soviet Union it can be argued that Ethiopia's 
allies response fell short of the expectations of their 
ally's appeals for emergency aid (at least as far as food 
is concerned). Admittedly, in 1988 the Soviet Union 
provided a quarter of a million tonnes of grain although 
the internal transportation cost had to be found from 
elsewhere.
The most visible form of Eastern aid therefore 
(as evident from the preceding analysis) is in the 
provision of manufactured hardware items such as machinery, 
trucks, trailers, light vehicles and air transport. The 
obvious explanation behind Eastern Bloc high visibility 
in this area certainly has to do with the nature of their 
economies-Soviet and Eastern Bloc economies are better 
producers of industrial goods.
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Another feature of the allies' aid is that throughout 
the relief period their assistance was completely 
Government oriented. Why this was so may be explained 
from two angles. First it is the case that they did not 
extend their humanitarian assistance to the rebel areas. 
This may have to do with either the fear of offending their 
ally's sensitivities or more realistically their lack of 
surplus food. Secondly and more importantly their 
assistance was Government focused because they could not 
run a programme of their own in terms of setting up their 
own relief or shelter camps and food distribution points. 
Essentially this is the field of NGOs and therefore a 
phenomenon of Western societies. In the words of an Eastern 
Bloc diplomat, NGOs are a western invention and luxury. But 
beneath this axiom is the implied issue of lack of 
resources. In addition, allies' participation in the 
Government's resettlement programme was partly based on 
solidarity with the Government, and partly on the appeal 
of the programme itself.
Finally a fundamental influence on allies' response 
is their perception of the issues at stake. They perceived 
the crisis basically as a problem of underdevelopment and 
poverty and as such this affected their approach and 
response. The Socialist states' philosophy favoured more 
development assistance as the ultimate solution to the 
crisis, instead of relief which they saw as a palliative. 
And this more than any other factor explains why they 
responded to their ally in the manner they did.
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5. Conclusion
In this Chapter we concentrated on examining the 
bilateral response of Ethiopia's political allies to her 
appeals for emergency assistance.
It is evident from the preceding discussions that 
since the revolution of 1974 there had been a vast 
expansion of socio-cultural, technical and political ties 
between Ethiopia and the Eastern Bloc.
In response to Ethiopia's appeals the allies have 
come up with food and other relief items, although their 
most visible area of assistance was in the provision of 
land and air transport and associated with that their 
participation in the resettlement of the famine victims.
But in view of their inadequate response to meet the 
massive needs, Ethiopia was left with no option but to turn 
to other donors for help. And in this case it inevitably 
meant turning to her political opponents.
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TABLE 2
Year 1984 1985 1986
Column (A) (B) .. (A). ____ (B) (A) (B).
USSR 3100 • • • • 7045 • • • • • • • •
GDR 230 2234 336 1985 • • • •
YUG1 210 • • • • 71 325 • • • •
N/KOREA 1005 • • • • 1005 • • • • • • • •
CUBA • • • • 4588 • • • • • • • • • • • •
CZECHOS • • • • 8 14 242 • • • •
BULGARIA • • • • 13 17011 821 • • • •
HUNGARY • • • • 33 1006 1559 • • • •
CHINA 1000 • • • • 22257 • • • • 2024
POLAND • • • • • • • • 870 100 • • • •
ROMANIA • • • • • t • • 588 • • • • • • • •
Sub/
Total 5545 6876 50203 5032 2024
The Total of Food Grain provided between 1984-86, 57772. 
mt tonnes. While the Total of supplementary food 1984- 
1986 11,908. Therefore the Gross total of both food grains
and supplementary food provided by the Allies for the 
three Year Period, 69,680 mt tonnes .
Source: RRC (Aid Coordination Office).
Notes: Column(A), refers to quantity of food grain given in 
Metric tonnes.Column(B) refers to the quantity of 
supplementary food grain provided.
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TABLE 3
Transportation Assistance from Ethiopia's Allies. 1984-86.
Year 1984 1985 1986
Out­
value
USSR
GDR 35
N/kOREA 30
CUBA
CZECHOS
BULGARIA
HUNGARY
CHINA
POLAND
ROMANIA
Value
1575000
618690
Value Otv
309 EB 15180000 9 EB155,000
35 1575000
34
22
397600
998000
80 9500000
Total 65 EB 2193690 480 EB 27650600 9 EB155000
Grand Total of Vehicles 554. 
Total in value EB 29,999,290.
Source: RRC (Aid Coordination Office).
Notes.
1)The quantity, includes trucks, trailers, and light 
vehicles.
2)The value is given in Ethiopian Birr. The Birr is fixed 
at 2.07= US $ 1, and at 3.13= £1 to UK pound Sterling as at 
May 1986.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Bilateral Response of Ethiopia's Political Opponents
1. Introduction
In this chapter attention will be focused on 
discussing the response of Ethiopiafs political opponents 
to her appeals for humanitarian aid. It is perhaps worth 
pointing out here that since 1977 when
Ethiopia switched its allies, relations between the 
country and its former Western allies have been anything 
but warm.
Whereas earlier on (in the days of the Emperor) 
probably no African nation enjoyed better relations with 
the West than Ethiopia, the deposition of the Emperor and 
subsequent developments changed all that. Although trade, 
continued, unaffected by ideological differences, Ethiopia 
never saw eye to eye with the West in any other area of 
contact. As a result there was sharp decline in 
socio-cultural, military and political ties.
It is against this backdrop that Ethiopia1s onetime 
allies responded to the country's appeals for 
humanitarian assistance. Consequently, Western bilateral 
responses reflected a range of political attitudes towards 
the Ethiopian Government.
But first we consider the nature of Ethiopia's 
relations with the West and afterwards analyse the response 
of the latter in this context.
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2. Interstate Relations
(a) Earlv Historical Relations
In its external relations Ethiopia has had closer 
links with the West than it had with the Eastern Bloc 
countries. This was true until the revolution of 1974, 
which altered the direction of the country's international 
relations. Below we trace the rise and decline of those 
relations.
(b). Diplomatic Relations
The level at which diplomatic relations are 
maintained between states indicates the significance 
attached by Governments to those relations. With the 
exception of Norway and Denmark, all Western European 
countries are represented in Addis Ababa.1 Ethiopia 
maintains diplomatic ties at Ambassadorial level with the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Sweden, Germany and France. 
With the United States, however, diplomatic relations are 
restricted to Charge d'Affaires level.
Thus, in the wake of the famine, diplomatic relations 
between the US and Ethiopia were the poorest among the 
alliance group. With the rest of the countries Ethiopia's 
diplomatic relations have been maintained at Ambassadorial 
level and conducted in accordance with the dictates of 
normal day-to-day interstate relations.
(c). Socio-cultural Relations
Socio-cultural relations had existed between Ethiopia
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and the West for many years. In the days of the Emperor, 
these relations flourished, and there were American, 
Canadian, Greek, German, French, British, Dutch, Norwegian, 
Australian and Italian citizens living and working in 
Ethiopia.2
Europeans travelled to Ethiopia as tourists. Others 
preceded them as missionaries. Some went in as teachers, 
businessmen, relief officials, engineers and medical 
personnel- all keen to assist the country in its 
development. At the same time Ethiopians were sent to 
Europe and North America to study and train. But while 
the trend in the 1960s and 1970s was towards an expansion 
of these ties, more recently they have declined sharply. 
Lamenting the situation, one writer observed that there 
were about 1250 Britons living in Ethiopia at the time of 
the revolution, but that the number shrank to about 50 in 
the following three years.3 The case of the US Peace Corps 
was even worse. It was noted that twenty years ago,
Ethiopia had the largest number of Peace Corps volunteers 
in Africa.4 Now all that has changed, even though these 
relations are continuing. On the whole, however, the 
trend is that of sharp decline.
(d). Development Aid and Drought Relief
As a result of the diminished relations, the US, UK, 
and France stopped supplies of development aid to 
Ethiopia, following the Government's nationalization 
programme, shortly after the revolution.5
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The US's bilateral development aid was phased out 
completely in 1979 and no new loans or investments were 
extended to Ethiopia. With regard to drought relief, 
however, the USG, did provide a cheque of $750,000 for the 
support of livestock development and afforestation 
projects, which formed part of a $1 million dollar 
commitment by the US at a time when the the RRC was 
scouting for $430m for its activities in relief and 
development. It was like a drop in the ocean.
The British Government's position on bilateral 
development aid was similar to that of the US, and 
remained so until the famine. Progress was made during the 
relief operation however, when a British firm reached an 
agreement with the Ethiopian Government for compensation 
of its nationalized assets.6
The French followed the American and British response 
and refused provision of loans or new investment. Nor did 
they respond to Ethiopia's ritual annual appeal to donors 
for drought-relief assistance. On one occasion, however, 
they gave Ethiopia $600,000 towards controlling "the 
potential of flooding in Addis Ababa"; and on another, in 
1983, they provided Djoubiti and Ethiopia with $90 million 
French Francs for the modernization of the French-built 
Addis-Djoubiti railway.
In contrast, Italy, Sweden, Canada and Germany have 
been Ethiopia's main providers of development aid, loans 
and drought-relief assistance.
Italy is currently the biggest Western donor to
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Ethiopia in spite of the fact that, they too have suffered 
nationalization of their investment in Ethiopia.7 In their 
view their efforts there "serve Western economic interests 
as a whole". For instance, in 1983, Canada, Sweden and 
Italy agreed to donate through Unicef 9.5m Birr to 
facilitate water supplies to areas striken by drought: 
Italy's share of the contribution was the largest by far, 
amounting to 8.07m Birr. Again, in February 1984, Italy 
agreed to assist the RRC with $3m for the construction of 
ten warehouses near the port of Asseb."8
The Federal Republic of Germany has given Ethiopia 
loans on several occasions to assist the country in 
tackling its development problems. In 1975 Germany 
advanced a $36.6m loan to help finance water supply. 
Germany's drought-relief assistance prior to 1984 was also 
given in forestry development, soil conservation, as well 
as in the provision of spare parts for the expansion of 
equipment and garages in Addis Ababa.
The Swedish Government too through its development 
agencies (SAREC and SIDA) has provided bilateral 
development assistance in projects which include education, 
agriculture, energy conservation, public health, industry 
and telecommunication. With regard to the consistency, of 
Swedish aid assistance, it is noted:
Sweden,which for four years has been 
giving Ethiopia about $17m development 
aid annually has agreed to raise it to 
$20.8 m for fiscal year 1980-81.9
Like Sweden, Canada only suspended aid to Ethiopia at
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the peak of political unrest in the country in 1977 but it 
was immediately reinstated when calm was restored. For 
instance, in 1977 Canada provided aid to Ethiopia worth 
$9.2m for the development of rural water supplies. Canada 
has also provided Ethiopia with both grain and money 
through direct bilateral channels as well as through 
multilateral channels such as the World Food Program (WFP) 
and Unicef. Again, in 1980 the Canadian Government provided 
9,400 tons of wheat (worth $3.5m). In the same year the 
Canadian Government provided 52,455 tons of wheat and 
edible oil to Ethiopia, through WFP.10 In 1983, a $1.06m 
Ethiopian Birr contribution was given to Ethiopia through 
Unicef for vaccination as well as providing 346,500 
quintals of grain and a promise of another 120,000 
quintals.11
(e). Economic Relations
Ethiopia's external trade is largely conducted with 
the West, despite the political and ideological 
re-orientation of the country's foreign policy. The West 
is Ethiopia's principal source of imports: machinery, 
fuels, transport, chemicals, manufactures and cereals.12 
Likewise, the destination of Ethiopia's principal exports: 
coffee, hides and skins, oilseeds, tea and spices is the 
West. The US in particular remains Ethiopia's largest 
export market.13 In a computation of Ethiopia's external- 
trade direction over a six year period from 1980-1986 (from 
IMF's Direction of Trade statistics year book), the
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following picture emerges. After the US, the next most 
important export market for Ethiopia's principal exports is 
the Federal Republic of Germany, followed by France, Japan, 
Italy and the United kingdom.
Over the same period, Italy was Ethiopia's principal 
source of imports, followed by the US, Germany, Japan, the 
UK, France, Canada and Sweden.14 These trade patterns 
reveal that political and ideological differences 
notwithstanding, Ethiopia's trade relations are primarily 
conducted with the West. What is even more interesting is 
that this aspect of relations with the West is expanding. 
For instance it is said because of the country's commercial 
reputation which is noted as probably unparalleled in 
present day Africa (Ethiopia pays its international 
obligations promptly):
Both the U.S. Export-Import Bank 
[Eximbank] and U.K.'s Export Credits 
Guarantee Department [ECGD] 
have provided considerable cover the 
past three years. Recent ECGD (sic) 
include 24m ($36.3m) on commercial 
consideration. Only section one, terms 
for two ships being supplied by the 
British ship builder's affiliate 
Austin and Pickersgill Eximbank, which 
in 1979 helped arranged the purchase 
of Ethiopian Airlines, is now helping 
to finance the National carrier's 
order for two Boeing 767s valued at 
over $150m.l5
Asked to explain this apparent anomaly, the US Charge 
D'Affaires responded that both sides need each other. 
Ethiopia needs the West for its machinery and manufactures, 
while the West sees in Ethiopia the potential of an
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expanding market.16
(f). Political Relations
Warm political relations with the West ended with the 
deposition of the Emperor. The level of decline, however, 
varies from one country to another. The sharpest occurred 
in Ethiopia / US relations.
This was due to the fact that the US was closely 
associated with the deposed Emperor and his government; 
consequently from the outset political relations with the 
Dergue were surrounded by suspicion and mistrust. The 
nationalization of foreign assets provided the excuse for 
US criticism of the Dergue's handling of the country's 
former political leaders, and with the executions that 
followed, Ethiopia drew heavy criticisms from the US, 
Britain and the other Western countries on human rights 
grounds.
Thereafter, the United States suspended development 
assistance and limited arms sales to the Dergue. Ethiopia 
in turn retaliated by closing four US institutions: the 
Kagnew communications station in Asmara, the US military 
advisory group, the US naval medical research group and the 
US information service.17 However, the two issues that 
aggravated the worsening state of relations between 
Ethiopia and the West were the Ogaden War and internal 
conflict in its Eritrean province,
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(i). The Final Parting of Wavs
The Oaaden war
The US decision to cut off military grants in 1977 
and its refusal to sell arms to Ethiopia (in the wake of 
Somaliafs attack on the Ogaden) angered the Ethiopians and 
finally led Ethiopia to part ways with the West, and to 
re-orientate its policy towards the socialist-bloc camp.18 
Moreover, the manner in which other Western European 
countries supported the US decision led to the further 
deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and the rest of 
West European countries. Britain's support for the US 
position, for instance, provoked bitter response and was 
considered parallel to her 1935 blockade of arms to 
Ethiopia.
Unlike the US and Britain (who withheld arms to 
both Ethiopia and Somalia), Italy chose to side with 
Somalia and supplied her with arms. The Ethiopia Government 
said Italy, with a long record of infringement of the 
sanctity of Ethiopian independence, was least entitled to 
support fresh aggression against it.19 After the conflict 
was over Ethiopia expelled the then US Ambassador, Mr. 
Frederic Chaplin, and downgraded diplomatic relations to 
Charge D1Affaires level.
(ii). The Eritrean War
Like the Ogaden war the Eritrean sec essionist 
conflict spilled over into Ethiopia's political relations
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with the West. The conflict became a thorny issue, 
especially in Ethiopia's relations with the US, Britain 
and France. With the US and Britain it was a question of 
policy differences. In 1978 it led the then Ethiopian 
Ambassador in London, Mr. Ayalew Wolde Georghis, to walk 
out on Britain's Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, 
accusing him of referring to the Eritrean regional problem 
as if it were a question of a liberation movement like 
that in Rhodesia. Disagreement over the same issue led the 
Ethiopian Government in 1982 to request the French Charge 
D'Affaires to withdraw half of his diplomatic staff 
within forty-eight hours.
By 1984 only the FRG, Sweden and Canada among the 
Western donor countries managed to steer clear of major 
political disagreements with Ethiopia. In the case of the 
US, deteriorating political relations continued as late as 
February 1984, when four American diplomats were expelled.
It is against this background that the West had to 
respond to Ethiopia's appeal for humanitarian aid. The 
immediate question here is what was their response? Below 
we examine the response of the US, UK, and Canada (the 
focus of this study) in detail, and, more briefly, of the 
other alliance countries.
3. USG's Bilateral Response
The response of the U.S in any one 
disaster is normally dependent upon 
its relationship with the affected 
country. If the country is considered 
"friendly" or strategically important 
the aid provided following a disaster 
can be massive.20
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Until the last quarter of 1984 the United States 
Government paid little attention to events in Ethiopia 
despite their good knowledge of the situation. When 
sufficient pressure was brought to bear on the 
Administration however, steps were taken in line with 
popular demand and having "bowed” to the new line of 
thinking the Administration put its response firmly at 
the forefront until the end of the relief operation.
In analysing the Governments involvement three 
policy phases emerge: the first, from December 1982 to 
September 1984, is basically a continuation of the prior 
policies pursued in the late 1970s. The second, from 
October 1984 to May 1985, is marked by intense US 
involvement. Although this phase witnessed increased 
assistance, restrictions regarding the use of the aid 
nevertheless remained in place. Between May 1985 and the 
end of the relief period in 1986, however, these 
restrictions were relaxed, thereby facilitating the 
implementation of the program. The third phase coincides 
with the general improvement of famine conditions, the 
return of the rains, a reduction of needs in Ethiopia and 
a trimming of the level of US assistance. The highlight of 
the phase is the withdrawal of US development aid, which 
in a way heralded the end of active US role and a return 
to its former position.
Considering the state of relations, it was not 
surprising that even after a number of USG departments had 
in the early 1980s, deliberated on what was then a
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developing crisis, the Reagan Administration did not 
initiate an early response.
Just as emergency needs were building, so was the 
attitude of the United States Government hardening towards 
Ethiopia. The late 1970s witnessed an end of US development 
aid. At the start of the 1980s, measures were being 
considered to deprive the country even of US humanitarian 
assistance. Peter Gill charts this development of 
diminishing US interest from figures made available to 
Congress. Clearly the country's relief entitlement under 
Title 11 of Public Law 480 (PL 480) was being trimmed 
severely. In 1980 Ethiopia received 43,000 tonnes of 
American PL 480 relief aid? in 1981 the figure had been 
almost halved to 24,000 tonnes; by 1982 that had been 
quartered to 6000 tonnes.21
This downward trend in Ethiopia's share of US relief 
aid culminated in the removal of the Ethiopian Government 
from the list of US food distributors. The United Nations 
World Food Programme (WFP) was next targeted for phasing 
out. As if these moves were not enough, the 1983 US budget 
contained proposals to remove Ethiopia completely from the 
list of recipients of US humanitarian assistance. This, 
ironically, was at a time when appeals for increased 
donations were being made as a result of the growing 
food shortages within the country.
(a). Early Warnings And Neglected Appeals
An analysis of developments from late 1982 to mid
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October 1984 suggests that the US Government withheld 
assistance to Ethiopia not for want of information but 
for a variety of reasons. It is evident, however, that 
when the public in the US and elsewhere in Western Europe 
took interest in the famine there was a shift in US 
attitude in accordance with the prevailing public mood. 
Writing in the Washington Post22 , Jack Anderson, cited 
official US Government documents which acknowledged 
that there were appeals for help to the US Government by 
both the Ethiopian Government and the United Nations as 
early as November 1982. US non-governmental organisations 
working there as well as the US Embassy, in Addis Ababa 
were "regularly and accurately reporting to Washington on 
the impending tragedy". What emerges from the report is 
that the US Government was aware of the impending crisis 
but refused to have anything to do with it. Below we 
trace developments inside Ethiopia and in the US which bear 
out this argument.
A month after both the Ethiopian Government and the 
m s  appealed for help in November, the Field Director of 
the CRS relief organization approached the US Embassy for 
relief assistance (for the people of Makelle region where 
it had been involved in relief and development). The 
Director was encouraged by Embassy officials to submit 
his application to the USAID office in Washington, since 
the office was inoperational at the time (having been 
closed down in 1979).23 He accepted the advice and 
submitted an application for 838 mt. tonnes of food aid,
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plus the ocean transportation cost to Ethiopia, estimated 
at $397000. This, the CRS believed, could cater for about 
5000 families for a period of nine months.24 This
application however failed to get approval until May 7,
1983, five months later and two days after the US Charge 
D'Affaires had declared Ethiopia a disaster state.25 By 
June 198 3 the State Department was informed about the 
deteriorating conditions as a result of which up to one 
hundred people were dying every day from starvation.26
With worsening food shortages in July the CRS 
submitted another application for 4500 tonnes of food in 
order to meet the ever expanding needs in Makelle. This was 
approved in less than ten days, while at the same time the 
CRS had its regular mother- and-child programme 
restored.27 However, its application for trucks and spare- 
parts funding, which would facilitate the transportation of 
the food to the outlying areas, was refused.28 By August 
1983, two teams from the US showed an interest in the 
crisis and visited Ethiopia. The first, from USAID, spent
two weeks there and on its return to Washington recommended
15000 tonnes of food to be made available to Ethiopia.29 
The second, an eight man congressional mission was led by 
representative Howard Wolpe.
Like the USAID team, the Congressional mission 
called for a massive increase in US aid and appealed to 
both the US State department and USAID to give their 
appeal very urgent consideration. By October 1983 
conditions in Ethiopia had grown worse. This time CRS
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applied for another 16000 tonnes of food aid for its 
programme in Tigre and Eritrea. Two months later, another 
USAID team visited Ethiopia and made recommendations to the 
effect that CRS's application for 16000 tonnes of food 
be given urgent approval. Unfortunately this was not 
approved until 12 May 1984, and even then only half of the 
original request was approved.30
Meanwhile, there was a spate of increased pressure 
on USAID from members of both Congress and Senate to be 
more liberal in their treatment of aid requests. Finally 
in September 1984 after the Government had celebrated its 
10th anniversary in power, three events occurred within 
a two day period that ultimately led to a dramatic 
change in US policy. According to an official report:
On 19 September, a senior PVO official 
with extensive world wide famine 
experience informed the U.S. Embassy 
that he had never seen a situation as 
bad as that which existed in Northern 
Ethiopia. On the same day the A.I.D. 
Administrator met with a number of PVO 
representatives, one of whom said his 
organization had reached its 
absorptive capacity and the U.S. 
should begin channelling food aid 
through the Ethiopian Government. On 
20 September, a senior Western 
Ambassador to Ethiopia reported that 
"Ethiopia is starving to death" and 
about 900,000 Ethiopians will have 
died of malnutrition and related 
diseases by the end of 1984.31
After these developments a USAID team was sent to 
assess the magnitude and severity of the crisis.32 By 
the time the team returned to Washington pictures of the 
familiar scenes of disease death and destitution were
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already being broadcast on western television stations. 
Following the BBC footage and its subsequent transmission 
by the NBC network,33 the USG altered its fundamental 
attitude.
(b). US Government's New Outlook
Comparing US Government response before and after 
the media footage there is a clear shift in the level of US 
interest and involvement. Hitherto, US response had been 
very slow and very tight-fisted.34 In a press briefing 
made on October 25, 1984 in Washington, the USAID 
Administrator, Peter Mcpherson, said that he had received 
orders from the President to respond to the needs in 
Ethiopia. Mcpherson said:
THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING THE 
MATTER VERY CLOSELY. OVER THE PAST 
MONTHS AND YEARS, I'VE GIVEN HIM 
SEVERAL REPORTS. MY LATEST REPORT TO 
HIM WAS THIS MORNING. TELLING HIM WHAT 
WE HAVE DONE EXACTLY SO FAR THIS YEAR 
IN ETHIOPIA. THROUGH ME, HE WISHES TO 
CONVEY HIS REALLY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT 
THIS ENORMOUS HUMAN TRAGEDY, THAT IS 
OCCURRING IN ETHIOPIA AND THROUGHOUT 
AFRICA. HE HAS INSTRUCTED ME AND THE 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS THERE.35 
(Emphasis Added).
Although the briefing did not explicitly state what 
the new form of American response would look like it 
nevertheless contained a very useful passage underlining 
the contemporary nature of the response, as well as 
revealing its size. On this, we quote Mr. Mcpherson again, 
who said:
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BY ANY MEASURE, HISTORICAL OR 
OTHERWISE, DOLLARS 43 MILLION IN LESS 
THAN A MONTH OF OBLIGATION IS AN 
ENORMOUS FIGURE. IT IS OF HISTORICAL 
PROPORTIONS. OBVIOUSLY IT IS A 
COMMITMENT MADE WITH DEEP INTEREST ON 
THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, TO RESPOND TO THESE 
TERRIBLY STRICKEN PEOPLE, AND WE ARE 
GOING TO PROVIDE - WE ARE GOING TO 
RESPOND TO THIS NEED AS BEST WE CAN.3 6 
(Emphasis added)
On October 26, the Administration authorized the 
dispatch of about 45,000 tonnes of food aid, consisting of 
cereals, dried milk, vegetables and oil.37 Soon after the 
Government followed this with a pledge of additional 
emergency fcod aid.38
With the sudden increase in US assistance, Ethiopia 
instituted measures to ensure its effective implementation. 
A commitment was made by the relief Commissioner, Dawit, 
allowing the closed USAID office to reopen. However, the 
office was allowed only five officers to staff it.39
In November the US declared Ethiopia a "friendly 
State" (for the purpose of channelling aid direct to the 
Ethiopian Government). In the same month Peter Mcpherson 
arrived to take personal control of the US relief 
programme. In his first meeting with Dawit, Mcpherson said 
that the US would provide food and two aircraft directly 
to the Ethiopian Government.40 This was the first time 
that the United States made such a direct offer- previously 
all its assistance had been made through US non­
governmental organizations and the UN's agencies. Towards 
the end of November another congressional delegation led
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by Mickey Leland, Chairman of the Congress Select Committee 
on Hunger arrived on a four-day tour to study the famine 
conditions. Alarmed b^ . the severity of the situation, 
they sent cables to the President appealing for increased 
assistance.
In response, ships carrying US food to other 
destinations were given instructions to re-route their 
Cargo to Ethiopia.41
With additional appeals from Senator Kennedy and 
other Congressional advocates of aid, the size of US 
assistance as well as the level of its involvement began to 
expand, so much so that by the end of December 1984 almost 
a quarter of a million tonnes of grain, about two thirds of 
that food donated or pledged to Ethiopia, was supplied by 
the United States.42 Despite its generosity the US attached 
restrictions to its aid. Emphasizing this point Peter Gill 
observed:
Title 11 of PL 480 food assistance is 
intended specifically for relief 
purpose and there were supposed to be 
no political barriers to its 
distributions. Such food is intended 
"to meet famine or other urgent 
requirements to combat malnutrition 
(especially in children) and to 
promote economic and community 
development". Since 1982, one 
significant restriction had been 
placed on Title 11 emergency shipments 
to Ethiopia when USAID refused to 
channel food through the Government's 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. 
The restriction remained in place for 
two years. It was relaxed only when 
Peter Mcpherson of USAID reached a 
formal agreement with Commissioner 
Dawit of the RRC in Washington in 
November 1984 in the aftermath of 
massive television exposure of the
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famine in the United States. Ethiopia 
had been declared a friendly country 
so that it could again receive direct 
government-to-government food 
assistance.43 (Emphasis added)
It was in this context of relaxation that the US on 
one occasion utilized the bilateral channels as the route 
for 50,000 mt. tonnes of food aid. The restrictions were 
relaxed only for a short while, however, and were never 
removed completely. From October 1984 to April 1985, US 
aid was subjected to a variety of restrictions. It was to 
be used for saving lives only, since any of its use 
considered developmental was disallowed by the 
Hickenlooper and Brooke Amendments Acts. Had the 
Administration wished, however, these laws could have 
been lifted and therefore need not have been an impediment 
to relief. It was much later, when the relief 
operation was well underway, that action was taken 
temporarily to abandon them.
Thus if the intention of declaring the country a 
"friendly state" was essentially to expedite direct US 
assistance, the efforts had only a limited success. The 
restrictions remained in place until May 1985, when there 
was change in US relief policy.44 This was mandated by 
Congress when $137.5 million of "supplemental 
appropriation for Africa emergency relief" was approved. 
It was also consequent upon a more liberal interpretation 
of US laws by the State Department.45
Exactly a year after the crisis had began, US 
commitment to the relief effort stood at $380 million.46 By
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the end of the relief period the US Government was 
Ethiopia's largest benefactor, providing $460 million in 
food and supplies in both 1985 and 1986. This amount 
accounted for one third of all Ethiopia's famine relief. 
With the improvement of conditions the US relief program 
was trimmed from an average figure of well over $200 
million in both 1985 and 1986 to $20 million in 1987. In 
effect this reduction marked the end of active US 
participation in the operations and the resumption of its 
no-development-aid policy.
(c). Evaluation of US Response
In analysing the US response, four observations can 
be made, with regard to the issues of timing; the choice 
of channels; the scale and size of the aid; and the 
motivations of involvement. Although we have discussed 
the first three it is necessary to refer to them in our 
discussion of the last; in so doing, we will comment on 
some of those aspects previously mentioned only in 
passing.
The US provided more assistance than any country of 
either East or West. This assistance undoubtedly saved 
millions of lives that would otherwise have perished. The 
question that attracts attention, however, is not whether 
the US was the leading donor (important as it is ), but 
rather why it took the Administration so long to react 
to the numerous appeals made to it? Related to this, why 
did the Administration keep the Ethiopian Government at
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arm's length even after agreeing to provide the
necessary help? That it did so is seen in the
Administration's preference for channels other than the 
Ethiopian RRC, which had been created to coordinate 
external assistance.
According to the findings of the Government's General 
Accounting Office (GAO), published in 1985,47 the 
Administration acknowledged the existence of a disaster 
situation in May 1983 but refused to respond. When USAID 
was convinced of its existence it set up an interagency 
task force to address the problem. This Committee drew 
representatives from six of the most influential US 
Government departments: the State Department; the Defence
and Agriculture Departments; the CIA; the National Security
Council; and USAID. By 1983 the Committee was meeting at 
least once a month to deliberate on the crisis and it was 
from this committee that criticism of the early US 
response was first heard. It is not certain which of the 
representatives caused the delay in early response. Missing 
information made it impossible even for the powerful GAO 
to reach a conclusive judgement in this regard. For 
instance, documentation pertaining to the deliberations of 
CRS requests were missing or were not, at least, made 
available to the investigators: information with regard 
to when the committee met, how many times they discussed 
Ethiopia's needs or what views the different members 
expressed regarding the requests was never obtained. Even 
simple questions such as which committee members chaired
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the meetings were evaded.48
Jack Anderson points to the NSC representative on the 
committee as being instrumental. According to him, it was 
the NSC representative, Fred Waterings, who blocked 
Ethiopia*s requests. Waterings insisted that since the 
famine was the creation of Government it should take care 
of its own mess. Failing that, it should seek help from 
its Soviet allies. If, however, the Government needed 
American help there should be a price: it should make 
strategic concessions. In effect Waterings was advocating 
conditional US assistance.49
Janowski, the US Counselor in Ethiopia, said it was 
after Mother Teresa telephoned the President, shortly 
after the media sensitized the issue, that the President 
gave the orders for the USAID to start responding. It was 
this, combined with appeals from the public, the 
legislators and incessant demands from their leaders 
such as Mickey Leland, House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neil and 
Senator Edward Kennedy, that influenced the Administration 
to re-examine its attitude. In this regard it was not 
surprising that the response was sudden. According to the 
Washington Post:
In the 2 months since fiscal 1985 
began October 1, five times that 
amount (for all of fiscal 1984, US 
food aid to Ethiopia was 41,000 mt. 
tons, valued at $23 million) has been 
committed. Of the 215,000 tons of 
food worth $98 million already sent 
or on the way two thirds of it was 
committed after October 23.50
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Ideological differences appear to have provided the 
underlying motivation for the delayed US response, seeming 
to explain why the Administration was unwilling to address 
the problem, despite appeals from the CRS, UN, and 
Ethiopia. At first the Administration justified its 
refusal on grounds of lack of accurate information. The 
Ethiopia Government figures were said to be inflated and 
those of the UN were rejected on similar grounds.
Two additional problems were later added to the list 
of US complaints. The first was the absence of its AID 
office, which could have verified the authenticity of the 
amount requested. The second was the fear that the food 
could be diverted for use by the Army. This was why the 
US subsequently preferred to use channels other than the 
Ethiopian RRC . Even after assurances were made by both 
the EEC and the UN following their investigation, the US 
did not greatly alter its position. Behind those delaying 
tactics was perhaps the hope that the Addis Ababa 
regime might fall. Although this did not happen the 
possibility of wooing the country away from the Soviets 
might be the reason behind Washington's rather big carrot; 
after all, it has happened before with Ethiopia's 
neighbours- Egypt under Sadat, Sudan under Numeiri and 
Somalia under Barre.
4. British Government Bilateral Response
Ethiopia's relations with Britain were only marginally 
warmer than those with the U.S.
Peter Gill
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(a) Neglected Appeals and Subsequent Aid
Like the US, the British Government (BG), was aware 
of the famine through a variety of channels but was 
reluctant to respond in time: its information derived from 
media reports;51 from Ethiopia's direct appeals;52 and from 
its own sources.53
Although the BG did provide some assistance prior to 
1984, it is clear that the Government increased its aid 
after public opinion demanded so.
However, Timothy Raison, the then Minister for 
Overseas Development, reacted strongly, against criticism 
of the BG's late action. In October, in a Commons debate
on the famine he said:
It was simply not true to say the 
Government had not done anything about 
providing goods until the past few
weeks.....In 1983 Britain had sent
9000 tonnes of cereals to Ethiopia and 
this year it had sent 26500 tonnes 
before the recent additional supplies 
were announced.54
Indeed it was reported that no sooner had the plight 
of the suffering Ethiopians been brought vividly into 
British homes on Tuesday night by the BBC, than the BG 
ordered extra emergency food aid to Ethiopia, responding 
with a donation of £5 million and 6000 tonnes of food.55 
Thereafter the Government took the decision to send two 
RAF Hercules planes to assist with the internal 
distribution of food relief.56
All these actions were taken in the first week after
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BBC news bulletin in October. By the end of the month the 
British Prime Minister had announced further that the 
Government was providing lorries to facilitate the 
transportation of aid. In addition she hinted that the 
Government was considering the provision of drilling rigs 
(to secure water places for relief tanks) and would 
continue to provide other forms of disaster relief 
including medical supplies.57
The £5 million and the 6000 tonnes however, was to 
remain the Government's most substantial contribution for 
the rest of 1984. It later became a controversial issue, 
moreover, because it was drawn from ODA's existing 
budgetary funds rather than coming from a new source 
entirely. The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee observed 
that:
In respect of the sums devoted to the 
crisis in 1984-85, no increase was 
made to the ODA's cash limit: 
resources provided by the ODA were all 
allocations within the original aid 
budget. Only the cost of the RAF 
airlift in Ethiopia, paid for the 
1984-85 by Ministry of Defence was 
additional money.58
In December the ODA Minister visited Ethiopia to 
assess the relief operations. On his return he announced 
a further Government grant of £750,000 (channelled via 
British charities: War on want, SCF, and Christian Aid), 
59and the provision of grain conveyors and mills and 
18000 Blankets-all at the cost of £215000.60
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The Government later made another donation of 5000 
tonnes of grain to Oxfam and another 10,000 tonnes to the 
WFP (inclusive in the later is 5,000 tonnes of British 
contribution to the international emergency reserve).61 
In May 1985, the Government provided another 
£2 million towards the relief in both Ethiopia and Sudan 
(in response to requests from the British NGOs there),62 
and in June the Government added a further £750,000 to meet 
the acute transport needs in Ethiopia. In July the ODA 
Minister went to Ethiopia again to assess the needs and the 
progress being made.63 Although this was the last visit of 
a top-ranking Government official, BG emergency assistance 
continued, especially in the transport sector.
(b). BG Transport Assistance
In addition to food and other relief commodities the
BG made a substantial contribution to the transport sector
of the relief operation. The Government provided two RAF
Hercules aircraft, which played a key role in
airlifting and airdropping of relief food.64 Although
the RAF operations were initially intended for a month,
they lasted for fourteen months during which period they
distributed more than 32000 tonnes of cargo. Commenting on
their achievement the then ODA Minister said :
Our major contribution to food 
distribution in Ethiopia has been the 
provision since November 3 last year 
of two RAF Hercules aircraft and their 
accompanying detachment, including a 
team from the Royal Corps of 
Transport. This operation has now
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airlifted well over 12600 tonnes of 
grain and dropped a further 7 000 
tonnes to places inaccessible by any 
other means of transport.65
At the end of their stay in Ethiopia the crew had 
clocked more than 4000 hours and flew over 2,100 missions. 
The cost of maintaining their operations was, however, 
shared between the Government and the Ministry of 
Defence.66
Thus at the end of the relief operation the BG had 
donated to Ethiopia bilaterally (through the ODA), 
multilaterally (through the WFP and the EEC) and through 
British charities. It is evident from the foregoing that 
the Government increased its aid after public opinion swung 
in favour of more Government participation. Despite the
“TBG's expanding involvement, its aid was drawn fo m the 
existing budgetary allocation. Indeed, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee felt that the Government should have provided 
substantial new money, in view of the fact that the tragedy 
was a new situation altogether.67
5. Canadian Government Bilateral Response
(a). Government's Early Interest
What distinguished the response of the Canadian 
Government from that of both the British and the 
American Governments was the early interest it took in the 
crisis at the very highest level of government decision 
making.
Apparently, after a five-day visit to Ethiopia in 
August 1983, the then Agriculture Minister, Eugune Whelan,
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proposed a $2 0 million Government emergency support 
scheme. Had it been acted upon, this scheme would have 
constituted an early preventive response to what was then 
only a crisis in the making. This particular scheme, 
however, never got off the ground because it was blocked 
by the External Affairs Cabinet Committee, and was 
consequently never put to the whole Cabinet.
What is significant to note here is that the issue 
was discussed at the highest level (below the cabinet) as 
early as December 1983.68
In the fall of 1983, the Trudeau Government then 
sent an inter-departmental committee of senior civil 
servants on a fact-finding tour to Ethiopia. It was the 
reported findings of this committee that dealt a death blow 
to Whelan's proposal for early intervention. Following the 
committee's report the issue was not discussed again by the 
cabinet until almost a year later after the October BBC 
report, by which time there was a new Government in 
Canada.
(b). Government's Favourable Attitude
Following the media broadcast of the famine in mid­
winter of 1984, there was an immediate change of Government 
attitude. The office of the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) received a barrage of calls in 
reaction to the bulletin, from aid organizations, 
legislators, private individuals and the media.69
In response, the External Affairs Minister, Joe
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Clark, visited Ethiopia in early November (the first top-
ranking Western official to go there), to gain a first-hand
knowledge of Ethiopia's relief requirements. This is an 
indication of Canada's special interest in the famine. At 
the same time the Government appointed David McDonald as 
Canada's coordinator of emergency aid to Africa.70 During 
his tour, the then Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Tibabu 
Bekele, requested that Canada should act as a "bridge" 
between Ethiopia and Western donor governments and lead a 
"new world drive" for more assistance to Ethiopia. The 
choice of Canada for this crucial role was later explained 
by Ethiopia's Minister on the grounds that:
Canada has no political axe to grind,
so perhaps it is in a position to
explain to others what is involved in 
this, what the needs and 
preoccupations of this country are and 
why Canada believes there should be 
assistance regardless of political 
orientation.71
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, Canada's 
Ambassador, Stephen Lewis, made an ^ mpassioned plea to the 
international community for increased emergency aid to 
Ethiopia and the other drought-affected countries of 
Africa. Appealing to the Assembly members to take the 
threat of the crisis seriously he said:
I cannot remember in my entire adult 
life scenes of such unendurable human 
desolation.72
The magnanimous stance adopted by the Canadian 
Government contrasts strikingly with the position adopted
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by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jean 
Kirkpatrick. On one occasion Kirkpatrick complained about 
the rationale of supplying food to the marxist government 
on the grounds that the food would not reach those it is 
intended for.73
Meanwhile, the Canadian Government reviewed its aid 
policy and adapted it to immediate requirements in 
Ethiopia.
By the November 1, the Government External Relations 
Minister Monique Vezina indicated the possibility of 
increased Government aid as well as what form this aid 
should take, i.e. whether the Government should send more 
money and trucks or more food.74
(c). Government's High Profile
One special feature that set Canada's response apart 
was its high profile. The policies adopted by the 
Government in the course of the relief operation were 
consistent with a pattern established by Canada with 
respect to Third World problems. It was a case of the 
Government encouraging and complimenting the efforts of its 
citizens or, more appropriately, a case of the Government 
leading and the people following.
Government representatives were quick to realize that 
the starvation issue in Ethiopia required joint action by 
Government and citizens and the Government acted 
accordingly.75
For instance, despite the emergence of some criticism
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regarding the political complexities involved in mounting 
the relief operation, Canada's official response was rather 
to encourage it. A good example of this is Clark's 
response to the question of whether the civil war 
constituted an obstacle to the relief effort. He said:
My view is that (it) is minor and on 
the margins and it should not deter 
the people of Canada from giving the 
aid that is necessary.76
He went on further to say:
I am looking for reasons to encourage
Canadians to give aid that will help 
the starving. I am not looking for 
reasons to stop that aid.77
To this end the government introduced a new aid 
policy of matching private donations.
The interesting aspect of its approach was that while
it matched the number of donations, the value of government
contributions was sometimes two or even three times that 
contributed by the private sector.78 In essence this meant 
encouraging the public in Canada to donate generously 
through the knowledge that a donation from an individual 
would generate a multiple effect. Canada was the only donor 
state to have adopted this policy during the period of the 
relief.
Thus the government created a special African 
emergency aid fund in November 1984 and allocated $50 
million to it and also earmarked another $15 million for 
private donations.79 This, paved the way for a cooperative 
relationship between the national relief agencies and the
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Federal Government, (the Government's chief 
representative, David Mcdonald, headed the new coalition of 
the NGOs and the Federal relief program). Thus NGOs and 
the Government worked together, thereby channelling 
their resources more effectively.
(d). Government Assistance:
Matching Words with deeds 
One of the first steps taken by the Government was to 
restore to CIDA some of the money cut from its budget in 
November 1984 (this, contrasts with the action of the 
British Government in cutting the ODA budget). This enabled 
the Government to contribute immediately an extra $7.5 
million to Ethiopia.80
Again, we must not forget that the Canadian 
Government was Ethiopia's Chief benefactor of food aid 
before the current emergency programme. According to CIDA 
officials, Canada provided one quarter to one third of all 
food aid prior to the crisis. Indeed, in 1984-85 fiscal 
year Canada provided more than $25 million worth of food 
aid to Ethiopia.81
Alongside questions regarding the nature of emergency 
food provided was that regarding the medium of transfer. In 
this regard the Government unlike that of the US made 
optimum use of all channels available to it. The 
Government donated aid bilaterally as well as 
multilaterally through the United Nations (WFP) and 
through a host of Canadian NGOs such as the LWFC, the
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Canadian Red Cross, SIM, etc.
By the end of the first year of the relief operation 
the Government had offered Ethiopia emergency aid worth $26 
million, as well as contributing almost $1 million 
dollars to finance seven of Ethiopia*s resettlement 
projects.82
6. The Response of other Western Countries
Italy, Sweden, the FRG and France all featured 
prominently during the relief period. For instance,
Swedish bilateral food assistance in 1985 and 1986 was 
larger than that of the United kingdom in both years. In 
fact, Sweden was the second largest donor of bilateral 
food aid in 1986 after the Canadian Government: it was the 
also the top donor in spare parts and blankets in 1984.
The French bilateral response was also made mainly 
in food aid. France donated 6000 mt. tonnes of food aid 
in 1984, 1,000 mt. tonnes in 1985, and 8,000 mt. tonnes in 
1986.83 Overall, however, the French were content with a 
low-key involvement, although in 1985 they provided 
blankets (worth EB. 28,8000) and an Aircraft C-160, which 
served from the beginning of January 1985 to the end of 
that month.84
By contrast, Italy and the FRG adopted a very 
high-profile bilateral position akin to that of the 
Canadian Government. In 1984, the FRG was the second 
largest donor of food after Canada and the third largest 
in 1985. In 1984 it was also the second largest donor of
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medical equipment and the only donor of transport and 
shelter materials, while in 1985 it was the largest 
donor of medical equipment and shelter materials and the 
second largest of transport vehicles.85 And in 1986, the 
FRG was an important donor of household utensils. 
Additionally the FRG provided two C-160 aircraft.
The Italian Government provided food (986mt. tonnes) 
and spare parts in 1984, and was the largest single donor 
of medical equipment. In 1985 it donated 5,000 tonnes of 
food aid and was the largest single donor of transport 
assistance (331 vehicles), and in 1986 the Italian 
Government was the largest single donor of medical 
equipment and transport.
7. Conclusion
This Chapter has focused on the response of Western 
states to Ethiopia's appeal for humanitarian aid.
It appears that despite the ideological gulf between 
Ethiopia and Western governments, much of Ethiopia's 
emergency relief was provided by these states. The United 
States Government, for instance, was Ethiopia's chief 
benefactor during the period.
Having said that, we should note that there are 
similarities and differences in the manner in which Western 
donors responded to the appeals. On one hand, the 
governments of those states that had formerly maintained 
marginal relations with the Ethiopian Government (for 
instance the US and UK) showed a tendency to play down the
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Ethiopian Government's appeals and consequently their own 
response, until they were influenced critically by public 
opinion. On the other hand, those Governments that had no 
axe to grind (for instance Canada) were more favourably 
inclined to the appeals. The responses of the rest of the 
Western alliance members were similar to those of Canada. 
Table 4, at the end of the chapter summarizes Western 
states contribution to Ethiopia during the crisis.
How Ethiopia was able to obtain its humanitarian 
assistance, despite the apparent lack of convivial 
relations with the major donor states, is examined in more 
detail in the next chapter.
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TABLE 4
Summary of Maior Items Donated bv Ethiopia's Political 
Opponents; 1984-1986. (valued in Ethiopia Birr).
Country; (USA)
Year 1984
Items
Food Aid ....
Spares ....
Medical Equipment .... 
Blankets and 
Clothing
Shelter Materials 
and H/Household 
Equipment
Water, Power Supply 
and Equipment 
Communication Equip,...
Totals
1985 1986
28,524,666(a) ....
• • • • • • •
• • • • • • •
65,620 ....
18,000 ....
• • • • • • •
• • • • • • •
28,608,286
2,302,690(b)
(BRITAIN)
Food Aid 
Transport 
Spare Parts 
Medical Epuip 
Blankets and 
Clothing
Shelter Materials 
and H/Household 
Utensils 
Water and Power 
supply Equip. 
Communication Equip
Totals 2,302,690
2,650,000(c) 
1,117,128 
304,792
70000
869,040
3,940,960 70,000
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED
(FRANCE)
Food Aid 
Transport 
Spare parts 
Medical Equip. 
Blankets and 
Clothing
Shelter Materials 
and H/Household 
Equip.
Water,Power supply 
and Equip.
Communication Equip.
2,133,250(d)
Totals 2,133,250
589,293(e) 4,
288,000
877,293
18,413,700(g)
(CANADA)
Food Aid 
Transport 
Spare Parts 806,587 
Medical Equip.
Blankets and 
Clothing
Shelter Materials 
and H/Household Equip 
Water,Power supply 
and Equip.
Communication Equip..
Totals 19,220,287
5,5555,250(h) 14,
5,5555250 
'  J
(FED.REP.GERMANY)
Food Aid 3,568,630(j)
Transport 
Spare Parts 
Medical Equip. 
Blankets and 
Clothing
Shelter Materials 
and H/Household 
utensils
Water,Power supply 
and Equip. 
Communication Equip
491,830
257,414
175,650
5,000
6,413,613(k) 
10,737,184 
1,013,975 
3,505,093
682,320
698,400
9,500
500
Totals 4,498,524 23,060,585
194,947(f)
4,194,947
951,042(i) ?
14,951,042
• • • • • •
23,700
6,000
29,700
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED
(SWEDEN)
Food Aid   5,300,000(1) 4,593,392(m)
Transport .... ....  ....
Spare parts 936,160 3,600 23,700
Medical Equip. .... ....  ....
Blankets and
Clothing 170,000 ....  ....
Shelter Materials 
and H/Household
Utensils ....
Water,Power supply
and Equip.......... ....
Communication Equip.
Totals 1,106,160 5,303,600 4,617,092
(ITALY)
Food Aid 702,190(n) 6,093,011(o) l,679,360(p)
Transport     485,400
Spare parts 171,820 1,527,580 1,059,796
Medical Equip. 188,400 165,000 9,359,700
Blankets and
Clothing ....   ....
Shelter Materials 
and H/ Household
Utensils ....   100,000
Water,Power supply
and Equip. .... .... ....
Totals 1,062,410 7,785,591 12,684,256
Source:RRC (Aid Coordination Office) 
Notes
a) For 50,000 mt tonnes of
b) " 7000 " ii ii
c) " 5000 ” ii ii
d) " 6000 " ii ii
e) " 1000 " ti ii
f) " 8000 ” it ti
g) " 52000 " it ii
h) " 25000 " ii n
i) " 48000 " it ii
j) " 10000 '» ii ii
K) " 11000 " ii n
1) " 10000 " it ii
m) " 9000 ” ii ii
n) " 9000 " ii n
o) ” 5000 " ii ii
P) " 2000 " ii ii
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CHAPTER SIX
The Response of NGOs and Others in The UK. US and Canada
1. Introduction
In this chapter attention will be focused on the 
contribution of humanitarian agencies and the general 
public and how this has affected the course of the relief 
operations.
In the US and UK the involvement of NGOs and the 
public played a much more critical role in shaping the 
course of the relief operations than it did in Canada: 
while in the former countries the involvement of the 
charity organizations and the public was instrumental in 
bringing about the desired change in Government policy, it 
was not necessary in the case of Canada since the 
Government there was already predisposed to Ethiopia*s 
appeals.
As will be seen, NGOs' impact on the relief process 
has been in three principal areas: first, they mobilized 
resources from the public through direct appeals; second, 
they influenced governments attitude through raising 
public awareness and pressure which consequently led to 
increased government aid;third, they undertook the 
responsibility of administering the mobilized assistance 
directly to the famine victims. In this chapter the 
discussion will focus on the first two roles as they are 
more relevant in shaping the course of the relief at the
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donors' end.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first 
part examines the response of the non-state actors in the 
UK. The second part, looks at the process in the US, while 
the third and final part focuses attention on Canada.
2. The Response in UK
British charity organizations like Oxfam, the Save 
the Children Fund (SCF), World Vision (WV), British Red 
cross (BRC), War on Want (WOW), Christian aid, the Irish 
Concern and Catholic Fund For Overseas Development (CAFOD) 
have played a central role in mobilizing relief and in 
changing public attitude and subsequent response to the 
crisis.
As a result, all segments of British society from pop 
stars to the clergy, from school going children to 
University lecturers, from farmers to big business 
corporations and from pensioners to rich philantrophists 
came to emphathise with the sufferings of Ethiopians. 
Through employing a variety of methods suitable for each 
group the quantity of the relief material increased.
(a). NGOs1 Appeals and the Origins of Public Involvement
The British public response dated from around July 
1984. This was when "news of the famine first seriously 
impressed the western public".! following the BBC 
television documentary broadcast based on Michael Buerk's 
visit to Ethiopia. After the documentary, the Disaster
138
Emergency Committee (DEC) sent out appeals for public
donations. This raised £8.5 million: that this amount
represents half of all money the organization had received
since its inception in the sixties indicates the strength
of the public response to the NGOs* appeal.2
After the BBC bulletin in October 1984, there was a
tremendous outburst of concern and interest regarding
events in Ethiopia. Almost everybody wanted to contribute.
According to a BBC spokesman, within minutes of screening
the film their telephone switchboard was inundated with
calls from people asking how they could help.3 Similar
stories were told by the relief agencies themselves.
According to a staff of the SCF:
massive pressure was felt first of all 
on the telephone system: staff and 
volunteers organized themselves into 
evening, weekday and weekend.4
This was the start of a long campaign of public 
solidarity that was to last for the duration of the relief 
operation. How this was achieved by the NGOs and the 
different groups in Britain is analysed below.
(b). NGOs1 Mounted Pressure
Indeed, even before the nationwide mass response in 
October the voluntary agencies had been following 
developments in Ethiopia with keen interest and had been 
taking measures to remedy the situation. In early October, 
representatives of Oxfam, SCF and the British Red Cross 
met Foreign Office and Overseas Development Administration
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(ODA) officials and pleaded for more emergency aid for 
Ethiopia.5 At the same time, the Deputy Director of SCF, 
Mark Bowden, met with the EEC food aid representatives and 
appealed to them to attend to the emergency needs on 
humanitarian grounds.6 Furthermore, at the end of the SCF's 
general meeting officials urged the 2000 attendants:
to write to their MPs to pressure Mr.
Timothy Raison and Mr. Malcolm Rifkin, 
the Ministers responsible for aid, 
to give more assistance to Ethiopia.7
Their efforts paid dividends and the ODA released 
3 000 tonnes of cereals shortly thereafter.
In October Oxfam and SCF made successful 
representations to the striking editors of Thames TV to 
allow the documentary Bitter Harvest to be screened on 
October 25 1984, as a sequel to Michael Buerk's BBC 
report, to broaden public awareness of and interest in the 
famine. Oxfam appealed to the public to protest at the lack 
of strong Government aid and, as a result, 500 protesters 
surrounded a locked and guarded EEC grain store at 
Tyneside, demanding that the grain be released for the 
famine victims.8 These efforts, in addition to the 
coordinated campaigns mounted through the DEC, softened 
the British Government and EEC official attitudes. Both 
subsequently increased their relief assistance to 
Ethiopia:
European Governments and the EEC have 
at last began to take vigorous action 
to deal with the Ethiopian famine
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under pressure from the aid agencies 
and public opinion.9
NGOs' efforts were, however, supplemented by the 
contributions made by other sections of society.10
(i). Pressure from Others
Church Leaders
Church leaders played a vital role in publicizing 
the issue and ensuring sustained public interest. On 
several occasions Church leaders were instrumental in 
persuading the Government to play a more active role.11 
The involvement of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Robert 
Runcie, the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Basil Hume, 
and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council was 
crucial in raising public consciousness and keeping 
pressure on the Government and the EEC to expedite their 
assistance. For instance, the church leaders' intervention 
through correspondences with the then Foreign Secretary,
Sir Geoffrey Howe, helped in averting the early 
withdrawal of the RAF Hercules from Ethiopia.12
(ii). Workers
Workers throughout the country joined in the relief 
efforts enthusiastically. Dock workers picketed on 
learning about the Government's plans to stockpile food.13 
Others called off their industrial strike in order to 
increase the effectiveness of relief mobilization.14 TUC 
leader Mr. Norman Willis added his voice to those of the 
Church leaders on hearing of Government's intention to 
withdraw the RAF Hercules prematurely. He appealed to the
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Foreign Secretary, arguing that the withdrawal would be 
seen by the public as an abdication of the Government's 
responsibility to assist the famine victims.15
(c). Sustaining the Pressure and Awareness Campaign:
The Emergence of Band Aid and Live Aid 
If there was one individual that epitomized public
concern it was Bob Geldof, referred to by the media as Bob
"the Saint".16 Geldof was the brain behind Band Aid, Live 
Aid, and Sports Aid (Race Against Time). These events each 
represented milestones in the campaign for mobilizing 
international relief assistance. It all started on the 
night of October 23 1984, with the BBC Television 
pictures. On seeing them Geldof was moved and wanted to do 
something. He said:
I sat there.... feeling horrified, 
ashamed and disgusted. What could I do
personally? Doing something with music
seemed the logical thing 17
His response was immediate and spontaneous. He 
telephoned
his friends, fellow musicians and music companies and got 
them to agree to produce a record to raise money for the 
famine victims. Within a week, he was able to gain the 
cooperation of "virtually every top-line British pop star". 
His initial target_ was to raise £100,000 from the sales 
of 500,000 copies. As things turn out the recording served 
not only to focus international awareness on the famines, 
but also became an agent of resource mobilization.
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(i). The Making of the Record
The making of "Do They Know It's Christmas ?" was
the first event to popularize the famine in Britain and 
later throughout Western Europe and America. The recording 
itself was hastily organized in view of the enormity of 
the crisis. According to the producers, production started 
on a Sunday and by the following Friday the disc was on 
sale in record shops. In the first two weeks it was
declared the most successful single in the history of pop
music, selling more than two and a half million copies. 
Proceeds for the first two months brought £8 million into 
the coffers of the trustees.18
(ii).Impact of Band Aid
The success of the Band Aid record inspired Geldof 
and his colleagues to organize the Live Aid concert in July 
and later Sports Aid and Telethon. The Live Aid concert, 
staged simultaneously at both Wembley Stadium and John 
F.Kennedy Stadium in Philadelphia, represented the climax 
in the global mobilization of humanitarian assistance. The 
two stadiums sold tickets to an estimated audience well 
over 160,000 (90,000 at JFK and 70,000 at Wembley Stadium). 
Globally, close to 2 billion people viewed the event 
according to Syntat, an American company that distributes 
television programmes by satellite.19
By staging the concert in July, already half way into 
the year, public interest was rekindled and another $14 
million was raised at the Philadelphia show in America. In
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this way funds were raised and awareness was heightened .
If the 2 billion figure claimed is correct, then 
nearly half the world population had switched on their 
television sets for at least a moment or two. In America, 
which has a population of over 230 million (representing 
about 4% of world population), three quarters of the 
population is estimated to have watched the concerts? in 
China, with a fifth of the world's population, the 
country bought four-hour rights to the programme; in 
India, with a sixth of the world population, but only two 
million television sets, it was estimated that more than 
100 million people with access to a television watched the 
event. All Western European countries tuned in, although 
only Yugoslavia among the Eastern European countries was 
able to view "non-stop”, while the Soviet Union allowed 
selected viewers to watch the program. In the rest of the 
world two thirds of the countries bought rights to the 
show.20 The event raised more than £50 million with more 
than a quarter of the sum coming from the United Kingdom. 
To this extent the money raised from the record and Live 
Aid concert dwarfed other efforts.
The success of Band Aid and Live Aid can be perceived 
from several perspectives. First, they have raised large 
sums for the cause. Second, they raised public 
consciousness to an unprecedented level thereby 
facilitating the transformation of the relief overnight. 
Third, the organizers succeeded in getting aid directly to 
the needy areas of Ethiopia including the war zones of
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Eritrea and Tigray, in itself no mean achievement, given 
the difficulties involved in dealing with the central 
Government and the rebels.
Given the spontaneous emergence of Band Aid, its ad 
hoc nature and the non professionalism of its management, 
its success thus indicates the potential more generally of 
music for raising global awareness on shared global 
problems. To what extent can the success of Band Aid be 
extended to such issues as a free nuclear world, the 
equitable distribution of shared world resources and 
environmental issues? Both Band Aid and Live Aid have made 
the climate more favourable for the NGOs to mobilize 
greater relief assistance.
(d). The Mobilization of Resources
(i). NGOs and Mobilization
The gravity of the crisis led Oxfam to make its 
largest ever single donation,21 the biggest by far of 
all NGO donations from Britain and also among the earliest 
efforts. Indeed, Oxfam was the first organization to draw 
government and public attention to the crisis, acting well 
before October 1984. In July, the organization produced a 
report warning governments and the international community 
about the impending disaster. When it realized the 
situation needed urgent action, it went out of its way to 
purchase 10,000 tonnes of grain, which it sent to 
Ethiopia.22In early November, Oxfam dispatched a further 
shipment of 14,000 tonnes of grain.23 Oxfam continued with
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its relief appeals and raised £23 million (barely three 
weeks after the BBC bulletin), for Africa as a whole, out 
of which it directed £19 million to Ethiopia.24
The SCF raised £2 million by November 14,25 and was
the second most successful relief agency in fund raising 
by the end of the operation. Of the £18.2 million that the 
charity raised by October 1985, it committed £7.5m in 
Ethiopia and £4.7m to the Ethiopian refugees in Sudan.26 In 
addition it undertook close to a dozen airlifts during 
the period of the relief operation.27
War on Want took active interest in campaigning 
for the supervision of the relief operations through 
calling for the setting-up of an International Commission. 
This, the agency believed, would minimize the Central 
Government's mismanagement of relief food sent in by 
Western donors. War on Want's high profile sets it apart 
from the other non-governmental organizations. Its active 
support for the EPLF and TPLF, (with whom it worked for
more than 10 years), highlighted the plight of those
areas.28
By the end of the relief operation British charities 
raised somewhere between £75m and £100m.29
(ii). The Role of Others In Resource Mobilization 
Church Leaders 
Church leaders were active in taking measures that 
helped the relief cause. Cardinal Hume went on a five-day 
study tour to Ethiopia in October 1984 shortly after the
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broadcast.30 On his return, Hume together with other Church 
leaders intensified efforts and called on the Government 
to increase its assistance.31 During the launching of the 
Daily Mirror's "Mercy Mission" the Anglican Bishop of 
Liverpool, the Rt. Rev. David Shepherd, and the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool, the most Rev. Derek 
Worlock, added their influential voices to the efforts 
being undertaken.
The role of the Church leaders has been important in 
establishing a measure of credibility for the cause where 
the involvement of a politically less-neutral body would 
have met with resistance from the Government.32
(iii). Workers
The involvement of workers further contributed to 
the additional quantity of aid made available for relief. 
Workers volunteered their services free. At Fox's biscuit 
factory in Batley, West York, they worked an extra shift 
so that high-energy biscuits could be produced for the 
famine victims. Dockers worked overtime during the 
Christmas break to load relief items for shipment to 
Ethiopia.33
(iv).Corporate Organisations
A number of private and public corporations responded 
to appeals by contributing their services or goods. 
Phonogram produced the Band Aid record without charging 
for its services and forfeited its share of sales profit?
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ICI (one of Britain's leading chemical companies) provided 
Phonogram with the Vinyl used to produce the first half 
a million copies of the Band Aid record?34 the print 
media provided free advertising space for the promotion 
of sales; the Independent Broadcasting Authority waived its 
normal procedures on charity-appeal advertising, thereby 
allowing Tyne-Tees, Granada, and Border television stations 
to join in giving the relief effort free publicity in 
their local areas.35
The Manufacturer's Stationers Association (MSA) 
donated six million envelopes to the SCF for use in the 
collection of donations. British Airways provided an 
airliner for the Daily Mirror "mercy flight", while 
British Telecom opened three special lines and a Disc line 
on Christmas Day 1984, donating proceeds from calls made to 
those numbers to the relief. The Post Office
allowed its staff to distribute the six million envelopes 
donated by the MSA free throughout the country (the first 
time such a delivery had been made free of charge).36_
The leading food stores contributed quantities of a 
variety of needed relief items. Sugar was donated by Agyll 
Foods and Tate and Lyle, condensed milk by Sainsburys, 
flour by Tesco, Horlicks by Beechams, porridge oats by 
Quaker Oats, cooking oil by Craigmillar and medical 
supplies by Boots.37
The banking world organized "Bond aid", while the 
Leeds Permanent Building Society allied with Band Aid and 
Help the Aged and made its 475 branches available as
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centres for deposit of blankets by customers.38
Finally, as a result of a project organized by Rod 
Cousens of "Quicksilver", in conjunction with Band Aid, 16 
software houses collaborated together to produce 10 
computer games in two versions, in aid of the relief. The 
games help raised £200,000 through sales of 50,000 copies 
of the software.39
Notwithstanding the altruistic objectives of these 
companies, it is clear that they too stood to derive 
advantages from their involvement. For instance, goodwill 
was expected to accrue from these efforts: their 
identification with a humanitarian cause, it was 
perceived, would enhance their public image, particularly 
given the publicity surrounding the event. For the 
computer companies there was the spin-off possibility that 
the new games would provide opportunities for testing 
ideas that could be marketed later.
(v). Educational Institutions
British educational institutions and colleges 
contributed tremendously both in raising funds and 
creating awareness of the cause. One of the earliest 
responses came from school children, who after seeing the 
film contacted the Sheffield Whirlow Hall farm - and asked 
that a ton of their harvest of grain be sent to Ethiopia.40 
Universities throughout the UK organized rag weeks and 
other funds raising events which increased publicity and 
raised resources.41
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(f). Response of the Left
Two contradictory positions emerged in the 
response of the British left. On the one hand, there were 
those in favour of active involvement; this was 
demonstrated in the Labour Party's attempt to get all 
socialist parties in Europe to arrange a joint response.42 
On the other, there were those who advocated 
non-involvement. They argued that involvement was 
misguided, first because the "famine movement " ignored 
the conditions that created the crisis in the first place 
and second, because it detracted attention from those 
responsible for the conditions. Hence, they argued, 
response by the left, would create an "ideological bloc" 
against the fundamental questions that ought to be 
raised.43 Consequently, those who took part were blamed by 
this group for exploiting the consequences of the crisis.44 
Hall and Jacques noted:
By and large the organised left has 
been almost totally absent from the 
whole movement and process. The 
left sought no popular points of 
entry into it.... Following Live 
Aid, there was a series of 
initiative such as Fashion aid and 
Art aid but no Union aid.45
(g). The Response of Public
The contribution of ordinary people lent significant 
support to the efforts of the relief agencies and others 
involved. Many people identified with those suffering.
Some sold their possessions in order to assist; others 
contributed savings and earnings. One Hertfordshire farmer
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sent 3 2 tonnes of grain to Ethiopia as part of the "Send a 
Tonne to Africa" campaign, while the Cambridgeshire 
farmers' appeal for the "Send a Tonne to Africa" campaign 
raised over 2000 mt. tonnes of farm produce.46
The public have used a variety of methods to 
mobilize resources. These included: street and pub 
collections? exhibitions and concerts; film and slide 
shows? sponsored walks? swims? sit-ins? artists sketching; 
book publication? raffles and even parachute jumps.
The NGOs shaped the level of material assistance 
raised for the famine using public support, encouraging 
increased public donations and direct public protests, 
which put pressure on the British government to take more 
concrete policy steps towards relieving the famine. How 
these efforts resemble or differ from similar efforts 
undertaken in the US and Canada we shall find out below.
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3. The Response in the US
In the US the exercise did not gather momentum in 
time. This was due to the lack of information and interest 
concerning Africa in general and the crisis in particular. 
The major newspapers had run a number of articles?47 relief 
organizations had sent out mass mailings?48 the churches 
had pleaded for assistance. All these produced few results. 
Nonetheless, they were important in preparing the ground 
for what was to follow. Indeed, The Washington Post's. 
five-part series on the issue was the basis of 
Representative Harold Wolpe's seven-member delegation to 
Ethiopia in July 1983.49
When the media focused its attention in October, 
however, public apathy ended:
The turning point was television. On 
October 23, "NBC Nightly News" aired a 
BBC film of emaciated children huddled 
by the hundreds in squalid camps. The 
picture was horrible, riveting as any 
sight of a starving child can be. The 
dormant apathy broke at both 
government and private levels.50
The public became suddenly motivated: school 
children, teachers, priests, politicians, company 
executives, in short people from all walks of life, 
suddenly became interested and concerned. The relief 
organizations were flooded with calls and enquiries.
Public reaction was overwhelming, the outpouring of 
offers of help unprecedented. The American NBC was one of 
the earliest to receive such calls. On the night of the 
broadcast alone the network received more than 1000
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telephone calls.51 The story was repeated all over the 
country.
According to James Sheffield, President of the US 
Committee for the UNICEF, many of the callers were in 
tears. Betley Woodward of the SCF said they had never seen 
anything like this in terms of the volume of telephone 
response: staff and volunteers were fully employed in 
taking calls up to 2.00 a.m.52 Robert Burch, a Vice 
President of SCF, said it was a record response in the 
organization's fifty-one year history.53Melissa Lowe, a 
spokesperson of the WV, said there was an "unprecedented 
bonanza of financial contributions that buy food, shelter, 
medical care, blankets and other items for the 
Ethiopians".54 Keith Griffin of the Christian Relief 
Service (CRS) organization said:
I have never seen a fund-raising 
effort that brought in so much money 
from so many people in so little a 
time.55
The major relief and development organizations were 
deluged by volunteers, who worked in squads each night to 
assist in fielding telephone calls from the many million of 
donors across America. Many small organizations also sprang 
up overnight in response. The sections following outline 
and analyze the public contribution to the relief effort.
(a) . Pressure on the American Government
(i). Pressure from Concerned Organizations
One of the earliest public appeals made to the
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President of the US was from a group of 162 religious 
leaders operating under the auspices of the Bread For 
The World Organization (a relief organization representing 
major US religious denominations), who requested the 
authorization of a "Berlin- style" airlift of food to 
save human lives. The appeal is significant as the first 
major organized pressure on the Administration, and 
notable in its invocation of "Berlin style" airlift, thus 
drawing the comparison with one of the greatest human 
tragedies this century. The appeal sought to emphasize 
the central role the US had played in the earlier crisis 
and thereby appealed to the Government to play that role 
once more. The priests urged the President to "mobilize 
the same kind of response to save human lives".56
Likewise, the consortium of Bay Area clergymen, 
representing different local and national black church 
organizations such as the National Baptist Connection USA 
inc., Church World Service and the Methodist Federation of 
San Francisco, appealed to the President and Congressmen 
to increase their relief effort. They urged the President 
to launch an expedited relief program and pleaded with 
Congress for the quick passage of all Africa relief 
legislation.
In what looks like the most comprehensively thought- 
out strategy for coping with the disaster, the clergy 
presented the Administration with a five-point plan and 
demanded its immediate implementation. For the first time 
the Administration was faced with concrete demands from
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the public regarding its action. These demands were:
1). The establishment of an Africa airlift, utilizing 
military and other Aircraft to deliver food and 
transportation;
2). The coordination of food airlifts and food convoys 
within Africa;
3).The re-routing of grain shipments now at sea to African 
ports ?
4).The development of a short-term food-delivery network 
within Africa.
5).The development of a long-term international plan aimed 
at reducing the projected famine death toll.57
By mounting pressure on the Administration public opinion 
changed government policy. Accordingly:
Washington moved quickly to approve 
increased aid requests through private 
agencies and initiated a bilateral 
government-government grant of food58
As the former US Ambassador McCloskey acknowledges, public
opinion cannot shape government's policy more directly than
it did in this instance.59
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(ii). The Response of Black Americans
Despite the early interest showed by a section of the
black community, in general the black response was not
radically different from that of the rest of the country. 
This appears to be the case even after the BBC/NBC 
programme was televised nation-wide in October. A concerned 
black American activist and businessman, Ed Brown, 
reflecting upon the general 
situation at the time, lamented:
Despite mutterings among us, despite
scenes of starving babies in Ethiopia
on Evening News, this situation hasn't 
received the exposure it needs. And 
what is sadder to me is that there has 
been no articulate black leadership 
on this issue.60
The response of the black community was therefore 
slow, gathering momentum concurrently with the national 
response. This can be seen from the fact that the 
earliest black organization to express interest -BARAC- 
owed its origins to a UN report about the impending 
disaster, which had prompted fifty black-American clergy 
to convene, and consequently to form BARAC in February
1984.
The organization's leaders went on a fact-finding 
tour to Ethiopia and on their return mounted a campaign to 
raise funds. Tapping the rich talents of its community, 
the group organized concerts and showed film of the drought 
at community functions and gatherings. BARAC was able to 
raise about $100,000 by September 1, 1984.61 Explaining the
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motive of the organization's involvement, the Chairman,
Reverend Alfred Smith, said the organization was
motivated by what other American minorities such as
Italians, Polish, Jewish, Germans, and Irish have done for
their homelands. He said:
When there's hunger in Poland, the 
Polish rise to the occasion. When 
there's an earthquake in Italy the 
Italians respond. We as black 
Americans are just trying to do the 
same.62
Expanding on the point, Larry Carroll, the National Media 
Director agreed:
It's our homeland. We as a people are 
the only ones who have a vested 
hereditary interest.63
In a similar fashion the Ethiopian community in Washington 
joined the efforts to raise funds for the homeland. 
Steered by the Ethiopian Hunger Relief Coordinating 
Committee they helped in the campaigns within their 
community and in their neighbourhood.64
(b). NGOs and Raising Consciousness
An important component of fund-raising is the 
creation of the right climate to generate the required 
response. American relief organizations undertook a number 
of projects that educated the public on the nature of the 
crisis and at the same time reminded them of the needs 
required to overcome the problem. The activities themselves 
created awareness and helped to sustain the drive of the
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fund-raising campaigns. An example is the WV's calls for 
the public to fast during the weekend of April 26-28. In 
this way the public could individually identify with the 
cause in addition to being involved in raising funds. 
Reverend Richard Maloney's twenty-three mile jog at 
Christmas - popularly referred to as "preaching with his 
feet" - raised $9000 and attracted press coverage.65 
Subsequently the baton of sustaining the campaign was taken 
over by the music industry.
(i). The US Artists
The campaign was sustained to a large extent by the 
emergence of impromptu organizations which developed in 
response to the needs. The United States Artists for Africa 
organized two major events which raised awareness and 
sustained public interest.
(ii). Origins of the Song
The idea of writing a song and organizing a benefit 
concert in the States drew inspiration from Band Aid. The 
idea was to make it "bigger and better", and its initiator, 
Harry Belafonte, aimed at improving on Band Aid's success. 
In December 1984, Belafonte telephoned Ken Kragen (the 
manager of Kenney Rogers and Lionel Riche) and discussed 
with him the idea of organizing a benefit concert. Instead, 
Kragen suggested making a benefit record with video spin­
off possibilities as a better way to raise large sums.66 
On January 28, forty-five musicians assembled at the A & M
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recording studio and produced the record.67
By the middle of May the single had sold about 7.5 
million copies, while the album had sold about 4.5 million 
copies. Commenting on the projectfs success, Kragen 
expressed belief that the impact of the song ("We Are The 
World") marked a fundamental shift in the American psyche 
and that the "selfish narcissim of the 1970s has suddenly 
given way to a national altruism".68 In under ten weeks, 
proceeds from sales plus donations raised over $45 
million.69
fiii) The Impact of the Song:("We Are The World")
Expanding the Publicity Drive
To ensure maximum publicity was given to the event 
the song was aired all over the world in a mass "simulcast" 
that lasted six minutes, twenty-two seconds. It was 
estimated that about five thousand radio stations in the US 
alone participated in giving the song airplay, together 
with another one thousand stations in the rest of the 
world.70 In the USA alone, the impact was phenomenal. Both 
national and international US network stations such as 
Muzak, the American Cable Rock Channel MTV, the Voice of 
America (VOA) and the Armed Services Radio tuned in and 
helped to spread the message to millions of people. In the 
case of Muzak it is observed:
Muzak, which piped background music 
into 110,000 offices, shops and 
factories around the country, 
broadcast a human voice only once
before,  The first time was to
announce the release of American
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hostages from Iran in 1981. Muzak 
reaches 80 million Americans daily 
through satellite transmission around 
the U.S..71
While the amount of money raised is quantifiable, the 
achievement of USA in raising public awareness is beyond 
measurement. As underscored by Kragen:
You try to influence a time. Whatever 
it is. Five, 10, 15, 20 years. The 
song "We Are The World" did that. The 
kids who grow up with "We Are The 
World" as one of their major 
influences will make a society that is 
better about giving. It's a big 
mistake to try and accomplish too 
much.7 2
An immediate by-product of the USA was the "Hands 
Across America" campaign which addressed the problem of 
American poor in the same manner as it did to the African 
problem. Perhaps without the birth of the "We Are The 
World", "Hands Across America" would never have been 
"conceived". Indeed the contribution made by musicians in 
both Europe and America will be remembered as the greatest 
single event that united the world on the famine issue and 
helped mobilized relief for it.
(c). NGOs and Mobilization of Relief
(i) . NGOs and Mobilization
Both secular and religious organizations such as the 
CRS, WV, SCF, CARE, the American Red Cross, Oxfam America, 
and other smaller ones such as the Americans Friends 
Service Committee, World Alliance of YMCAS, the Hunger
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project, the American Jewish Joint Distribution committee, 
Africare and Black American Response for the African Crisis 
(BARAC) collected funds for the relief. It is estimated 
that not less than 125 organizations were involved.73
These organizations coalesced under an umbrella name 
Interaction and together by the first week of February 1985 
mobilized over $40 million.74 The six largest American 
relief agencies collected $10 million in the first five 
weeks.75 Later as the fund-raising continued, the CRS alone 
raised $20 million in three months.76 By the first half of 
January that figure had risen to $29 million. This makes 
an interesting comparison with previous CRS efforts 
during the same quarter of 1984, which raised less than $lm 
dollars.77 By March 1985 the American public donation had 
reached close to $100 million. According to the Washington 
Post:
The outpouring of American generosity, 
public and private, exceeds modern 
precedent. Almost $90 million has been 
donated by the public to the 
organizations that are working to feed 
the millions who have been forced off 
their land and are near starvation.78
Their success reflects the dynamism of the different 
fund-raising strategies adopted. The smaller organizations 
raised funds and transferred them to the bigger and more 
experienced. For instance, BARAC initially donated its 
money to the WV, which undertook the direct administration 
of the relief plus long- term development projects.79BARAC 
later started its own food distribution in Ethiopia under 
the direction of WV.80 This is an example of church-based
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organizations cooperating for the same cause. Another 
example is the case of the American bishops who raised $7 
million through parish congregational collections for the 
CRS. The secular organizations relied mainly on direct 
donations from the public, or in organizing fund- raising 
events such as sales and auctions, sponsorships and direct 
mailings. The majority of them accepted US Governments 
subventions.
(ii). The Public and Relief
The success of the US relief organizations would 
have been negligible were it not again for the support 
they received from the public both in quantifiable terms 
and expressed moral support. This was invaluable in terms 
of the impact upon the lives of the affected people and 
in terms of encouraging the organized agencies to demand 
more from their governments. Various sections of American 
society were generous with their donations. A law student 
from the George Washington University collected more than 
$1,900 on the campus.8lThrough their door-to- door 
collections, organized dances and car washes the students 
in return received public recognition for their 
contribution. Donations received were from every social 
strata.
(iii). Corporate Firms and Relief
Those with the financial power to influence the
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operation also responded substantially to the public 
demands for more aid. Financial companies that would 
normally not associate themselves with humanitarian 
endeavours contributed to the relief efforts. Examples of 
household American names that identified with the cause 
were the American Telephone and Telecommunication (AT&T), 
Chevrolet, Pepsi, Kodak and Tower Records. These companies 
provided funds, material resources and expertise.
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4. The Response in Canada
Among the Canadian relief agencies82 working in 
Ethiopia were the Mennonite Central Committee, which has 
been active for over ten years in the country; the 
Lutheran World Relief (LWR), which has been in Ethiopia 
since 1968; the Society of International Missionaries 
(SIM), which was in the country prior to the 1974 famine, 
and the Food for the Hungry International (FFHI), which 
was established in Ethiopia in December 1984.
As a result of their grassroots knowledge of what was 
happening, the World Vision of Canada (WVC) attempted to 
raise public awareness long before October 1984. According 
to Weale, a relief official of the WVC, the agency tried 
to bring what was then a developing crisis to the notice 
of Canadians 18 months earlier, but regrettably no one 
seemed to notice, until the BBC film broke the story.83 In 
this respect, the mass public in Canada was no different 
from the public in the UK or the US.
However, once the media had provoked public response 
to the crisis, first in Britain, and subsequently in the US 
and Canada, everybody seemed involved: virtually all 
relief agencies in Canada were inundated with calls from 
the public, seeking to offer help.
The Director of Oxfam, Mr. Mckinnon B.C., said their 
telephone lines were literally off the hook. People were 
phoning and pledging their donations non stop.84 The 
response was so overwhelming that according to one Oxfam 
Canada report, they received 3 00 to 400 phone calls in one
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day, when on normal days they receive three to four calls 
only.85 All the relief agencies were flooded with calls. 
According to the Director of WVC, Bill Newell, his agency 
had to put in special lines to accommodate the 
additional traffic.86 The Canadian Save the Children 
(CanSave) reported a tremendous increase in telephone 
calls from the public. Shortly after the television 
reports, the organization put the figure in the region of 
2000 calls.87
Enthusiasm for the cause pervaded the entire 
political landscape in Canada. In Ottawa, the Government 
agency CIDA was flooded with what it described as a 
"barrage of calls from aid organizations, MPs1 offices, 
private individuals and the media, in response to the 
footage". Lorna McCornick, International Affairs officer 
for the Red Cross national headquarters in Toronto, claimed 
the response to be the heaviest since that for the Vietnam 
Boat People.88
Offers of public assistance came from people in all walks 
of life.
(a). Public Relief Mobilization
(i) . The Public and Mobilization
Reports of public generosity are many: the man who 
walked off the street to hand a $1000 dollar donation to 
the Canadian Save the Children Fund89; a company that sent 
a donation of $3000 to CanSave yet asked not to be 
named; a woman who was so touched by the sufferings she
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saw on the screen that she organized a campaign encouraging 
all mothers in Canada to donate their November family- 
allowance cheques: according to one Ottawa- based relief 
agency, so great was her success that they were overwhelmed 
with cheques from responding mothers.90 Fred Benson, a 
farmer who had personally witnessed the earlier Ethiopian 
famine in 1973, donated his 43 hectare farm, estimated to 
be worth $400,000 to the relief effort in Africa.91 Making 
the donation to the Mennonite Central Committee of 
Ontario, he said:
I have a full belly every day. We in 
Canada have a responsibility to those 
less fortunate.92
One of the most moving responses to the famine was that of
the Inuit Eskimo community of the North West Territory.
With vivid and painful memories of the famine that affected
their own community in the 1950s, they related to the
suffering of the Ethiopians. One Canadian Inuit, Mr.
Panagoniak said:
I hurt for those people, I was skinny 
like them. My little sister was better 
off because my mother could feed her, 
but the rest of us were under the 
snow, with only heads showing, waiting 
waiting........ 93
The community raised $48,000, representing about 10% of 
their savings, in a matter of weeks.94
(ii).The Active Support of Public Officials
Many public officers, such as Mayor Michael Harcourt
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of Vancouver and James Matkin, President of the British 
Colombia Business Council reacted enthusiastically. 
Supported by David Mcdonald (Africa Emergency Aid co­
ordinator) , the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
they chaired a 100 member committee of businessmen, 
religious leaders, trade unionists, teachers and 
representatives of aid agencies, to raise a $1 million 
dollar relief- fund. Involving over 50,000 school children 
in the fund-raising effort, Harcourt and his committee 
expanded their project to include a live entertainment 
benefit concert and a Telethon. The mayor sought to ensure 
that suffering of this kind would not be repeated, and 
to apply pressure on the Canadian Government to this end:
We hope that this pressures 
Governments into realising that what 
we're after is draining the swamp. We 
want to get rid of famine and we want 
to make sure that we don't have to do 
this again.95
The Speaker of the Ontario Legislature, John Turner, 
cancelled his annual Christmas party ( normally the most 
lavish celebration held at the Legislature) and donated the 
money to Unicef.96
(iii) . The Contribution of Provincial Governments
Closely related to the efforts of public officers 
were those of the various provincial governments. Many 
followed the Federal Government by donating generous sums 
of money to the cause. The government of Quebec sent 
$100,000 to the Christian Relief and Development Agency in
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Ethiopia.97The Mayor of Toronto promoted the relief effort 
in Ontario by declaring November 16, 1984 "give up your 
lunch day", the lunch money saved being donated for 
assistance in Ethiopia. This was in addition to the 
pledge of $ 60,000 made by the city.98 Other provincial 
governments such as Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba all made pledges of financial aid.99
(b). Canadian NGOs and the Mobilization of Aid
(i). NGOs and Mobilization
According to Rev. David Robins of WVC, 1985 was its 
"biggest year ever". The agency raised $43 million, of 
which almost $12 million came from the provincial 
governments.
The contributions made by CanSave, Oxfam, the 
Canadian Roman Catholic Church, and the other NGOs, was 
similarly impressive. All the relief agencies manned 
telephone shifts to receive public donations. They 
provided forums for coordinating the public response and in 
particular instances took measures to articulate public 
demands to both the provincial and Federal governments.
For instance, in early November 1984 a concerned citizen 
group, The Ethiopian Action Train Committee, was
formed and with the assistance of the Red Cross raised 
funds for the Red Cross organization in Metro.100 In British 
Columbia, the Federation of International Agencies (BCFIA), 
which included 16 member organizations such as Oxfam,
the Red Cross, YMCA, etc, made representation to the
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Columbia provincial cabinet in November, appealing for $2 
million "out of concern that private donations won't be 
enough to maintain relief to the drought stricken African 
nation".101
(ii). The Church
The Church in Canada (the Roman Catholic Church) 
undertook one of the earliest measures in response to the 
tragedy by setting up two special funds. An Africa 
Drought Relief Fund and an Ethiopia Drought Relief Fund 
were set up to collect donations.102 In the same vein, the 
Canadian Red Cross launched a $2 3 million disaster-appeal 
fund (its biggest appeal ever) and raised close to $0.5 
million in under two weeks.103
(iii).Corporate Organizations
Finally, there was the participation and involvement 
of the corporate community. The Royal Bank of Canada made 
available its branches as collection points for donations 
on behalf of the Canadian relief organizations.104 Air 
Canada provided five flights to Ethiopia at a cost 
$500,000, with LWF, Cancross, Oxfam, Canadian Catholic 
Organization for Development and Peace, and Unicef 
assembling the Cargo.
The Canadian musical group, Northern Lights, added 
another $2.4 million to the donations, through sales of 
their single "Tears Are Not Enough", modelled on Band Aid's 
" Do They Know Its Christmas?".105
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As stated by the Globe and Mail, by early December 
1984 Canadians from coast to coast had raised $11 million 
for the Africa relief projects allocating almost 
$9.7 million to Ethiopia.106
5. Conclusion
It is evident from the foregoing that the active 
involvement of the charity organizations and the general 
public in the US, UK and Canada played a central role in 
mobilizing emergency assistance for Ethiopia. This was 
more so in the US and UK where both the official and non­
official response was affected considerably by their 
actions. Once the relief organizations took it upon 
themselves to champion the cause, the speed and direction 
of the operation was positively changed. Subsequently, 
Governments increased their assistance and opened direct 
bilateral channels to move their aid. It was in the light 
of what the NGOs had accomplished that the UN was called to 
coordinate the operation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Role of The United Nations
1. Introduction
Unlike its intervention in other disaster situations, 
the United Nations played a central role in the 
coordination of humanitarian relief in Ethiopia. Its 
involvement came in the wake of the general concern about 
events in Ethiopia following the BBC film which showed the 
appalling conditions of life around the relief camps in 
the north of the country. Like the rest of the 
international community, the UN's response came late. The 
first action of the Secretary General, on October 26, was 
to issue a special appeal to the international community 
for expedited relief assistance to Ethiopia. Because of 
the critical food shortage there and the ominous prospect 
that vast numbers might die, he urged quick and 
coordinated action.1 The following week, on November 2, 
the former RRC Commissioner addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly and reiterated the magnitude of the crisis 
engulfing his country.20n November 5, the Secretary General 
created a special Office for Emergency Operations in 
Ethiopia (OEOE), and appointed Mr. Kurt Jansson to head the 
office as his special representative. Jansson was 
designated United Nations Assistant Secretary General for 
Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (UN ASG/EOE). On the same 
day (November 6) that Kurt Jansson accepted his
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appointment, the UN General Assembly debated the crisis 
affecting not only Ethiopia but the entire sub-Saharan 
region. On November 8, the Secretary General arrived in 
Ethiopia and visited the Korem relief camp to assess the 
situation for himself.3His visit indicated the high level 
of concern within the UN and its determination to play an 
important role in the relief process. In order to put the 
UN role into proper perspective a review of its earlier 
involvement seems appropriate.
2. UN Involvement
(a) UN1s Earlv Effort
The UN involvement with the Ethiopian crisis predates 
the creation of the special office. In March 1983, 
following the warnings made by the UN Resident 
Representative in Addis Ababa, at a meeting of donor 
governments and international agencies in Geneva, the 
international community was informed of the developing 
crisis. On the basis of this information the United Nations 
Office of Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) issued an 
appeal for assistance.4 On April 22, UNDRO issued another 
appeal for $30m.5By June 1983, a special meeting of donor 
governments, UN agencies and NGOs was convened by UNDRO to 
raise further assistance for the country.6
Meanwhile, to maintain the momentum of these appeals, 
the former RRC Commissioner Mr. Dawit Wolde Giorgis 
undertook a tour of Western European countries. In Rome he 
appealed to both the WFP and the Food and Agricultural
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Organization (FAO) and in Geneva he requested assistance 
from the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees 
(UNCHR) and UNDRO.7 In November, he addressed the UN 
General Assembly and pleaded for more aid.8
Faced with an with ever-rising demand for emergency 
relief, the RRC launched a major appeal on March 30, 1984 
in Addis Ababa. On the basis of the RRC ' s outlined aid 
requirements, UNDRO issued a special appeal for food, 
transport and medicines in April.9In May, Dawit made 
another appearance before the United Nations General 
Assembly and reiterated the worsening of the crisis in 
Ethiopia.10UNDRO meanwhile pursued its role of issuing 
appeals for assistance. Although it is difficult to know 
exactly how much assistance was secured at this stage 
through the UN's efforts, it seems safe to assume that it 
was minimal: the increased frequency of appeals to donors 
by both the UN and the RRC underlined the low level of 
response to previous appeals for help.
(b). UN And Relief Operations in General
The creation of a special office to coordinate the 
international response to the disaster (instead of using 
existing structures) within the UN was evidence of how 
seriously the crisis was now taken, as was the fact that 
the other affected offices within the UN system cooperated 
fully with it. The most appropriate office to coordinate 
the UN involvement would otherwise have been UNDRO, which 
had been created in the early 1970s in response to the
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perceived need for effective multilateral involvement in 
disaster relief operations. As a result of the 1970 
earthquake in Peru, and the tidal wave in what is now 
Bangladesh, the UN General Assembly authorized the 
creation of UNDRO in resolution 2816(xxvl) on December 14 
1971.11The coordinator was appointed the same year and the 
office began operations from its headquarters in Geneva on 
March 1, 1972.12 The chief functions of the coordinator as 
defined in the resolution include:
 (b) to mobilize, direct and
coordinate the relief activities of 
the various organizations of the 
United Nations system in response to 
a request for disaster relief from a 
stricken state?
 (c) to coordinate United Nations
assistance with assistance given by 
the intergovernmental organizations, 
in particular by the international Red 
Cross...13
Schiavone summarized the overall functions of the
coordinator thus:
The coordinator is empowered on behalf 
of the Secretary General to direct all 
relief activities of the 
United Nations system, to receive 
contribution in kind or cash for 
disaster relief assistance and to 
serve as a clearing house for 
information on assistance provided by 
all sources of external aid.14
In spite of its mandate however UNDRO was not meant to be 
operational at the site of disasters. Its lack of human and 
financial resources limited its ability to develop into an 
operational agency. The UN cannot in general respond to
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emergencies in the manner that western non-governmental 
organizations are able to do: only The United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and WFP have adjusted their 
machinery to respond to emergencies, and the activities 
even of these two agencies in this respect are geared 
towards medium and long-term development.15For this reason 
the UNs Secretary General created the special Office for 
Emergency Operations in Ethiopia.
(c). Creation of The OEOE
The special Office was created, in response to 
pressure from both the donor community and the recipient 
state, on the realization that there was a need for a much 
stronger role for the United Nations in the operations.16 
Two views emerged regarding the inauguration of the 
office. The first, promulgated by Kurt Jansson and later 
by Peter Gill, claimed that the UN Secretary General 
created the Office on the advice of James Grant, head of 
UNICEF, and James Ingram, head of WFP, who wrote an urgent 
memorandum to the Secretary General after the BBC film, in 
which they proposed the need for a UN special office to 
respond to the famine, and suggested the best person to 
head it.17
Alternatively Dawit claims that it was he, who put 
forward the case for a much stronger UN involvement to the 
Secretary General during their meeting in November 1984. 
According to Dawit, James Grant advised him that to 
achieve assistance from the international community he
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should request that the Secretary General create the 
special office and put Mr. Kurt Jansson in charge. This 
would both ensure the "smooth coordination of supply" and 
confer "international credibility" for the emergency.18
A number of observations can be made. First, serious 
UN response was made after, not before, the media focused 
its attention on the crisis. We infer that the UN decision 
to create the office was made against the background of an 
already desperate situation and the Office was created 
substantially to strengthen the UN's effective role in the 
relief operation.19 Second, both versions attribute a 
central role to Dr. Grant in the creation of the Office. 
The question left unexplained is why Dr. Grant should have 
featured prominently? As has been stated, the only UN 
agencies able to respond to emergencies are UNICEF and WFP, 
and this could be why Drs. Grant and Ingram were able to 
influence the Secretary General. Last, whatever the 
motivation of the UN in creating the Office, both the 
donor community and the recipient government wanted it to 
play a central role.
The primary objective in establishing the Office was 
to coordinate the international response to the 
emergency.20In this respect it was in charge of overseeing 
the effective coordination of all aspects of the 
operation, including ensuring that the assistance reach its 
intended beneficiaries, so that the loss of lives could be 
reduced drastically. How did the UN discharge this task? 
Four key roles were undertaken by the Office in the course
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of coordinating the operation: as mobilizer of resources?
as legitimizer of recipient relief requirements? as 
mediator between donors and the recipient? and finally as 
distributor of donor aid (or rather guarantor of its 
efficient distribution).21
(d). Organizational Set Up of the Office
When the Office was set up in Addis Ababa in November 
1984, Kurt Jansson needed the services of a handful of 
specialists and experts to assist him in carrying out his 
job. UN agencies such as United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, WFP, World Health Organization 
(WHO) and UNDRO provided for his staff requirements. The 
WFP provided nine officers, including the deputy Resident 
Representative, who deputised for Kurt Jansson whenever he 
travelled abroad to New York or Geneva for consultations. 
UNDRO provided him with six officers, some of whom served 
as field monitors. The WHO assigned a public health 
specialist to the office, while UNICEF provided the bulk of 
the office's staff including an Administrative Assistant, 
the secretarial staff and the office drivers.
The Assistant Secretary General (ASG) in turn 
assigned duties to these officers. Thomas Fitzpatric was 
assigned to the RRC to liaise with the RRC on all aspects 
of the relief and in particular to work out food relief 
requirements and analyse the food distribution reports.
Ms Bilge O' Reid was assigned the task of monitoring 
bilateral contributions and pledges? Thomas Franklin was
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assigned data management and NGO coordination; Ms Asbjorn 
Devoid liaised with UNDRO? Ms Inger Wiren served as 
information officer; Mr.Roman Roos worked as the 
Logistics/Transport officer? Mr. Burkard Oberle as the 
food supply coordinator? Mr. Hans Pedersen as the Assab 
ports officer?, and Mr. Paavo Pitkanen looked after the Air 
Transport coordination aspects of the operation.22Working 
with these officers Kurt Jansson steered the relief 
operation from November 1984 to December 1985.
3. The Role of Mobilizer of Relief
The Office mobilized relief assistance from the 
donor community for the period of the emergency.23It became 
the focal point in the mobilization of food, transportation 
(both land and air), medical aid and all the auxiliary 
needs, such as spare parts, money for rebagging and fuel 
for transportation.
The approach adopted by Kurt Jansson for carrying out 
this task was to base his operation in Addis Ababa. The 
advantages offered by Addis Ababa over New York and Geneva 
are numerous. First, most of the major donor states were 
represented in the capital. Second it was easier and faster 
to collect and analyse data on the relief requirements in 
Ethiopia and pass the information to the representatives of 
the donor governments and relief organizations based in 
Addis Ababa. This provided the opportunity for donors' 
queries to be clarified quickly. For this reason it was 
felt better to concentrate this aspect of the operation at
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the local level.24
The UN Assistant Secretary General utilized a number 
of mechanisms in the execution of this task. He organized 
donor meetings where all the major donors bilateral, 
multilateral and NGOs were invited to attend and these 
became the forum where he presented his relief reguirements 
to donors. They were also used as the main forum for review 
of progress made and problems encountered. Initially they 
were held once every two weeks. Later they were held once 
every month, and as the situation improved they were held 
less frequently. This was the basic forum adopted by the 
ASG/EOE for the mobilization of relief aid. Most of the 
major Western donors sent their ambassadors in Addis Ababa 
or a representative from the Embassy to the meetings.25 
Kurt Jansson also worked through channels outside 
Ethiopia. These were occasional meetings at UN headquarters 
in New York or at the headquarters of UNDRO in Geneva. On 
December 18, 1984, in New York, he presented his first 
major appeal to the international community.26This was 
followed in March by the UN convened conference in 
Geneva, aimed at increased mobilization of relief and 
international support for the African crisis.27 Although 
the aim of the conference was to raise about $1.5 billion28 
for the sub-Saharan countries as a whole, there was no 
doubt that the Ethiopian crisis provided the main impetus. 
With regard to the significance of the conference, UNDRO 
said:
It is also clearly the biggest single 
rescue and relief operation ever
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mounted by the United Nations in its 
40 year history and to that extent 
highlights the key role of the United 
Nations system in mobilizing 
international support and sustenance 
for peoples and nations afflicted by 
natural and other disasters.29
An important component of the external mobilization effort 
was through the office's links with UNDRO headquarters in 
Geneva. Indeed, UNDRO remained the OEOE's chief channel 
for relaying information to the donor community outside 
Ethiopia.30 The EOE sent its reports of relief requirements 
to UNDRO for onward transmission to donors. These reports 
were then telexed to donor governments and relief agencies 
or were distributed to them in the form of UNDRO's 
situation reports, which provided an overview of the relief 
aid required, a description of the condition of the
affected population and other related aspects of the
\
relief.31
Thus, UNDRO relayed the OEOE's assessment of relief 
aid requirement and the ASG's identification of unmet 
needs. UNDRO issued a series of appeals on behalf of the 
ASG on December 12 1984? February 5, 8, 22? and on August 
1, 1985.32 A substantial portion of the relief aid was 
mobilized in this way.33It was estimated that during the 
ASG/EOE's tenure UNDRO issued a total of twenty situation 
report which detailed the overview of the emergency, its 
progress and problems.34
4. The Lecritimizer of Recipient's Relief Requirements 
Another role played by the UN Office was that of
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ascertaining the validity of the recipient's aid 
requests. Because of the political differences between 
the major donors and the Ethiopian government, most Western 
donors wanted a neutral body to ascertain accurately the 
relief requirements of the country. The RRC's assessment 
of its relief requirements were on many occasions 
distrusted by both the bilateral and multilateral donors. 
In 1984 the RRC calculated that it needed 900,000 mt. 
tonnes of food aid relief for 1984; but as a result of its 
transport difficulties it appealed to donors, for half that 
amount. FAO mission, however, further slashed the figure 
to 125,000 mt.tonnes and it was this that emerged as the 
UN backed appeal for the country's relief requirement. 
Thus the antagonistic relations between Ethiopia and the 
major donors necessitated the involvement of a body 
acceptable to both parties.
Jansson's first major task after his appointment was 
the preparation of estimates of emergency needs for the 
forthcoming period, from December 1984 to December 1985. 
However, for Jansson to prepare these on time for the 
December 18, 1984 donor meeting in New York, he had to rely 
on RRC's own data of its relief aid requirements.
Jansson's report included estimates of both food aid 
relief and logistical requirements for delivery of food 
from the sea ports into the interior of the country. 
Estimates of the former for the period, including 
supplementary food and edible oil, were set at a total of 
1,330,000 mt. tons; For the latter which covered trucks,
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port handling, spare parts, medical supplies, inland 
transportation subsidies, materials for shelter and 
clothing, at $139.2 million. These were the estimates 
presented by Kurt Jansson at the first donor meeting on 
December 18 1984, which were accepted by the donor 
community as targets for the international community.35 
They later became the basis for the evaluation of 
subsequent periodic estimates for appeals and appraisals of 
the situation. In this way the type of assistance, and the 
quantity were established by the UN office, although the 
Office's estimates were in actual fact derived from the 
RRC's own data.
The UN office fulfilled this role, in particular 
because the bilateral donors preferred any assessment to 
that made by the Ethiopian Government.36 The UN Office 
and Ethiopian Government agreed that the UN judgement 
carried more weight and had helped win the confidence of 
donors.37 Table 5 (on the next page) gives a summary 
breakdown of the estimates of food assistance required for 
the twelve-month period from January to December 1985. 
Compare the stated requirement of grain in Jansson's 
December request (1,330,000 mt.tonnes) with the figure 
shown here (1,295,764.18). The two figures are indeed 
similar bearing in mind that the former included 
supplementary food and edible oil estimates which the 
latter omitted.
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Table 5
FOOD ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS OF 1985 
(January -December)
REGION GRAIN SUP.FOOD EDIBLE OIL TOTAL
l.ARSI 14,293.19 1,292.69 329.06 15,914.94
2. BALE 33,050.43 2,916.19 805.43 36,772.05
3.ERITREA143,102.11 13,429.81 3,282.84 159,814.05
4.G/GOFFA 19,158.56 1,416.31 482.32 21,057.19
5.GOJJAM 13,044.03 1,287.94 209.48 14,622.45
6.GONDAR 62,118.00 6,133.50 1,383.30 69,634.80
7.HARARGHE153,261.49 13,681.26 3,528.32 170,471.07
8.SHEWA 149,189.57 13,492.98 3,434.59 166,117.14
9.SIDAMO 95,945.85 7,093.17 2,415.42 105,454.44
10.TIGRAI 143,139.30 24,185.27 5,454.47 172,779.04
ll.WOLLO 469,461.65 38,190.31 11,009.39 518,661.35
GRAND/
TOTAL 1,295,764.18 123,299.43 32,415.62 1,451,479,23
Source: RRC, February 1985, from documents of The UN 
ASG/EOE, Addis Ababa.
The UN figures were taken as the last word on the famine. 
Kent observed that donors believed Jansson's assessment 
although his estimates were the same as those issued by the 
RRC in October 1984. He noted:
The bilaterals assumed that the OEOE's 
independent assessment of relief needs 
issued one month after Jansson's 
arrival represented a realistic
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picture of the situation.38
5. The Guarantor of Donors1 Aid
Amidst fears of the likelihood of recipient 
mismanagement, the UN office was seen as guarantor of the 
efficient distribution of donor aid. The office discharged 
this role by concentrating its efforts on two levels.
First, it ensured the efficient planning of the arrival of 
the mobilized relief materials from the point of origin in 
the donor countries to the point of delivery at the 
Ethiopian ports. Second it followed the distribution from 
the ports to its final destination and its distribution to 
its intended beneficiaries.
6. The Role of Coordinator
(a) Coordinating Relief from Outside
After the office had presented its estimates of 
relief needs to donors and obtained their pledges there 
remained the task of coordinating the delivery of these 
items. The aid had to be transported, stored in warehouses 
and ultimately distributed. Donors provided the bulk food 
and the relief items. They also provided the trucks and 
warehouse-related equipment and the money to cover the 
internal transportation costs within Ethiopia. But the task 
of ensuring that all went well was left to the UN office.39
The Office in conjunction with WFP devised the means 
of coordinating the arrival and discharge of all relief 
shipments comihg to the Ethiopian ports. In undertaking 
this task the aim was always to avoid port congestion and
191
thus ensure optimum utilization. WFP appointed a shipping 
coordinator for all donor commodity-donations. He liaised 
with donors on all matters concerning shipments. Donors 
informed him of forthcoming vessels with details of 
approximate dates of arrival at Ethiopian ports. He in 
turn recommended a port for the vessel(s), and assigned a 
suitable berth and time when the commodities could best be 
discharged.4OThe port officer at Assab then telexed Addis 
Ababa with the daily update of stocks at the ports, the 
number of trucks on call, as well as the off-take rates.41 
Through this mechanism the UN office was kept informed at 
all the various stages of the movement of donated relief 
items.
To facilitate the process, WFP further produced a 
weekly shipping bulletin which was issued to donors, 
informing them of the arrival and off-takes of food aid 
deliveries.42In this way the office coordinated the 
planning of donor shipments of relief with the assistance 
of the WFP and the support of the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Transport.43Table 6, below, shows the amount of emergency 
food aid delivered to the Ethiopian ports, on a monthly 
basis, from December 1 1984 to December 31 1985. The amount 
is close to that for which the UN ASG appealed in December 
1984, representing over 91 per cent of the UN target.
Table 6
EMERGENCY FOOD AID DELIVERED AT PORTS-DEC.1.1984- DEC.31. 
1985
(All figures in Metric Tonnes)
192
TABLE 6 CONTINUED
CER CGR BLF NCR(l) TOTAL
Dec. *84 97,439 4,248 5,032 106,719
Jan. *85 93,607 3,590 1,000 27,952 126,149
Feb. 117,379 6,102 5,205 8,457 137,143
Mar. 45,692 6,830 6,715 7,299 66,536
Apr. 46,206 1,481 1,801 10,422 59,910
May. 106,091 171 14846 16265 137,373
Jun. 66,424 534 14,815 1,786 83,559
Jul. 69,998 773 4,546 13,658 88,975
Aug. 88,635 9,778 2,781 11,124 112,318
Sep. 40,971 307 586 11,166 53,030
Oct. 85,601 - 7,240 7040 99,881
Nov. 54,239 12,469 5,159 6,644 78,511
Dec. 41,795 8,094 6,856 6,679 63,424
Total(1985) 856,638 50,129 71,550 128,492 1,106,809
Grand Total
(13 months) 954,077 50,129 75,798 133,524 1,213,528
1,004,206 209,322 1,213,528
Source: WFP, Shipping Bulletins- Nos 11-21, From documents 
of the UN ASG/EOE office, Addis Ababa.
(1)CER=Cereal.CGR=CourseGrain.BLF=BlendedFood.NCR=NonCereal
(b). Internal Coordination of the Operation
Coordinating the distribution of food from the ports 
to the relief camps and shelters was a much harder task 
than getting it to the country*s ports. Although, at the 
start of the operation, it was not the intention of the
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office to become involved with this aspect of the 
program, the exigencies of the situation entailed its 
involvement especially with the transportation of relief. 
Kurt Jansson held meetings with Ethiopian government 
officials and donor agencies and calculated the measures 
necessary to resolve aspects of the transportation 
problems. In his first estimates, transport was identified 
as the ASG's second most important area of concern after 
food.
On January 17 1985, Kurt Jansson met with top 
Ethiopian officials and a representative of WFP to work 
out the logistics for the January-April quarter when there 
was a heavy schedule of aid shipments expected.44Among the 
Ethiopian officials was the then RRC Commissioner, the 
Vice-Minister of Transport, and a high Politburo member. At 
that time it was felt that at least 4000 trucks were 
required to assist in the transportation of relief from the 
ports to various destinations in Ethiopia.45 When this 
was found, to be inadequate, in April 1985, Kurt Jansson 
obtained the support of the Ethiopian authorities for the 
use of 100 army trucks to clear the stockpile at the port 
of Asseb.46
In May 1985 the Office established its own UN
transport fund which allowed it to hire trucks to overcome
the temporary shortage of transport and to meet other
logistical problems.47The fund enabled the ASG to hire
vehicles from the Ethiopian National Transport Corporation
(j&m/nfr'b CYjAAjjdr'm fa
(NATRACOR) and from "Katena” (a ■tyiwSfOT'tr .') to
A
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ease the trucking difficulties.
Part of the fund was also used to procure tyres and 
spare parts to keep the trucks and vehicles on the road.
It was also used to subsidize NGOs food transport. However, 
from November 1985, when the WFP established its own 
transport fleet -World Food Program Transport Operation in 
Ethiopia (WTOE) -with a fleet of over 1,100 trucks, the 
land transport situation was substantially eased.48
The UN officials spent much time monitoring the 
distribution program, covering it from the ports all the 
way to the beneficiaries.49It was they who ensured the 
final distribution of the relief at the camps, shelters 
and the distribution points throughout the country. 
Nevertheless it proved difficult to escape problems 
altogether, especially given the vast scale of the relief 
operation. Hence certain problems were experienced such as 
port congestion at Asseb, and in the delivery of relief to 
Eritrea and Tigray. The office did its best, however to 
resolve these problems. That of port congestion was never 
allowed to persist for long; and in the search for better 
solutions the ASG talked periodically with the Head of 
State whose involvement emphasized the measure of the 
problems the office faced and the priority it attached to 
the famine.
Storage was another problem, especially as the grain 
piled up at Asseb and incurred rain damage although the 
timely intervention of the office, in procuring 
tarpaulins limited this damaged to a very small
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percentage. Overall, the office's activities greatly 
enhanced both port capacities and storage facilities; the 
off-take capacity of the ports of Asseb increased three 
times and that of Massawa six times; additional storage put 
in place by the office improved the internal transport 
situation as a whole.50
(i). Coordinating Relief Delivery in Eritrea and Tiarav
The mandate of the UN office extended to coordinating 
all aspects of the relief throughout Ethiopia. However, 
ensuring that relief reached certain parts of the country, 
in particular the provinces of Eritrea and Tigray and parts 
of Wollo, complicated its task. Because of the civil war in 
parts of these provinces, the central Government in Addis 
Ababa did not permit unrestricted access to these areas.
The estimates of relief requirements for March and October 
1984 showed that over 1,3 31,890 people needed assistance in 
Tigray while another 1000,000 were affected between the 
period January 1985 to December 1986; in Eritrea 827,000 
people needed assistance in March and October (1984) and 
at least 650,000 needed assistance between January 1985 and 
December 1986.51 Overall, these provinces were amongst 
the hardest hit by the famine and constituted a serious 
challenge in terms of getting food to the people. The rough 
terrain of the country, the poor state of its roads and the 
urgency of the situation all compounded the problem.
Because of the insurrections, food distribution in 
these provinces was difficult. Relatively few organizations
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were allowed to work in those areas, even under Government 
control. Basically, those allowed were local Ethiopian 
church related organizations, plus a few foreign NGOs and 
an international organization, the ICRC. In Tigray, the 
ICRC, Africare, Action Internationale Contra La Faim, MSF 
(Belgium) were allowed to operate. Generally, however, the 
food distribution was undertaken by such local Ethiopian 
organizations as the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the Ethiopian Evangelical 
Church of Mekana Yesus, etc. In areas under rebel control, 
food distribution was usually carried out by the relief 
arm of the Tigrian People's Liberation Front -the Tigray 
Relief Society and by the few NGOS who risked assisting 
them.52
In Eritrea the situation was similar. In areas under 
Government control only a few international organizations 
and a few church related local organizations were allowed 
to work: for example, the ICRC, the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church, the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat and the 
Evangelical Faith Mission. In areas controlled by the 
rebels, food distribution was undertaken by the Eritrean 
Relief Association and a few foreign NGOs.53
In order for the UN to ensure increased aid to those 
areas cut off by war, the ASG appealed to the central 
Government (and the rebels) to allow increased aid and 
greater UN coordination. The ASG sought the permission of 
the government to allow both the UN and the ICRC to 
undertake their food operation in these areas. At a
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meeting on January 19 1985, Kurt Jansson presented 
Mengistu with the UN and ICRC plans on how they might be 
able to undertake their operations.
The UN proposal asked the Ethiopian government to 
allow UN trucks to move relief into the interior. The idea 
was to move food from Makelle in Tigray and from Asmara in 
Eritrea (both Government controlled areas) to the regions 
in the north outside the control of Government. If the 
Government (and the rebels) agreed to the plan it was hoped 
that it would ensure the safe passage of UN convoys and 
increased relief aid to the affected population in these 
areas.
The ICRC attached three further conditions before it 
would operate in the affected areas. First, it demanded 
that the Government should de-mine the roads; second, that 
the ICRC rather than the RRC should undertake the 
distribution of relief; and third that the civilians 
registered for its feeding program should not be involved 
in the resettlement program.54Despite these efforts, 
neither proposal was accepted by the Government. Agreeing 
to either plan would have implied conferring a degree of 
official recognition on both the TPLF and EPLF. It would 
have also implied acknowledgement that the areas were 
outside the effective control of the Government. The 
Government's fears were confirmed when the rebels attacked 
convoys of UN relief assistance later in March.55Thus both 
sides frustrated the efforts of the international community 
to deliver assistance to famine victims.
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(ii). The Air Lift and Airdrop Operations
The UN office organized and coordinated the Airlift 
and Airdrop operations, with the support and cooperation 
of the RRC and donor community, in order to get relief to 
areas inaccessible by other means. In the early days of 
the emergency, there were areas where huge needs existed 
but which could not be reached in time by land, and as a 
result the only effective alternatives were airlifting or 
mounted airdrop operations. The airlift operation started 
in November 1984 and involved moving food from Asseb to 
scores of areas in Tigray, Eritrea, Wollo, Gondar and on a 
small scale to parts of Hererghe. In Tigray food was 
airlifted to Makelle and Aksum where an estimated 40-
50,000 people were in need.56 In Eritrea food was airlifted 
to Asmara. In Gondar the airlift was carried to Gondar town 
itself and to Metema: while in Wollo the town of Alamata 
was served.57
In parts of Wollo and Shoa it was not possible to 
reach the population through airlifts. The rugged high 
plateaux terrain of these provinces, and the absence of 
airstrips, necessitated the mounting of airdrop operations. 
These were carried out in six different spots in Wollo and 
seven in Shoa.58The British Hercules transport planes, the 
German Transalls planes and the Polish relief squadron 
helicopters undertook the operations. The Polish squadron 
prepared the zones of the airdrop in advance. They carried 
the radio navigation teams which guided the planes. The 
Hercules flying low, dropped the grain from an altitude
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of about 15 ft and a speed of 130 miles per hour.59In 
some places, even after the planes had dropped the relief, 
the Polish helicopters had to carry the grain further into 
the interior.60By the time the operations were completed 
in December 1985, approximately 168,000 mt. tonnes of food 
had been airlifted (sufficient for 900,000 people) and
20,000 mt. tonnes was airdropped (sufficient for 180,000 
people) at an estimated value of $100 million.61 
Governments in both East and West helped with the 
operations; the UK, West German, US, USSR, Italian, 
Polish, French, Belgian, Swedish, Libyan and Botswana 
Governments all contributed the use of their Airforces.
The British RAF and the German Luftwaffe spent 
$1.5 million and $1.2 million respectively on both the 
airdrop and the airlift operations monthly. Table 7 below 
gives details of the countries that participated in the 
operations and the duration of their service.
Table 7 
EMERGENCY AIRLIFT RESOURCES
Sponsor Aircraft Service Dates Operation
USG 2 C-130S 11/84-11/85 Airlanding from
Asmara to Mekele and 
other towns in Tigray 
and Eritrea.
UK 2 C-130S 11/84-12/85 One C-130 used for
airlanding food from 
Assab to Mekele, the 
other for airdrops in 
northern Shewa and 
Souther(sic) Welo
FRG 2 C-160 11/84-12/85 Same as UK aircraft
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GDR
Libya
France
Poland
USSR
ICRC
Table 7 CONTINUED 
2 AN-26
1 IL-18
2 AN-26
11/84-10/85 General airlift 
2/85-10/85 General Airlift
1 C-160 
3 MI-8*
12AN-12 
22MI-8(1)
1/85-1/85
2/85
11/84-
General Airlift 
Airlanding food in 
Shewa and Harerge and 
support of FRG and UK 
airdrops.
Mostly movement of 
resettlers
1 or 2 C-130S 3/85-
1 Twin Otter
2 Pilatus Porters
WVRO
LWF
EEC
2Twin Otters 1/85-12/85
1 C-130 
1 C-130
9/85-3/86
7/86-9/86
Airlanding for towns 
in Tigray and Eritrea, 
and airdrops in 
Southern Welo (C-130s 
provided by Belgium 
and Sweden, or under 
contract from private 
companies)
Airlift of personnel 
and supplies to WVRO 
camps (supported by 
USG)
Airlanding for Eritrea 
and Tigray
Airlanding for Tigray
Source:Final DisasterReport:The Ethiopian
Drought/Famine. Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986.
By the Staff of the USAID Office, American 
Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.p.86 
Note: (1) Helicopters
Although the airlift and airdrop were costly to 
implement, they represented the only realistic alternative 
for getting relief to otherwise inaccessible areas and 
thereby saving lives. The experience gained from the 
exercise, meant that aid could be deployed similarly and 
faster to other areas in the future. The joint cooperation 
under the auspices of the United Nations has already 
brought the airforces of NATO and the WARSAW Pact countries 
together.
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(iii). Coordinating other UN Agencies
The task of coordinating the UN agencies did not 
present the UN Office with a serious problem.62 Each of 
the offices cooperated during the operation. In addition to 
the secondment of officers and specialists, the sister 
agencies provided assistance in their areas of competence. 
For instance, the FAO assisted in assessing the emergency 
needs; UNHCR provided resources worth $3.3 of relief 
program to the 300,000 refugees who needed relief 
assistance in Hererghe63? UNICEF provided drugs, vaccines 
and supplementary feeding; and the WHO made available 
$300,000 for the purchase of medical supplies. The WFP 
financed the provision of tarpaulins, trucks, and paid for 
the air-freighting of Oxfam's relief items with funds 
provided it by the World Bank.64
7. The Mediator Between Donors and the Recipient
(a) The Ibnat Incident
Many donors felt that one of the most important roles 
played by the UNs Office was that of persuading the 
Ethiopian Government to change or adjust some of its 
policies in the light of donor requests or complaints. A 
typical example relates to its role during an incident at 
Ibnat. In the last week of April 1985, the Party Chief in 
Gondar, Melaku Teferra, ordered closure of the camp and 
forced the people to go back to their homes without 
adequate arrangements.65
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Ordinarily the closure of relief camps would be 
greeted with relief to the extent that it heralds the end 
of the operation and therefore is a sign of its success.
In this case, however, the process was prematurely and
"overzealously" executed by the Party Secretary. Many of 
the camp dwellers who were already weak and sick, were 
coerced to leave the camp further injuring some in the 
process. This action angered western donor governments and 
the relief agencies and threatened the relief operation. 
The crisis was averted by the prompt intervention of the 
UN ASG. The Ethiopian Government admitted its mistake, 
rendered an apology and gave assurances that such an action 
would not be taken again. This assurance pacified the 
regime*s critics and ensured the continuation of relief.66
(b). Other Areas of Mediation
The UN mediated in getting the Government to make 
concessions in a number of areas. For instance, the 
influence of the ASG was vital in getting port charges 
reduced67? in assisting NGOs to obtain travel permits; in 
helping the USAID mission to secure visas; and in
preventing the expulsion of the French relief
organization MSF on two occasions.68
8. Conclusion
After the Ibnat incident the UN monitors took 
control of supervising the return of the camp 
populations to their homes in an orderly manner. There
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were about one million people in April 1985 but as a result 
of the success of the operation the figure fell to under
20,000 by the end of the year. By May 1986 the number 
had been reduced to a few hundred, most of whom remained in 
the camps for medical attention.69 With the closure of the 
camps, NGOs switched their operations from relief to 
rehabilitation.70
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PART THREE
EVALUATING THESIS UNDERLINING ASSUMPTIONS
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Humanitarian Relief And International Politics
1. Introduction
In this chapter we will focus attention on the 
relationship between humanitarian aid and international 
politics. The aim is to evaluate the stated assumptions of 
the thesis in the light of our discussion of the various 
donor responses in the preceding section. We will 
accomplish this after we have first examine the theoretical 
positions in tlie literature underlying donors' involvement 
in relief operations.
2. The Origins of Humanitarian Relief
The origin of humanitarian help to those in need 
goes back beyond the ancient civilizations of Egypt, 
Greece, and Rome. Most probably it arose in the context of 
meeting the demands of tribal communities for hospitality 
when farted by natural calamity to move from their 
traditional hunting lands and pasture. Afterwards it was 
elevated into a principle of social justice.1 As 
Nightingale points out :
There thus was precedent for helping 
people unknown to you? and as nomadic 
tribes became communities, and 
communities cities and nations, family 
responsibility developed naturally 
enough into social responsibility. The 
need to divert the fruits of 
sacrifice became apparent, the
210
justification easy, the obligation 
increasingly strong. Thus, in Egypt, 
we find the Pharaohs giving shelter to 
the poor, and distributing bread and 
clothing? and Greece and Rome 
followed.2
Indeed, all the world's great religions enjoin us 
to help the poor and the weak: Buddhism stresses compassion 
for the suffering, Islam and Hinduism the obligation of 
the wealthy towards the unfortunate while Judaism and 
Christianity the love of one another.3
During the current crises, similar calls of concern 
were made to meet the demands of the famine victims. For 
example The Times said:
The public has no great interests in 
whose fault it is, in fine theories 
which put the blame on western 
development aid policies or 
incompetent marxists governments. It 
goes to the heart of the Ethiopian 
matter; here are human beings, fellow 
men, women, children and babies of the 
same species in deadly trouble and 
they must be helped. Christmas 1984 
isn't Christmas without " the bitter 
sting of tears" ........... 4
3. The Assumptions of Humanitarian Relief And the 
International Response
Ideally, humanitarian assistance should rest on the 
assumption of the universal brotherhood of man.5 The aid is 
supposed to be given because of the shared primordial 
origins of mankind. The rationale behind it, is that a 
calamity that affects one section of mankind affects 
humanity as a whole. This is why such aid is referred to as
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humanitarian, meaning that it is given in the interest of 
humanity.
Because of this, the aid should ideally be divorced 
from politics. However studies reveal that often this is 
not the case because donors have additional motives 
accompanying their relief. Disentangling the true motives 
as opposed to the humanitarian ones therefore becomes the 
major problem of every analyst.
Cuny believes that if aid is provided quickly to a 
disaster afflicted country, the effect of such a quick 
response could ensure the stability and continuity of the 
recipient Government. In other words, a timely intervention 
is an indication of positive donor concern for the 
recipient. By contrast where donors withhold aid to a 
government, or delay it, the intention may be to create a 
crisis for that government. Cuny, concludes that, usually, 
the primary objective of government intervention is to 
maintain and expand their influence.6 However, even where 
donors' objectives are not easily visible some scholars 
argue that there is no such thing as unpolitical relief. 
Bloomstien is quoted by Linden as saying:
In the hard realities of the 
international situation there is no 
such thing as unpolitical relief. It 
is true that aid can be rendered 
solely on the basis of need, without 
respect to race, creed, or political 
affliation. But it is also true that 
the very giving of help carries with 
it implicitly if not explicitly a 
message of friendship and 
international human solidarity. In 
these precarious times such a message 
is loaded with political 
implications of the most fundamental
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sort 7
Relief aid is therefore political. This is, 
particularly so, at the bilateral level: afflicted nations 
may have to look a lot harder to secure relief, especially 
if they are not getting on well with the major donor 
states.8The international response to the Sahelian drought 
of the 1970s provides a good example. Hal Sheets and Roger 
Moris ascribed the ineptitude of donors due to the low 
priority accorded the Sahelian countries in the donors' 
priority scale.9 The criteria of allocating humanitarian 
aid on the basis of need was set aside in favour of what 
tangible advantages the donors could gain. Unfortunately 
in the case of the Sahel, it turned out to be a disaster 
because the region has little to offer donors.
Similarly Curti's study of American philanthrop y 
abroad, reveals that both religious and secular factors 
enter into peoples motives in donating relief abroad. 
Interestingly, political sympathies, social pressure, 
habit, national pride tied to national policy and national 
interest are all factors that featured prominently in 
Curti's findings. Although Curti's study is concerned 
mainly with NGO relief abroad, it showed that even at the 
non-governmental level donors' motives resembled those 
behind official government relief-such as the desire to 
open new markets, or to check the spread of communism.10 
The convergence of humanitarian motives and self 
interest need not, necessarily, be considered negative.11 
Humanitarianism, as we have been reminded by Wiseberg,
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is always a mixture of concern for humanity on the one hand 
and self or partisan interests on the other.12 What is 
important is that we should be alert to the idea that not 
all NGOs are faithful to their humanitarian charter 
despite the fact that their very raison d'etre lies in 
relief and development.13
No doubt NGOs are, by virtue of their role in 
relief, classed (in strict legal terms) as non-profit 
entities oriented towards the fulfilment of the public 
good.14 This is certainly the basis of their legitimacy 
as humanitarian organizations.15However, there is no doubt 
also that there are times when they engage in relief for 
their own survival reasons. As Cuny explains:
The greater the tragedy, the greater 
the opportunity for a successful 
appeal. Therefore many organizations 
for reasons of self-preservation start 
up disaster relief programs.16
Furthermore, their acceptance of Government resources
affects their autonomy and independence.17
Shawcross believes political, military, strategic
and commercial concerns undoubtedly rear their heads in
the humanitarian arena.18 His examination of NGO responses
during the brief but brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia shows that relief could be manipulated by
individuals and groups for their own benefit. The role
played by Rosalind Carter was cited as an example. In the
midst of the American Presidential elections Mrs Carter
visited Cambodia and on her return to the US publicised
the plight of the Cambodians. In doing so not only did she
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d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p l i g h t  o f  t h e  v i c t i m s  b u t  a l s o  h e l p e d  
h e r  h u s b a n d ' s  e l e c t o r a l  c a m p a i g n .  F o r  t h e  p u b l i c ,  g i v i n g  
r e l i e f  i s  a l w a y s  a c c o m p a n i e d  a  s e n s e  o f
s a t i s f a c t i o n .  I n  i t s  m o s t  b a s i c  f o r m  t h e  a c t  o f  g i v i n g  i s  
a n  a c t  o f  f r i e n d s h i p . 1 9  M a c a l i s t e r - S m i t h  a c c u r a t e l y  s u m s  
u p  t h e  c o m p l e x  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  h u m a n i t a r i a n  a i d  a n d  
p o l i t i c s  w h e n  h e  n o t e d  t h a t  a l l  h u m a n i t a r i a n  a c t i o n  h a s  a  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e n t  i n  i t .  H e  s a i d :
T h e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  s u c h  c o n c e r n  i s  
i t s e l f  a  p o l i t i c a l  a c t  a n d  i n v o l v e s  a  
f o r m  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o m m i t m e n t .  T h o s e  
e n g a g e d  i n  h u m a n i t a r i a n  a c t i v i t y  a r e  
t h u s  e n g a g e d  i n  p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e  b r o a d  
s e n s e  i n  t h e  s t r u g g l e  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
p r i n c i p l e s  o r  p o l i c y . 2 0
T h u s ,  a l l  t h o s e  i n v o l v e d  i n  r e l i e f ,  b e  t h e y  
G o v e r n m e n t s ,  r e l i e f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a r e  
i n d e e d  i n v o l v e d  i n  p o l i t i c s  t h o u g h  e a c h  c o m e s  i n  w i t h  a  
d i f f e r e n t  m o t i v e .  H o w  t h e n  d i d  t h e  t h e  d o n o r s  f a r e  d u r i n g  
t h e  c u r r e n t  c r i s e s ?
B e l o w  ( T a b l e  8 )  w e  o u t l i n e  t h e  s u m m a r y  r e s p o n s e  o f  
E a s t e r n  a n d  W e s t e r n  d o n o r s  a n d  a n a l y s e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  m o t i v e s  
f o r  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n c e .
T A B L E  8
D O N O R  F O O D  A I D .  1 9 8 5  A N D  1 9 8 6  ( I N  M T S )
1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6
D O N O R  T O :  R R C N G O  T O T A L  R R C  N G O  T O T A L  % ( 1 )
U S G 5 0 , 0 0 0  4 1 3 , 9 0 3  4 6 3 , 9 0 3  0  3 1 5 8 4 5  3 1 5 , 8 4 5  4 1
E U R O P E A N  E C O N O M I C  C O M M U N I T Y  & M E M B E R  S T A T E S
E E C  1 2 3 , 6 3 3  4 9 , 5 1 1  1 7 3 , 1 4 4  1 2 1 , 9 7 0  6 0 0 3 0  1 8 2 , 0 0 0
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Belgium 24 15,033 15,077 0 0 0
Denmark 0 1,437 1,437 0 415 0
France 1,230 8,043 9,273 8000 0 8,000
FRG 6,938 41,460 48,398 0 22647 22,647
Greece 7,540 0 7,540 0 0 0
Ireland 0 1,543 1,543 0 0 0
Italy 7,173 3,148 10,321 2304 11740 14,044
Netherlands 282 5,280 5,562 0 5276 5,276
Spain 358 5,279 5,637 0 0 0
U.K. 25,338 14,576 39,914 0 7000 7,000
EEC TOTAL172.516 145 .310 317.826 132.274 107108 239.382
Canada 27,972 52,922 80,894 47,500 3,000 50,500
OTHER OECD STATES
Australia 630 19,568 20,198 6,304 8,900 15,204
Austria 4,000 837 4,837 4000 3,984 7,984
Finland 0 4,958 4,958 0 0 0
Iceland 0 64 64 0 0 0
Japan 0 10,063 10,063 0 0 0
N/Zealand 0 140 140 0 0 0
Norway 9,500 513 10,013 0 0 0
Sweden 14,000 423 14,423 9000 10,900 19,900
Switzerland 0 3,196 3,196 0 1,000 1,000
OTHER OECD 
TOTAL 28.130 39.762 67.892 19.304 24.784 44.088
WARSAW PACT
Bulgaria 17,958 54 18,012 0 0 0
Cze/lovakia 391 0 391 0 0 0
GDR 2,060 0 2,060 0 0 0
Hungary 2,484 0 2,484 0 0 0
Poland 1,110 897 1,986 0 0 0
WARSAW PACT 
TOTAL 24.003 930 24933 0 0 o :
OTHER GOVTS
China 23,594 0 23,594 2000 3000 5000
India 0 0 0 4000 0 4000
Iran 0 5,158 5,158 0 0 0
Israel 0 204 204 0 0 0
Libya 0 1,000 1,000 0 0 0
Pakistan 1,000 0 1,000 0 0 0
UAE 1,825 0 1,825 0 0 0
Yugoslavia 0 5,771 5,771 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 12,469 0 12,469 12246 0 12246
Minor donors 181 12 193 0 0 0
OTHERS TOTAL39.069 12.145 51.214 18.246 3000 21.246
WFP 7,918 38,439 46,357 53,640 1000 54,640
Private Donorsl5,589 36,383 51,974 1,751 53296 55,047
GRAND/
TOTAL 365.197 739.796 1.104 .993 272 .715 508.033 780.748
Source:Final Disaster Reoort. o d . cit.. d .38A.
Note(l) % of total food aid.
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From the foregoing it is clear the USG was by far the 
biggest single food aid donor nation to Ethiopia during 
the famine years, providing 41% of the food aid followed 
by the EEC, in the second place with 30 %. Canada came 
third with 7% of the overall food aid and indeed in the 
second place after the US at the bilateral level. Other 
OECD states provided 6%, and the WFP donated 5%. Private 
donors and other states accounted for 10 % while the 
Warsaw pact countries the remaining 1%.
However, because of the problems associated with 
assigning a monetary value to all items of aid, it is 
instructive that we bear the following in mind when we make 
comparison between the response of Ethiopia*s allies and 
that of her political opponents. First, the various donors 
ascribe different values to their contributions. For 
example it is recognized that trucks donated by the USSR 
were valued at $24,000 per truck while those donated by 
the USG are valued four times higher even though they had 
ten times the capacity of Soviet trucks.21 Secondly, 
Eastern Bloc countries submitted all their aid to the 
Ethiopian Government, while Western state Governments used 
both the RRC and the NGOs simultaneously.A clear 
illustration of this is seen in the difference between the 
RRC*s and UN's reports on their aid receipt from donors 
over the same period of time. In 1985 donors reported 
giving the UN,$680,604 worth of non-food aid assistance, 
while in 1986 their aid totalled $200,792 (See Table 9 
below). For the same period however their non-food
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assistance through the RRC was $48,883,242 in 1985 and 
$7,929,529 in 1986 (See Table 10 below). The implication 
of this is that there is a significant variation in what 
donors reported to the RRC and to the UN and to this 
extent, therefore, it is difficult to be exact on over 
all donors aid during the crisis. Tables 9 and 10 below 
illustrate the discrepancies of donors' report of aid 
during the relief.
TOTAL NON-FOOD
TABLE 9 
ASSISTANCE TO THE U.N. 1985-86
(IN '000s) 
1985 1986
Australia $9,849 $0
Austria 830 0
Belgium 3,109 0
Bulgaria 8,916 0
Canada 10,044 1,050
China 3,163 850
Cuba 774 0
Czechoslovakia 2,852 0
Denmark 4,028 0
EEC 22,650 23,120
Finland 796 980
France 370 0
GDR 10,036 0
FRG 55,076 1,000
Greece 152 0
Hungary 700 0
Ireland 0 1,000
Italy 49,344 0
Japan 18,178 1,570
Republic of Korea 710 0
Libya 1,836 0
Netherlands 2,705 0
Norway 360 0
Poland 4,215 2,590
Romania 19,000 0
Spain 600 0
Sweden 12,250 5,690
Switzerland 2,467 100
USSR 260,000 62,000
U.K, 37,205 4,540
USA (1) 93,606 47,782
Yugoslavia 133 0
FAO 4,200 0
IBRD 0 4000
IFAD 0 2000
UNDRO 1,655 0
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TABLE 9 CONTINUED 
UNCHR 8,761 50
UNICEF 26,396 640
WHO 220 0
WFP 3,418 0
Private/NGO N/A 24,860
Recovery(donor unspecified)N/A 16.970
TOTAL $680.604 $200.792
Source:Final Disaster Report. The Ethiopian Drought/ Famine 
Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986.(by the staff of the USAID 
office American Embassy, Addis Ababa), p.38 B
TABLE 10
NON-FOOD AID CONTRIBUTION TO THE RRC. 1984-1986
1984 1985 1986 TOTAL
Austria $0 472,195 16,379 488 574
Belgium 73,171 0 0 73 171
Bulgaria 0 2,660,279 0 2,660 279
Canada 393,457 0 0 393 457
China 0 118,021 18,146 136 167
Czech/kia 17,561 997,079 0 1,014 640
Egypt 0 158,537 0 158 537
EEC 165,854 5516 438,318 609 687
France 0 140,488 0 140 488
GDR 801,463 2,351,078 0 3,152 541
FRG 453,607 8,120,474 12,249 8,586 330
Greece 167,074 321,471 142,729 631 274
Hungary 0 487,341 0 487 341
India 0 0 20,000 20 000
Japan 18,763 603,483 67,841 690 088
Kenya 0 11,707 0 11 707
Korea/Rep 301800 71,474 364 373 638
Netherlands 0 126,293 78,802 205 095
OPEC Fund 0 1,609,756 0 1,609 756
Poland 381,760 98,295 0 480 055
Private 0 7,380,488 0 7,380 488
S/Arabia 691,996 0 0 691 996
Spain 0 103,858 0 103 858
Sweden 539,590 1,756 11,561 552 907
UNDRO 0 15,591 14,034 29 625
UNCHR 12,195 0 199,167 211 362
UNICEF 0 40,273 58,933 99 206
USA 0 42,254 0 42 254
USSR 0 9,884,720 107,000 9,991 720
U.K 0 693,831 107,245 801 076
WFP/WTOE 0 0 468,262 468 262
Yugoslavia 9,891 0 110.839 120 730
TOTAL $4.203,900. $48,883,242 $7,929,529 $61,016 671
Source: Ibid p.39.
But despite these problems, the overwhelming 
evidence indicates that when Western states' food aid 
contribution is placed side by side with that of the 
Eastern Bloc countries, the difference between the two 
sides is quite wide. In 1984, Western states food 
contribution was in excess of 100,000 mt. tonnes. The 
Canadian Government alone donated over 50,000 mt. tonnes of 
food aid. The EEC donated over 70,000 mt. tonnes. These 
figures do not include food aid donation made by both the 
USG and that of the individual member states of the EEC as 
national donors.
In 1985, Western countries further increased their 
food aid donations. They provided Ethiopia with over 
200,000 mt.tonnes of food. Canada's contribution of 24,000 
mt.tonnes together with the EEC's donation of over 100,000 
mt.tons and the USG's single contribution through the RRC 
of 40,000 mt.tons, indicates the magnitude of Western 
states' food aid to Ethiopia.
And in 1986, the whole of the food aid donated to 
Ethiopia came from Western states, since the Eastern Bloc 
countries did not provide further food aid. In that year 
over 185,000 mt.tons. was provided to Ethiopia. The 
Canadian Government provided 47,000 mt.tons, while the EEC 
donated over 120,000 mt. tons.
Thus, it is clear that Western donor nations 
provided Ethiopia with more food grain assistance than its 
socialist allies. Extending the analysis further into 
other areas of relief like transport, medical aid, and
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spare parts, it still appears the West provided greater 
assistance to Ethiopia than the Eastern Bloc countries 
(refer to Chapters Four and Five).
Over all, by the end of the relief operation, the 
assistance to Ethiopia from governments and public 
donations was over $2 billion dollars.22 This was a major 
contribution from the international community, representing 
more than one-third of Ethiopia's annual GNP. The USG 
alone contributed over one half billion US dollars.23 
Thus when the contribution of Ethiopiafs political 
opponents is put side by side with that of her allies, it 
is clear that Western states performed better than 
Ethiopia's allies. One question that needs examination 
here is why West gave aid to Ethiopia on a larger scale 
than the East, especially in view of the ideological gulf 
between Ethiopia and the West? A related question to 
consider is whether the aid from donors was given solely 
on humanitarian grounds or whether there were other 
considerations that moved them to act also? The last 
question is relevant to both state and non state donors 
alike.
The following factors are suggested as responsible 
for the generosity of Western countries vis-a-vis the 
Eastern Bloc. Those factors may also account for the 
apparent contradiction between the response of Ethiopia's 
opponents and allies respectively.
221
4. The Needs Factor and the Humanitarian Basis
of the international response 
The size and scale of the crises was a major 
determining factor in the international community's 
response to the disaster. By 1984 there was a massive need 
for all kinds of relief: food grain and supplementary 
food? medicines; blankets; cooking oil? transport; 
tarpaulins? syringes? spare parts? shelter materials and 
utensils, and the personnel to organize the operation such 
as nurses, engineers, medical doctors and administrators.
Deaths were running at over a hundred people per day 
in most of the relief camps and so the only option open to 
the international community if the death rate was to be cut 
was to intervene massively. It is for this reason 
primarily that donors responded to Ethiopia's appeals for 
help.
The magnitude of the disaster was of such a compelling 
nature that no civilized nation could stand by and watch. 
Long ago Vattel advocated the need for nations to assist 
others in those circumstances:
 if a nation is visited with
famine, all those who have provisions 
enough to spare should come to its 
assistance .... Help in such an 
extremity is so much in accord with 
the dictates of humanity that no 
civilized nation could altogether fail 
to respond.... whatever the nature of 
the disaster that overtakes a nation, 
the same help is due to it.24
In the past nations helped other nations on this 
basis. The US, for example has a record of providing
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overseas relief that stretches back to the eighteenth 
century; in 1793 relief was provided to Santo Domingans; in 
1812 it was given to the victims of the Venezuelan 
earthquake; in the 1820s Greece benefited during its war 
against the Ottomans; and in 1847, Ireland was aided during 
the potato famine.25The globalization of relief is 
however a twentieth century development, particularly 
since the first and second world wars.
The 1984 famine clearly needed nothing less than a 
massive international action. It is for this reason that 
both West and East gave assistance to Ethiopia. However 
the existence of needs alone does not explain why Western 
donors came up with more aid than the Soviets. We 
therefore have to look for other possible explanations.
5. The Availability Factor
Another reason that easily draws itself to 
attention is the availability of the relief commodities in 
surplus in the West. Availability is indeed a necessary 
condition for helping others. The US and Common Market 
countries are the world*s largest producers of grains 
and consumer goods. In 1984 the EEC had produced more 
grains than it could store.26
Eastern Bloc countries, on the other hand, are 
themselves importers of grain from the world market. In 
1985 the USG, Canada and France were in the top league of 
the five leading exporters of wheat grains. On the other 
hand the Soviet Union, Japan and China were in the top
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league of the five major importers of wheat.27
Thus the availability of surplus is a necessary, 
though not sufficient, condition why the West supplied 
Ethiopia with aid during the crises. The Eastern Bloc 
countries are yet to attain the same level of economic 
development as the West, and as such even if they wanted to 
match Western assistance they had to divert resources from 
elsewhere.28 This explains why they were rather better 
donors of industrial and manufactured goods than food 
aid.
6. The Nature of The Political Systems
Coupled with the above, a third explanatory factor 
why the West was more generous is to be found in the 
nature of Western political system. Western political 
systems expect governments to respond to demands of lobby 
groups. Here the influence of pressure groups and public 
opinion is an accepted feature of the political systems. 
Groups outside government place demands on the machinery 
of government and expect to influence the outcome. As we 
have seen, in the western democracies, generally 
governments bowed to the power of pressure groups and 
public opinion and increased their aid to Ethiopia.
By contrast, in the East there is no place for 
pressure groups or charity organizations.29 For this reason 
Eastern governments were shielded from the demands of 
pressure groups and the influence of public opinion. What 
exists instead is a strong involvement of the state in all
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facets of public life. If these forces had existed, perhaps 
they too would have influenced the shape and size of their 
governments' response. With the absence of NGOs, and a 
limited role for the media, Eastern Bloc governments 
responded to the famine at their own pace.
It was also the reason why their assistance to 
Ethiopia was limited to the bilateral channel. Hence, 
where pressure groups and public opinion are accepted norms 
of the political process (and where such groups bring their 
power of influence to bear on the decision makers), they 
help shape the response of elected governments on both 
domestic and international issues. Thus, because of the 
pluralistic nature of the West, the UK and US Governments 
responded to appeals from pressure groups and the public. 
For example the Thatcher Government increased its aid to 
Ethiopia in response to appeals from the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and Church leaders. Similarly the f^ T^ ner US 
President Ronald Reagan acted more expeditiously only 
after receiving a telephone call from mother Teresa.30
7. The Expectations of Donors
(i) Western Bilateral Donors
In addition to their genuine concern for the famine 
victims, Western bilateral donors, especially the US and UK 
governments, took into account non-humanitarian factors in 
making their relief aid. The contrast between their aid to 
Ethiopia and that given to other African countries makes 
this fact very obvious.
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In 1984 out of the twenty four African countries 
affected by drought and famine, only the marxist states of 
Mozambique and Ethiopia failed to get what they needed. 
Ethiopia was continually refused even after repeated pleas 
from their Government, from charity organizations and 
above all from organizations set up by Western 
governments.31
Again, the contrast between Western governments' 
assistance to Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, and their 
assistance to the marxist regime further reinforces the 
argument. The US gave more food to Haile-Salassie1s 
Ethiopia in six months than it did in the three years 
preceding 1984.32
Thus, it is evident that there is a link between the 
food aid fortunes of dependent countries and cordial 
political relations with the major food aid donors. For 
example other than Liberia, the other three leading 
recipients of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa- Sudan, Somalia 
and Kenya all are of strategic interest to the US in the 
Middle East and the Indian Ocean.
Ethiopia on the other hand had poor political 
relations with the US and as a result did not have its 
requests for food aid met. In fact when the donors sent 
food to Ethiopia they did so after they were pressured by 
their angered public. Lancaster is cited by M.Li, as 
stating that the US did not send aid to Ethiopia until 
after pressure was brought to bear on the US Government. 
M.Li noted that:
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Although the socialist government had 
appealed for international aid as 
early as 1983, the US Agency for 
international Development( USAID) did 
not send significant quantities of 
food directly until forced by the 
public pressure after the BBC-NBC news 
broadcast in the fall of 1984. 
Allocations by USAID have always been 
closely tied to political 
considerations over the few years, 
that the largest recipients of aid in 
sub-saharan Africa have been Sudan, 
Liberia, Somalia and Kenya- each 
critical to the United States 
strategic interests in the middle east 
and the Indian Ocean.33
The implication of this is that without the pressure 
from the public, Ethiopia stood no chance of getting 
aid from the US. The cool relationship between the two 
states has therefore been an important factor in USG 
reluctance to assist Ethiopia (at least initially). Jack 
Shepherd, lamented on the attitude of the USG when he said:
Having first ignored Ethiopian 
requests for emergency food aid the 
Reagan Administration then denied 
them. Food, it appeared was to be an 
instrument of U.S foreign policy. The 
marxist government was the only 
African nation whose entire U.S food 
aid allotment was eliminated by the 
Reagan Administration in its fiscal 
1984 proposals.34
The British Governments attitude was similar to 
that of the USG. The Government dragged its feet for 
political reasons. Ethiopia falls within a category of 
British Government blacklisted countries. For this reason 
Ethiopia was excluded from all British Government aid
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including food aid. Indeed, at the time of the famine 
there was a general embargo on all government-to- 
government aid between the British and Ethiopian 
Governments.35
Perhaps this was why even after Western governments 
accepted public appeals, the majority of them chose 
channels other than the Ethiopian Government RRC as a sign 
of keeping their distance from that Government.36 
One reason behind the delay of the UK and US 
Governments was the hope that the famine could create 
unrest that would topple the marxist government.37 Short 
of that the delay was intended to "punish" the Ethiopian 
Government.3 8
There was a place for the cold war as well in Western 
donors* aid to Ethiopia. By providing aid more generously 
than the Soviets it was expected that the regime in Addis 
Ababa would appreciate the practical concern given to it 
and hopefully change sides. As one observer elaborated:
Indeed in view of the general 
anti-western stance of the Mengistu 
Government, the only explanation for 
the extent of western aid- described 
as humanitarian- is in fact the cold 
war. The west if possible wants to 
price Mengistu from the Soviet 
grasp- as it sees the situation. This 
is certainly the hope of the 
Americans, but it is not very 
realistic- at least at present"39
Indeed a powerful reason behind the massive US aid 
to Ethiopia was the hope of opening a dialogue with the 
Ethiopian Government and the anticipation of resuming
228
more cordial relations.40 Given the close resemblance of 
the foreign policies of the US and UK Governments towards 
Ethiopia probably the same motive may have been behind the 
UK aid.
Canada's aid on the other hand seemed to be a 
continuation of its aid policy to Ethiopia prior to the 
famine. This is in accord with its tradition of giving 
high priority to third world states. Italy's aid however 
may not be unrelated to the special relationship between 
Italy and Ethiopia. Apart from Libya in the north, Italy's 
former colonies on the continent are all in the Horn of 
Africa. And perhaps that is why after the US, Italy was 
the second largest donor country to Ethiopia over all. 
France's assistance on the other hand was small, compared 
to its aid to the Sahelian countries. It was certainly 
small in comparison to France's economic size and political 
power.
(ii). Eastern Bilateral Donors
If Ethiopia's political opponents have delayed their 
aid for political reasons, Ethiopia's allies were unable to 
accelerate it for economic reasons.
The USSR and its allies are poor donors of food aid. 
USSR food aid to Ethiopia during the relief was the 
equivalent of three percent of US food aid.41 In contrast 
their military hardware aid to Ethiopia between 1977 and 
1984 was $3 billion.42The USSR and Eastern Bloc countries, 
are generally speaking, poor donors of humanitarian aid,
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partly because they are not important producers of 
surplus relief commodities and partly because they do not 
encourage aid in general. Instead they prefer to encourage 
development from within, or when they give aid they prefer 
to render it in areas where they have a competitive 
advantage such as in the areas of military hardware or 
industrial goods like transport.
Furthermore, because they do not make distinction 
between relief and development aid they were able to 
provide assistance to the Ethiopian Government in areas 
that Western governments were hesitant to get involved.
(iii). Non-Governmental Organizations
There were NGOs from the US, UK, Canada, Italy, 
France, West Germany, Belgium, Australia, Finland, Norway 
and Japan. These NGOs were central in shaping the response 
of donor governments especially in the US and the UK. 
However once they arrived in Ethiopia they too became 
influenced with the realities of the relief.
With over sixty four NGOs involved it is difficult 
to follow their operations in depth and to analyse how each 
NGO was influenced in carrying out its relief programme.43
Broadly speaking we can classify all the NGOs into 
two categories: church related NGOs and non-church related 
(secular) organizations. Both lobbied governments and the 
public and raised funds for Ethiopia. Their officials 
criticised reluctant Western governments for their failure 
to respond to the crisis early and pleaded with them to set
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politics aside for the sake of the lives of the starving.44
The secular NGOs appealed to the public to lobby 
their members of Parliament and to pressure their 
Governments to increase their aid. For example dock 
workers in the UK went on strike on the urging of Oxfam, 
and protested against the off loading of EEC grains as a 
symbolic gesture to highlight the Ethiopian cause. The 
British DEC appealed to the British Government and public 
and to the the EEC officials in Brussels for increased food 
aid.
Clearly without the NGOs and public pressure the US 
and British Governments would not have responded to the 
famine in the manner they did after October 1984. In 
Ethiopia the NGOs took charge of the relief operation 
including the administration of the relief camps. They 
provided tents, sheets of plastics to the shelter camps at 
Korem, Makelle, Bati, Alamata, Ibnat and other less 
internationally publicised camps. Together with their 
local trained staff they attended to the needs of the 
camps* populations. They provided health services and 
facilities within the shelter camps such as cooking 
utensils; they undertook the bulk of the grain distribution 
and its administration? they successfully mounted feeding 
programs for the seriously malnourished children and adult 
population and helped overcome the crisis.45
Having overcome the critical phase they initiated 
rehabilitation schemes to put the communities back on their 
feet. Initially they set up food distribution points as
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close to the peoples homes as possible to minimize 
difficulties of access to food. Indeed the NGOs accounted 
for over two-thirds of all the grain distribution during 
the famine. As the situation improved they also supervised 
emptying the camps, by providing the people with seeds, 
equipment, ploughs, oxen and other agricultural goods. 
Having accomplished these tasks they stayed on to 
continue development programmes geared towards tackling 
the root causes of the famines.
(a). Humanitarianism: The basis of NGOs1 Involvement 
The involvement of NGOs in relief is derived 
primarily from their concern with easing the suffering 
endured by the famine victims. As one Oxfam spokesperson 
explains, NGOs are concerned primarily with the welfare of 
people:
Our concern is always with people not 
with governments and we do not see why 
we should refuse to help people just 
because they are unfortunate enough to 
live under regimes which have an odd 
sense of values.46
As such the operational side of relief was carried
out by the NGOs. They undertook the distribution of food
aid and the supplementary feeding of the seriously
malnourished? they attended to the medical and
psychological needs of the camp populations. And after
overcoming the crises they assisted the people in returning
to normal life.
Indeed some of them have been working among the
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people and helping them to overcome hardship even before 
October 1984. For instance the SCF (UK) had a supplementary 
feeding centre in Korem from late 1982 and had already 
provided assistance to over 400,000 children by early 1984 
47? the Irish Concern was already operational at the end 
of 1982 in Wollo and Gondar48 ; the US Catholic Relief 
Service Organization was also operational in Tigray by 1983 
49, as were the US World Vision International relief 
Organization and the Geneva based LWF.
The majority of the NGOs, however, came in response 
to the international appeal for help, after the famine 
had reached catastrophic proportions. Examples of NGOs in 
this category are: Africare, FFHI, SCF (US), CARE Ethiopia, 
JVC, AICL, Canadian Physicians, MSF Belgium and Hope 
International.50 In implementing their relief programmes 
the NGOs, like their bilateral counterparts could not 
completely shake-off other considerations altogether.
(b). The Religious Motive
Starting with the indigenous religious organizations 
there was the EECMY, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the 
Ethiopian Catholic Church. These church organizations 
undertook their operations in their areas of influence or 
where they had their main congregations. Normally these are 
areas where they have been long established. The rationale 
for working mainly in these areas is justified on grounds 
of working among their followers.
According to one relief official, his organization
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was happy to participate in relief although it was not 
willing to receive funds from sources that were at 
variance with its religious persuasion. The relief 
official cited the example of £4 million donated to the 
CRDA. His organization declined to accept any part of the 
donation because the money came from the American Rock 
Musician group-USA for Africa, which they considered to be 
a non religious source of funding.51
The extent to which religion was a major motive in 
the involvement of organizations with a religious 
background is difficult to assess. There was certainly a 
substantial representation of church organizations such 
as: Baptist Mission; Evangelical Church; Seven Day 
Adventist Mission; Jesuit Relief Service; Society of 
International Missionaries; Faith Mission; Church of 
Christ; Mennonite Missions etc etc. Religion certainly 
appears to be an important consideration taken into account 
by some of those who took part in the relief. For instance, 
one relief official told me that even though his primary 
concern was with easing the suffering of the people, he 
was certainly willing to share and exchange his spiritual 
values amongst the people he was working with.52
The factor was certainly important in fashioning the 
working relationship between overseas church groups and 
their Ethiopian counterparts. For instance the bulk of ECS 
received assistance came from the CRS and Caritas 
Interntionalis; that of EECMY came from LWF, while the
A
EOC, got its help mainly from the WCC.53 Similarly the
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choice of Gondar province by the American Joint 
Distribution Committee (AJDC) for its operations was 
motivated in part by the presence there of the Falashas. 
The organization did not work with the Falashas only, 
although by the same token it never worked anywhere outside 
the province. According to its programme officer, the 
reason why it did not mount programmes elsewhere in 
Ethiopia is to do with its philosophy which is focused 
on the social problems of small groups.54
(c). The High Visibility Motive
A number of NGOs had a preference for certain types 
of areas for their work.55 For instance locations that were 
easily accessible to Cameras were areas sought after 
because of the advantages attached to those locations. 
High visibility locations provide viewers back home with 
first hand information about the activities of the NGOs 
on the scene. The importance of this is underlined by the 
effect of the publicity on NGO income. This appears to be 
the case especially with the secular organizations. On the 
other hand, church organizations are happy undertaking 
their relief activities out of the panoramic view of the 
Cameras. Church organizations do not need the Cameras as 
much as the secular NGOs since their source of funds is 
mainly from church donations.
(d). The Economic Factor
Small NGOs avoided areas with heavy logistical
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problems since working in those areas might increase 
their operational costs. As such they preferred areas 
close to the capital where such costs of operations are 
much lower than in regions far away from the centre.56
(e). The Survival Motive
A very important consideration for all the 
organizations was survival. Although most of NGOs 
justification for involvement was the huge relief 
requirements, very few left Ethiopia after the operation 
was over. One known example that folded its operations was 
the small Japanese 24 Hour TV. Even in this case the 
organization was small and so perhaps one of the driving 
motive behind its involvement was the publicity associated 
with the famine. The majority of the NGOs branched into 
development programmes as soon as the relief phase was 
over, as the ultimate solution to the root causes of 
famine.
8. The Western Public
There are difficulties involved in understanding why 
people give in the first instance. As Jordan rightly points 
out the most essential datum remains buried deep in the 
recesses of our nature.57 Individual and family donations 
undoubtedly were made with the utmost of concern for the 
lives of the starving. Pensioners, teachers, miners, 
children and even the unemployed gave generously to coffers 
of the aid agencies. Millions were raised within a matter 
of weeks of launching the appeal.
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The epitome of public concern is no where better 
illustrated than in the involvement of Bob Geldof. Geldof 
himself summed up the individual's reason for involvement. 
He said:
But I can't sit and watch people die 
on my Television. Aid is a perversion 
of an individual's instinct to help 
another suffering human. The simple 
compassionate act of giving a pound to 
help others is without condition and 
is pure. It is never so simple when 
there are billions at stake.58
It is for the same altruistic reasons that the public 
support for the Band Aid and Live Aid appeals were made.
The general public likewise identified with Band Aid and 
Live Aid because they saw in those organizations 
objectives which they themselves identified with. As 
Geldof again pointed out, the public:
began to see Band Aid as something 
which stood for common sense and 
common decency in a world marked by 
self interest.59
Indeed it is precisely because Band Aid, Live Aid 
and Sports Aid represented a moral rather than a political 
constituency that these events attracted people to them and 
ensured their success. As Hamelink acknowledged:
only because of the virtue of being 
apolitical can they get so many people 
together in front of the Television 
and can they get so many people to 
spend so much in this big charity.60
However, not every one that supported the Band Aid 
and Live Aid did so for the same reason. This is the case
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especially with big business organizations. They hoped to 
gain commercially in addition to saving lives. For instance 
the AT & T and Pepsi Cola companies in the US provided 
substantial support to Live Aid (via sponsorships).
Although during the event none of them put out direct 
commercial advertisements it was nevertheless left in the 
minds of viewers that these organizations cared and 
identified with the cause. For AT & T there was an 
additional motive for their involvement. They had just 
broken up with the Bell system and so the Live Aid show 
offered them the opportunity to demonstrate to their 
rivals their capacity to handle a massive 800 telephone 
program. According to AT & T's Public Relations manager the 
show was an opportunity for experimenting with their new 
services as well as a chance to bring their employees 
together to market to their major customers.61
Otis, a small record company, believed that there was 
a publicity benefit in joining Live Aid.62 There were firms 
that also sought tax write offs which their donations 
could bring.63 The majority took part for the glory of the 
cause as an historic event worthy of involvement.64
9. Conclusion
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that both 
Eastern Bloc and Western countries have made significant 
contribution to Ethiopia's appeals for aid although the 
overwhelming response was made by Western bilateral donors. 
At the forefront of the major Western bilateral donors was
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the USG which contributed nearly half a million mt. tonnes 
of emergency food aid between October 84 and September 
1985, and over one-third of the food aid requirement in 
1985/86.65 Translated in monetary terms USG contribution 
was over half a billion dollar out of the two billion 
relief funds given to Ethiopia during the period of the 
relief operation.66
Part of the reasons behind greater Western response 
derives from the acuteness of needs in Ethiopia: the
availability of the needed items in the West and the nature
of the political systems is such that it allows forces 
outside the governmental machinery to influence the 
response of governments to meet Ethiopia's relief 
requirement.
By contrast Ethiopia's allies were not able to
respond to her appeals to the same degree as the West for
both economic and political reasons.
The involvement of Western NGOs on the other hand has 
been guided primarily by the preponderance of the 
humanitarian needs, although in the implementation of their 
programmes other factors such as the need for high 
visibility, the need for survival and religion have also 
featured. In the final analysis it is the response of the 
public that has been most humanitarian baring the 
difficulty of evaluating their motives as highlighted by 
Jordan, that the essential datum remains buried deep in the 
recesses of our minds.67
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CHAPTER NINE
General Conclusion
This thesis has been concerned with studying the 
international response to Ethiopia's famine of 1984-86.
Unlike many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Ethiopia is a country known by the outside world even 
before the European scramble for Africa. It is a country 
with a distinctive history and a long tradition of 
international contact with the outside world. In the 
Introduction we highlighted the country's declining 
international status, contrasting this with its "glorious 
past".
In Part One, we examined the background causes of the 
country's present predicament and noted the scope of 
damage inflicted by the famine on millions among the 
country's population. We also examined the critical role 
played by the media (television) in ending donors' inertia, 
thereby bringing about a large-scale international 
response.
In Part Two we discussed the various responses of 
international donors: first, we examined the response of 
bilateral donors in the context of their international 
relations with the recipient government; we then discussed 
the critical role played by Western non-governmental 
organizations and the public in affecting the response of 
their governments; and lastly, we looked at the essential
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coordinating role played by the UN.
In Part Three (Chapter Eight) we explored the 
relationship between humanitarian aid and politics and 
evaluated the performance of international donors in that 
context.
What emerges from the study is the discrepancy 
between Ethiopia*s expectations of its donors and their 
actual response. It was expected, for example, that 
Ethiopia's Eastern allies would rally around Ethiopia and 
provide the necessary support the country required.
Although they did not offer the degree of support 
expected, there is no doubt that they made their 
contribution to Ethiopia during the crisis. Their 
response is distinguished, however, by their participation 
in certain aspects of the relief operation rather than 
others.
First, the Soviet Union and its allies 
distinguished themselves as key donors of transportation 
assistance rather than of food aid. This is evidenced by 
their response from the very beginning of the relief 
operation. For instance, in the early stages of the 
operation Eastern Bloc countries provided 87% of the 
total land transportation to Ethiopia. In 1985 their 
assistance in this sector constituted 44% of the total. 
However, by 1986 their contribution had dropped to less 
than 5% (the main bulk of the transportation assistance 
was provided by the World Food Programme Transport 
Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE)). Similarly, the Soviet Union
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provided more transport planes than any one country in 
either East or West.
Secondt the East assisted Ethiopia's resettlement 
programme of famine victims from the north to south and 
South-Western parts of the country. Indeed, without this 
support it is doubtful whether Ethiopia could have pursued 
the programme, since most Western countries disassociated 
themselves from it and refused to lend it any support.
As we noted in Chapter Four, part of the objection 
of Western governments to the resettlement programme 
pertained to the lack of adequate preparation made by the 
Ethiopian Government and the manner in which it was 
carrying out the programme. Despite these objections 
Ethiopia's allies rallied their support and assisted the 
Government in tackling difficulties with the programme.
Lastly, Eastern Bloc response is distinguished from
that of the West in terms of their perception of the
problem involved. The East does not differentiate between
development aid and relief assistance. And as a result
their response to Ethiopia was affected by this
perception. In general the East favours long-term
development assistance (even better, development from 
«
within) as an answer to the problem of poverty, over 
relief assistance. It is partly for this reason that the 
allies did not run a programme of their own in terms of 
setting up relief camps and food-distribution points.
By contrast, the Western Bloc countries, that were 
least expected to assist, proved to be the more
246
responsive to Ethiopia's appeals for help. There is,
however, a caveat to be noted here. It is true that
Western Bloc countries were Ethiopia's largest 
benefactors. However, their involvement resulted from 
demands placed on their governments by pressure groups 
and public opinion.
In the case of the three countries we selected for 
detailed study, the evidence presented in the thesis 
suggests that although the USG was Ethiopia's largest 
benefactor, both the USG and UK Governments were slow to
initiate their response in earnest. It was only after the
BBC television footage of October 23 that both governments 
increased their relief. In fact, in the case of the UK, 
government assistance was drawn from the ODA budget. The 
additional element of the Government's aid consisted in 
the RAF's cost of operating the airlift operation.
Of the three, the Canadian Governmental response was 
unique. The Government appointed an Emergency Coordinator 
to coordinate Canada's response, established a special 
fund and introduced the policy of matching every dollar 
raised by the public with an equivalent dollar from the 
Government.
Although Western countries have been Ethiopia's 
largest benefactors, there appear to be differences in the 
manner of their response, arising mainly from differences 
in the nature of interstate relations maintained between 
Ethiopia and these countries. Those countries with which 
Ethiopia had poor relations before the crisis, such as the
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US and UK, demonstrated a reluctance to respond promptly 
to her appeals, while those others such as Canada, with 
which slightly better relations were maintained, showed 
more readiness to come to her rescue. On the whole, 
however, the state of relations did not preclude the West 
from emerging as Ethiopiafs largest donors of relief.
Some reasons for the greater scale of Western aid 
compared with that from the Eastern Bloc countries can be 
derived from the political and economic nature of these 
states. The West is affluent, as a result of which there 
are abundant surpluses of the relevant relief commodities. 
Politically too, there are institutional mechanisms, such 
as the Press and non-governmental organizations, that play 
critical roles in shaping the policies of elected 
governments. It is not, then, the absence of the concept of 
charity per se in the Eastern Bloc that most probably 
dictated their response but rather the absence of these 
societal institutions. The implication of this observation 
is that as the Eastern Bloc countries achieve a greater 
degree of economic and political development, so will their 
perception of and capacity to respond to emergencies be 
affected.
In spite of the scale of Western bilateral response, 
it is apparent that the avoidance of future large scale 
starvation in Ethiopia will be dependent on a number of 
factors. The first is the issue of early response. Famine, 
unlike sudden disasters such as earthquakes and floods can 
be predicted. As such its early warning can at least in
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theory be heeded before disaster strikes. As the 1984-86 
famine bears witness the problem is not that of lack of 
early warning to donors: rather it was the problem of 
convincing donors to believe the warnings sent to them. If 
donors can heed early warning signals from the RRC, FAO, 
their aid agencies or reports from their representatives 
then there will be hope that a repeat of past famines could 
be avoided. One of the reasons for the large-scale 
suffering in 1984 was the failure of donors to respond 
promptly to the appeals made to them. However, this point 
need not be overemphasized since the avoidance of famines 
subsequently (e.g. in 1987, 1988 and 1989) was achieved 
largely through the readiness of Western Governments to 
heed the early appeals made for relief.1 In other words, 
Western governments do appear to have learned something 
from their previous failures.
The advantage of speedy donor response needs to be 
emphasized here even because of its multiple benefits. A 
speedy donor response helps to nijp the tragedy in the bud, 
and thus avoid causing distress to thousands of would be 
victims. It also avoids the cost of mounting expensive 
airlift operations. For instance, the costs of undertaking 
an airlift operation could be avoided when aid is sent in 
good time by sea.
There is also the need to revive the idea of 
maintaining food security reserves in strategic parts of 
the country.2The main advantage offered by this idea is 
that it makes food readily available in the country which
249
could be moved to crisis areas when the need arises. Its 
disadvantage however relates to the cost of maintenance of 
the stock and the associated problems of storage. Overall 
benefits outweigh shortcomings and therefore help to 
strengthen the case for its improvement;! i.e since donors 
would inevitably have to donate in emergency they might 
consider doing so through the stock reserve system rather 
than wait till the problem reaches a crisis point.
Furthermore there is the need for donor states and 
aid agencies to consider the idea of local purchase of food 
from surplus regions of affected countries or from surplus 
producing countries in the same regions for use in the 
famine affected zones.4 The advantage of this approach is 
that it speeds up the transportation process compared to 
importing it from Europe or North America. Additionally it 
encourages local production and boosts the economies of 
these areas.
Second, it appears that the role of Western NGOs is 
critical as far as the initiation of large-scale relief 
operations is concerned, especially if the circumstances 
are such that bilateral donors are hesitant. This given, 
these organizations are indispensable within the field of 
humanitarian relief. On the one hand their publicity drives 
were necessary in developing and sustaining donor 
interest.This is evident from their performance during the 
1984-86 and subsequent famines, in influencing the scope of 
both governments* and public response. It is also in this 
context that the pertinent place of Band Aid and Live Aid,
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is established in terms of raising and sustaining the 
momentum of international interest and response to the 
crisis. On the other, their direct involvement with the 
famine victims in administering relief is irreplaceable.
During the course of the relief operation the NGOs 
distributed more than two-thirds of the emergency aid 
donated to Ethiopia. Without their involvement the degree 
of success of the relief operation would hardly have been 
achieved. In the case of Ethiopia the problem of 
distribution and logistics further underscored the role of 
these organizations. There is the practical problem of 
inadequate infrastructure: the roads are not good, the 
terrain difficult to negotiate and the state of 
transportation services poor. In addition, the ongoing 
political stalemate in parts of the country further 
complicates their role. In spite of these difficulties the 
NGOs performed their tasks.
The role of such programmes as "Band Aid" and "Live 
Aid" might not be a necessary feature were Governments 
(who in the final analysis are the largest donors of 
relief) prepared to respond on time. Where, however, an 
early response to international disaster is lacking, and 
the situation is as desperate as was the 1984 Ethiopian 
case, then the emergence of such organizations will need to 
recur, to fill the vacuum and keep the issue on the 
international agenda until it is resolved.
Finally, and especially in the case of Ethiopia, a 
permanent and lasting solution to famine does not lie in
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continuous international relief but in a firm and 
permanent resolution of the civil war in the north.
However, in view of the fact that the war is not the 
central theme of this thesis its further discussion is 
better left to the experts in that field. One thing is 
certain: it is evident that peace is necessary for the 
avoidance of repeated famines? and (as it appears thus far 
from the histories of these conflicts) only political 
settlements will secure peace.
All these measures however are to be seen in the 
context of undertaking purely humanitarian relief 
operations. These measures are in themselves far from 
enough in being the ultimate solution to the avoidance of 
famine in Ethiopia.
Food aid and food handouts are not enough: they only 
provide stop-gap relief. Indeed the continued provision of 
this kind of aid only serves to underline the failure of 
getting to the root causes of the problem. Clearly what 
Ethiopia (and indeed other affected African countries) 
needs is sustained agricultural reform. If the sector had 
been robust, the issue of relief would not have been there 
in the first place. The chief lesson to learn from this 
rather sordid state of affairs is for both donors and the 
affected states to move away from relief and to focus on 
substantive issues of development. This calls for foreign 
investment and capital and the accompanying technical know­
how that would improve not only the state of agricultural 
production but the general state of the economy. It also
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means the need for better terms of trade for the produce of 
those countries. At the moment the terms of trade are 
unfavourable to these countries. For example in 1974 10 
units of coffee was needed by these countries to buy one 
unit of oil, but today they need 100 units of coffee to buy 
the same measure of oil.5 As Hancock argues the natural 
response of countries such as Ethiopia, in these 
circumstance is to devote more of its good land to coffee 
and other cash crops in order to pay for its imports. In 
the process they end up unable to feed themselves.
Thus a fairer system of trade is called for. Such a 
system would be to the advantage of both the poor and rich 
countries, instead of the stop-gap measures of pumping 
large sums of money into relief or returning to the 
problem after every five or ten years. This is what Bob 
Geldof had in mind when he said:
A healthy continent to our south is 
the best thing that could happen for 
European business. The best. You have 
thriving markets? we would be the ones 
to benefit because we're financially 
stronger. Keeping them in subjugation 
financially is the worst financial 
theory. Even a moron understands that.
When you have things to trade, there 
is no sense in pouring down aid and 
making them dependent.6
This is the lesson to be learned from the crisis. 
Already the lessons of the 1974 crisis seemed to have been 
lost. We should not lose those of 1984. The world has the 
resources and the technical know how to get rid of the 
problem once and for all.7 Whether there is the political
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will to apply the lessons however remains to be seen. As 
the time tested adage reminds us, giving a man a fish is 
akin to giving him a meal for a day, but teaching a man to 
fish is feeding him for life.
In conclusion, what has emerged from the evidence 
presented in this thesis is that, as far as the 1984-86 
Ethiopian famine is concerned, it is Ethiopia's political 
opponents rather than her allies that have been more 
responsive to her appeals for humanitarian assistance, 
even though it took the influence of the Western 
non-governmental organizations and public to bring that 
about.
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1. See The Independent. December 5, 1985 p.14
2. This idea is favoured by many experienced members of 
the relief community I have spoken to. One of such offi­
cials is Brother Augustine Okeefe, Director of the CRDA.
3. According to Gill, the idea was first canvassed in 
1975 and was commended by the FAO of the UN in 1979. See 
Gill P., o p . cit p.36. Due to lack of donor enthusiasm 
the idea still remains far from being given a chance.
4. The Economist. July 20, 1985 p.22
5. Hancock Graham, o p . cit p.122
6. In interview in South Magazine, January 1987, p25
7. It is calculated that 0.002 per cent of the annual 
harvest of cereals would be enough to save 15 million 
lives each year and that no more than 2 per cent of the 
grain grown yearly is what is required to take adequate 
care of the 800 million of world's absolute poor. See, 
South March 1987, pl3.
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APPENDIX I
A. S U M M A R Y  OF MAJOR BILERATAL AID ITEMS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984
Value
(Birr),
FOOD AID ................................................................... 88,852,080
Quant i t y Va1ue
(MT) (Birr)
1.1 Food Grain   222,701 78,222,605
1.2 Supplementary Food   14,945 10,629,475
Total   237,646 88,852,080
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT ............................................................. 2,710,520
Quantity Value
(PCS) (Birr)
2.1 Trucks   78 2,658,520
2.2 Light Vehicles .......................  2 52,000
Total ................................ 75 2,710,520
SPARE PARTS ........................
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY ........
BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS ... . 
SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS 
GRAND TOTAL ........................
2,171,981
1,335,124
681,383
1,718,987
9^,470,075
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I. FOOD AID RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organisation
Food Grain Supplementary Food Total
Quantity
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr
1 China 1,000 350,000 _ 1,000 350,000
2 Yemen Arab Republic 25 8,805 4 3,195 29 12,000
3 WFP 65,164 22,807,400 2,814 1,997,940 67,978 24,805,340
4 EEC 73,000 25,550,000 3,400 2,414,000 76,400 27,964,000
5 France 6,095 2,133,250 - - 6,095 2,133,250
6 Canada 51,576 18,051,600 510 362,100 52,086 18,413,700
7 USSR 3,100 1,085,000 - - 3,100 1,085,000
8 Italy 770 546,700 219 155,490 989 702,190
9 PDRY 1,531 535,850 - - 1,531 535,850
10 Libya 40 14,000 - - 40 14,000
11 UK 6,500 2,275,000 39 27,690 6,539 2,302,690
12 GDR 230 80,500 2,234 1,586,140 2,464 1,666,640
13 Yugoslavia 210 73,500 - - 210 73,500
14 Dem. Peoples Republic of Korea 1,005 351,750 - - 1,005 351,750
15 UNHCR 500 175,000 - - 500 175,000
16 Cuba - - 4,588 3,257,480 4,588 3,257,480
17 Jordan - - 17 12,070 17 12,070
18 Czechos1ovaki a - - 8 5,680 8 5,680
19 Bulgaria - - 13 9,230 13 9,230
20 Hungary - - 33 23,430 33 23,430
21 Japan - - 94 66,740 94 66,740
22 Saudi Arabia 486 170,100 168 119,280 654 289,380
23 Iran - - 97 68,870 97 68,870
24 FRG 10,119 3,541,650 38 26,980 10,157 3,568,630
25 Greece - - 154 109,340 154 109,340
26 UNICEF - - 442 313,820 442 313,820
27 Switzerland 1,350 472,500 73 70,000 1,423 542,500
Total 222,701 78,222,605 14,945 10,629,475 237,646 80,852,080
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D. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization
T R U C K S T R A I L 0 R S LIGHT VEHICLES
pcs Value in Birr pcs Value in Birr pcs Value in Birr
1 German Democratic Republic 35 1,575,000 - - -
2 Republic of Korea 30 618,690 - - -
3 UNHCR - - - 1 25,000
4 FRG 8 464,830 - 1 27,000
TOTAL 73 2,658,520 - 2 52,000
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APPENDIX II
B. SUMMARY OF MAJOR BILATERAL AID ITEMS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
II.
Ill .
IV.
V.
VI.
VII
VIII
IX.
X.
FOOD AID
1.1 Food Grain ..... .
1.2 Supplementary Food 
Total ..........
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
2.1 Trucks .....
2.2 Trailors
2.3 Light Vehicles 
Total .....
Quant ity 
(M T )  
362,999
34,960
397,959
Quant ity 
(PCS) 
849
164
69
10 82
SPARE PARTS ..........................................
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY ..........................
BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS ......................
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IMPLEMENTS & INPUTS ..........
SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS ..............
CONSTRUCTION, WATER & POWER SUPPLY MATERIALS & EQUIPMENT
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT ..............................
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS ...................................
Value
(Birr)
170,400,810
37,324,257
207,725,067
Value
(Birr)
39,553,813
4,099,318
1,356,603
45,009,734
GRAND TOTAL
Value
IBirrl
207,725,067
45,009,734
4,541,316
6,903,812
5,242,481
6,266,198
2,711,675
9,170,612
987,612
461,933
289,020,618
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I. FOOD AID RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organisation
Food Grain Supplementary Food Total
Quant itv 
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr
1 Austria 4,000 2,120,000 55 39,192 4,055 2,159,192
2 Australia 4,400 2,332,000 25 76,875 4,425 2,408,875
3 Bulgaria 17,011 9,030,853 821 2,534,046 17,832 11,564,889
4 Canada 24,510 5,550,250 - - 24,510 5,555,250
5 China 22,257 6,843,889 - - 22,257 6,843,889
6 Czechos1ovaki a 14 10,045 242 578,551 256 588,596
7 EEC 107,000 55,815,360 2,830 3,198,820 109,830 59,014,180
8 France 1,097 584,701 8 4,592 1,105 589,293
9 Federal Republic of Germany 11,140 5,907,263 246 506,350 11,386 6,413,613
10 Gabon 150 98,400 75 115,927 225 214,327
11 Greece 6,491 3,460,995 1,202 1,759,310 7,693 5,220,305
12 Hungary 1,006 536,198 1,559 1,372,168 2,565 1,908,366
13 India 10,000 5,300,000 - - 10,000 5,300,000
14 Italy 3,782 2,713,586 955 3,379,425 4,737 6,093,011
15 Japan - - 6 18,450 6 18,450
16 Pakistan 1,000 717,500 - - 1,000 717,500
17 PDRY - - 2 6,970 2 6,970
18 Poland 870 2,152,500 100 270,000 980 2,422,500
19 Republic of Korea 1,005 351,750 - - 1,005 351,750
20 Romania 588 313,404 - - 588 313,404
21 Spain 48 27,626 265 366,764 313 394,390
22 Sri Lanka - - 18 5,330 18 5,330
23 Switzerland - - 27 83,025 27 83,025
24 Sweden 10,000 5,300,000 10,000 5,300,000
SUB TOTAL 226,369 109,171,320 8,446 14,£15,795 234,815 123,487,115
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Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organisation
Food Grain Supplementary Food Total
Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr Quantity
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr
25 United Kingdom 5,000 2,650,000 . . 5,000 2,650,000
26 United States of America 40,222 21,317,660 10,046 7,207,006 50,268 28,524,666
27 USSR 7,045 5,054,788 - - 7,045 5,054,788
28 Yugoslavia 71 53,095 325 974,980 396 1,028,075
29 Band Aid 22,393 4,667,518 - - 22,393 4,667,518
30 UNICEF - - 1,432 4,668,447 1,432 4,668,447
31 WFP 39,786 17,936,220 5,273 3,954,810 45,059 21,891,030
32 Belgium - - 19 13,490 19 13,490
33 German Democratic Republic 336 179,088 1,985 6,007,279 2,321 8,186,367
34 Netherlands 4,995 2,647,350 26 79,950 5,021 2,727,300
35 Zimbabwe 12,550 6,651,500 - - 12,550 6,651,500
36 SOS Enfats San Frontiers 100 39,071 - - 100 39,071
37 Polish Cath. Episc. Relief Com. 132 33,200 - - 132 33,200
38 Africa with Love - - 16 102,500 16 102,500
Grand Total 362,999 170,400,810 34,960 37,324,257 397,959 207,725,067
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H. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't 
or Organisation
TRUCKS TRAILORS LIGHT VEHICLES T 0 T A L
Qu(pcs) Value (Birr) Qu(pcs) Value (Birr) Qu(pcs) Value (Birr) Qu(pcs) Value (Birr)
1 Austria 19 950,000 - - - - 19 950,000
2 Bulgaria 10 788,000 12 210,000 - - 22 998,000
3 Czechoslovakia 34 397,600 - - - - 34 397,600
4 FRG 128 10,537,184 - - 10 200,000 138 10,737,184
5 Italy 198 16,830,000 115 2,875,000 18 324,000 531 20,029,000
6 Japan 3 35,773 - - 10 156,043 13 191,816
7 OPEC Fund 33 3,300,000 - - - - 33 3,300,000
8 Romania 80 9,500,000 - - - - 80 9,500,000
9 UK - - 30 817,128 12 300,000 42 1,117,128
10 USSR 300 15,000,000 - -  ■ 9 180,000 309 15,180,000
11
12
GDR
Menschen fur 
Men. Foundation
35
7
1,575,000
616,394 7 197,190 - -
35
14
1,575,000
813,584
13 Mitsubishi Motors 2 23,862 - - 4 51,452 6 75,314
14 J.H. Rayner - - - - 1 20,121 1 20,121
15 Ethiopian Comm, 
in Italy - - - - 5 124,987 5 124,987
TOTAL 849 59,553,813 164 4,099,318 69 1,356,603 1,082 65,009,734
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APPENDIX m
C. SUMMARY OF MAJOR BILERATAL AID ITEMS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
(Birr)
I.
II
Quant ity Value
, . (MT) (Birr)
1.1 Food Grain ................ .....  276,671 109,505,315
1.2 Supplementary Food ......... .....  8,120 12,478,066
Total .................... .....  284,791 121,983,381
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT .............
Quant ity Value
(PCS) (Birr)
2.1 Trucks .................... .....  210 16,192,171
2.3 Trailors ................ .....  130 4,455,350
2.3 Light Vehicles ............. .....  21 451,142
Total .................... .....  361 21,098,669
121,983,381
21,098,669
III. SPARE PARTS ......................................
IV. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY .......................
V. BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS ....................
VI. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IMPLEMENT & INPUTS .........
VII SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS .............
VIII. CONSTRUCTION, WATER & POWER SUPPLY MATERIALS & EQUIPMENT
IX. OFFICE EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY .......................
1,772,617
9,893,521
397,625
1,643,808
351,189
1,240,072
30,308
GRAND TOTAL 158,411,190
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I. FOOD AID RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organisation
Food Grain Supplementary Food Total
Quantity
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr Quant ity 
(MT)
Value in Birr
1 Austria 4,000 1,396,000 4,000 1,396,000
2 Australia 5,800 2,494,000 50 153,000 5,850 2,647,000
3 Canada 47,500 14,951,042 - - 47,500 14,951,042
4 China 2,024 838,011 - - 2,024 838,011
5 EEC 121,361 54,369,728 600 998,600 121,961 55,363,328
6 France 8,000 4,194,947 - -  ■ 8,000 4,194,947
7 Italy - - 2,304 1,679,360 2,304 1,679,360
8 India 4,000 1,400,000 - -  ■ 4,000 1,400,000
9 Sweden 9,000 4,593,392 - -  ■ 9,000 4,593,392
10 Zimbabwe 12,246 4,286,100 - -  ■ 12,246 4,286,100
11 WFP 60,726 20,080,983 3,657 6,786,115 64,383 26,867,098
12 Greece - - 16 731,445 16 731,455
13 Band Aid 979 342,650 428 303,880 1,407 646,530
14 To Africa with Love 39 112,750 - -  ■ 39 112,750
15 Medicin Sans Frontirs - France - - 16 4,800 16 4,800
16 UNHCR 996 445,712 1,049 1,825,866 2,045 2,271,578
Total 276,671 109,505,315 8,120 12,479,066 284,791 121,983,391
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H. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization
T R U C K S T R A 1 L 0 R S LIGHT VEHICLES
pcs Value in Birr pcs Value in Birr pcs Value in Birr
1 Austria - - - - 1 30,847
2 Italy 2 30,400 28 455,000 - -
3 UK 2 70,000 - - - -
4 USSR - - - - 9 155,000
5 UNHCR - - - - 2 85,857
6 Mennonite Mission in 
Ethiopia - - - - 1 15,533
7 WTOE 206 16,091,777 102 4,000,350 8 163,905
TOTAL 210 16,192,177 130 4,455,350 21 451,142
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m. THE VALUE OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT &  SUPPLY RECEIVED
BY THE RRC IN 1984
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Be1g i um 150,000
2 FRG 175,600
3 Italy 188,400
4 Japan 38,465
5 Po1 and 782,609
TOTAL 1,335,124
IV. THE VALUE OF BLANKETS. CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984
Ser
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Czechos1ovaki a 36,000
2 Greece 34,000
3 GDR 68,000
4 EEC 340,000
5 Sweden 170,000
6 Yugoslavia 20,276
7 Saudi Arabia 13,107
TOTAL 681,383
267
THE VALUE OF SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984
Ser
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Saudi Arabia 1,405,485
2 FRG 5,000
3 Greece 308,502
TOTAL 1,718,987
II1. VALUE OF SPARE PARTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 FRG 257,414
2 Canada 806,587
3 Sweden 936,160
4 Italy 171,820
TOTAL 2,171,981
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THE VALUE OF SPARE PARTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov’t or Organization Value in Birr
1 Austria 18,000
2 Czechoslovakia 8,100
3 EEC 11,307
4 Federal Republic of Germany 1,013,975
5 Italy 1,527,580
6 Japan 339,877
7 Republic of Korea 4,670
8 Romania 1,156,000
9 Sweden 3,600
10 UK 304,792
11 UNDRO 28,770
12 Germany Democratic Republic 95,900
13 USSR 28,745
14 CRIAA - Paris 19,117
TOTAL 4,541,316
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in. THE VALUE OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED BY THE RRC
IN 1985
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Czechos1ovaki a 1,210,650
2 Egypt 325,000
3 Federal Republic of Germany 3,505,093
4 Greece 26,000
5 Hungary 8,450
6 Italy 165,000
7 Japan 457,150
8 Romania 114,000
9 Spain 69
10 German Democratic Republic 67,275
11 Bulgaria 1,000,000
12 CRIAA - Paris 5,125
13 ARO KAHSAI WIGIROGIS 20,000
TOTAL 6,903,812
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IV. THE VALUE OF BLANKETS. CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS RECEIVED BY
THE RRC IN 1985
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Bulgaria 360,452
2 China 170,000
3 Czechoslovakia 362,862
4 France 288,000
5 Federal Republic of Germany 682,320
6 Greece 44,055
7 Hungary 85,000
8 Po1and 164,604
9 Republic of Korea 136,948
10 Spain 42,840
11 United Kingdom 869,040
12 United States of America 65,620
13 USSR 139,000
14 Japan 9,820
15 German Democratic Republic 1,563,220
16 Netherlands 258,700
TOTAL 5,242,481
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V. THE VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IMPLEMENT & INSPECTS
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Bulgaria 420,000
2 China 71,943
3 Italy 813,240
4 Kenya 24,000
5 Romania 4,000,000
6 United Kingdom 129,600
7 Germany Democratic Republic 563,550
8 Church of Sweden in Denmark 4,159
9 Mirror Group 239,706
TOTAL 6,266,198
VI. THE VALUE OF SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS RECEIVED
BY THE RRC IN 1985
’ Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Czechos1ovaki a 64,800
2 Gederal Republic of Germany 698,400
3 Greece 588,960
4 Po1and 36,900
5 United States of America 18,000
6 USSR 349,850
7 German Democratic Republic 954,765
TOTAL 2,711,675
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Vn. THE VALUE OF CONSTRUCTION. WATER & POWER SUPPLY MATERIALS
& EQUIPMENT
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Bulgaria 2,675,120
2 Federal Republic of Germany 9,500
3 Hungary 40,600
4 Italy 1,108,660
5 Japan 238,478
6 Romania 360,000
7 USSR 4,566,082
8 UNICEF 82,556
9 Mirror Group 89,794
TOTAL 9,170,790
HE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION EOUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE
IN 1985
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Federal Republic of Germany 500
2 Hungary 865,000
3 United Kingdom 118,921
4 UNDRO 3,191
TOTAL 987,612
IX. THE VALUE OF MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS: RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Daily Mirror 139,620
2 Band Aid 322,313
TOTAL 461,933
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THE VALUE OF SPARE PARTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Austria 2,729
2 EEC 106,612
3 FRG 19,110
4 Italy 1,059,796
5 Republic of Korea 746
6 Sweden 23,700
7 USSR 60,350
8 UNDRO 28,770
9 WTOE 445,028
10 Olympia Obitrous 2,500
11 MSF - France 21,675
12 Menschen fur Menschen Foundation 1,392
13 Netherlands 209
Total 1,772,617
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m. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Italy 9,359,700
2 USSR 4,000
3 Orphans Re 1ief Fund 256,081
4 Dr. Tadesse Adnew 5,520
5 Yugoslavia 227,220
6 India 41,000
Total 9,893,521
IV. BLANKETS. CLOTHING & FOOTWEAR RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 UNICEF 19,680
2 UNHCR 48,150
3 China 37,200
4 Greece 292,595
Total 397,625
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V. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY. IMPLEMENTS & INPUTS RECEIVED BY THE
RRC IN 1986
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 UK 149,852
2 Band Aid 789,250
3 UNICEF 66,133
4 WFP 364,910
5 Crown Agents 85,734
6 Fin.- Eth. Friendship Soc. 110,000
7 Netherlands 11,796
8 UNHCR 66,133
Total 1,643,808
VI. SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS RECEIVED BY THE RRC
IN 1986
’ Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 UNICEF 7,000
2 UNHCR 138,107
3 MSF - France 1,600
4 Menschen fur Menschen Foundation 32,239
5 Italy 100,000
6 FRG 6,000
Total 351,189
VH. CONSTRUCTION. WATER & POWER SUPPLY EQUIPMENT & MATERIAL
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
Ser. 
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Finland 4,475
2 Japan 139,074
3 UNHCR (for their own project) 70,045
4 Ethiopian Evangelical Church 
Mekane Yesus 85,000
5 EEC 791,939
6 Netherlands 149,539
Total 1,240,072
Vm. OFFICE EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986
Ser.
No. Donor Gov't or Organization Value in Birr
1 Finland 2,308
2 UNICEF 28,000
Total 30,308
APPENDIX IV
Non-Governmental Organizations Involved in Relief And
Development in Ethiopia.
1. Adventist,Development and Releif Agency (ADRA).
2. AFRICARE.
3. Agri Service.
4. American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC).
5. Air Service International
6. Action International Contre La Faim (AICF).
7. Baptist Mission of Ethiopia(BME).
8. Baptist General Conference Mission (BGCM).
9. Canadian Physicians for Medical Aid in Africa.
10. CARE Ethiopia.
11. Christian Reliefs Development Association (CRDA).
12. Christoffell Blinden Mission (CBM).
13. Catholic Relief Serrvices (CRS).
14. Church of Christ (COC).
15. CONCERN.
16. Espoir Ethiopia.
17. Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS).
18. Ethiopian Orthodox Church (DICAD).
19. Ethiopian Cooperative Union of the Blind.
'!
20. Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY).
21. Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS).
22. Faith Mission.
23. Feed The Children International Ministries (FCIM).
24. Food For The Hungary International (FFHI).
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25. Finnish Mission.
26. German Agro Action
27. Hope Enterprises.
28. Hope International
29. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
30. Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC).
31. Jerusalem Memorial of Ethiopian Believers.
32* Jesuit Relief Services.
33. Joint Relief Partnershiop.
34. Kale Heywet Church Development Programme.
35. League of Red Cross and Crescent Societies (LRCCS).
36. L'Esperance Children Aid.
37. Lutheran World Federation.
38. Medicins Sans Frontieres/Belgique.
39. Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA).
40. Mennonite Mission in Ethiopia.
41. Menchen fur Menschen.
42. Missionaries of Charity.
43. Norwegian Church Aid.
44. Norwegian Lutheran Mission.
45. Norwegian Save the Children (Redd Barna).
46. OXFAM U.K.
47. OXFAM U.S.
48. Ryder Cheshire Foundation for the Relief of 
Suffering.
49. Save the Children Fund U.K.
50. Save the Children Fund U.S.
51. Secours Populaire Francais.
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52. Society of International Missionaries (SIM).
53. SOS Enfants Sans Frontiers.
54. SOS Children's Village in Ethiopia.
55. St. Mathew's Church.
56. Swedish Save the Children (Redd Barna).
57. Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission.
58. Swiss Evangelical Nile Mission.
59. Terra des Hommes Lausanne.
60. Terra des Homme Netherlands.
61. 24 Hour TV Charity-NTV.
62. World University Service of Canada.
63. World Vision International.
64. World Missionary Evangelism of Ethiopia.
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Interviews conducted with officials of donor governments, 
represented in Addis Ababa.
Beton Elizabeth, Premier Conseiller, Ambassade de France, 
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Cantini Giampaolo, Italian Embassy, August 8, 1988.
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Caron Olivier, Premier Secretaire Pres Ambassade de 
France, July 20, 1988.
Cherny I.Yuri, Embassy of the USSR July 14 and 29, 1988.
Godwin P. Ruth, Australian Embassy, July 11, 1988.
Flanagan Peter and Colin Cooper, of British Embassy 
November 27, 1988.
Florida Peggy, Canadian Embassy, August 10, 1988.
Helding Alexander, The Charge D1Affaires, Royal 
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Janowski F. Louis Jr, The US Charge D'Affaires, August 3, 
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Sanchez Manuel, representative of Cuba for cooperation 
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Interviews with representatives of NGOs in Addis Ababa
Al-Kehler, Food For The Hungry International, July 13, 
1988.
Angela Roberts, Save The Children Federation (US),
August 18,1988.
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Ato Abate and Ato Tekele, Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, 
August 4, 1988.
Mr. Bornstein, American Joint Distribution Committee, 
August 21, 1988.
Brother Augustine Okeefe, Christian Relief And 
Development Association, July 22, 1988.
David Macaulay, Society of International Missionaries, 
July 18, 1988.
Fr. Jac Ermers, Terre Sw Hommes, Netherlands July 12, 
1988.
James Atkinson, Care Ethiopia, July 6, 1988.
Jim Maud, Save The Children Fund, UK, August 21, 1988.
Joeffrey H.Baron, Africare, July 6, 1988.
Fr. John Finucane, Field Director, Irish Concern, August 
4, 1988.
Goeff Loane, International Committee of the Red Cross, 
July 15, 1988.
Lawrence Hernett, League of Red Cross and Red Crescent
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Mesfin Hallofin, Ethiopian Red Cross, August 10, 1988. 
Tsega Wolde Mariam, World Vision, August 17, 1988. 
William Day, Oxfam UK, August 9, 1988.
Interviews and Discussions with RRC officials
Alemayo Fullas, Head of NGO desk, August 19, 1988.
Ato Getachew Ayalew, RRC Regional Representative at
Asossa, September 3, 1988.
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Ato Getachew Tesfaye, Head of Bilateral desk, August 17, 
1988.
Girina Kebede, Head of UN agencies desk, August 17, 1988.
Mr. Tamrat Kebede, Head, Aid Coordination and Public 
Relations. Discussions.
Tigdis Alemu, Head of Domestic Aid and NGOs, August 19, 
1988.
Sisay Yesus, Zone Coordinator office of Relief 
Operations, August 23, 1988.
Interviews with settlers through the RRC Regional
Representative and his Assistant, Ato Tesfaye 
Yimer, at Settlement units number 10, 11, 32 and 
33, September 3-5, 1988.
Interviews with UNs officials
Mr. Malcolm Ridout, field officer, UN's EPPG, 1988.
Mr. Michael Priestly, The Resident Representative, UNDP, 
July 22, 1988.
Mr. Paavo Pitkanen, UN'S EPPG office, July 9, 1988.
Other Interviews and meetings.
Kiflom Adgoi, Editor of Ethiopian Herald. Discussions.
Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam. Discussion, July 20, 88.
Professor Richard Pankhurst. Discussions.
Shimelis Adugna, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
and former Commissioner of the RRC, July 18, 88.
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Television Documentaries watched at the Audio-Visual
Centre RRC.
11A fight for survival”, FAO.
"African Cavalry", 1985.
"Aid to Ethiopia", July 1984.
BBC's Reports on Korem and Makelle, 1984. 
BBC's"Walaita Report", July 1984.
"Bitter Harvest", October 1984.
CBC-TV News.
"Consuming Hunger", February 1987.
"Crisis in Africa".
"Dawn of Hope", 1985.
"Diverse Reports", October 1985.
"Ethiopian Emergency".
"Ethiopian Emergency",1987.
"Ethiopian Famine", 1984.
"Ethiopian Reports", December 1985.
"Famine in Ethiopia", November 1984. 
"Fighting Famine", August 1985.
"Fragile future" FAO, October 1985.
"Geldof back to Ethiopia", November 1987.
ITN's Inserts-"News at Ten".
"Politics of Starvation".
"Seeds of Despair", 1985.
"Seeds of Hope" Episode 1-6.
"Split Screen".
297
